CHRISTIANITY AND THE STATE

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INTRODUCTION: THE NEED FOR A THEOLOGY OF THE STATE

EVOLUTIONARY THOUGHT HAS ACCUSTOMED US TO THINK OF POLYtheism, the belief in many gods or forces, as a mark of primitive cultures emerging out of animism. Polytheism is ostensibly succeeded by monotheism, and monotheism by science and reason. This construction is not historical; it is, moreover, philosophical and mythological.

Polytheism seems rather to mark a culture in decay, and an atomistic society. When, not long after World War II, Dr. Clark Kerr denied the concepts of a universe and a university in favor of a multiverse and a multiversity, he espoused polytheism. Instead of a unified cosmos and a truth binding in all times and places, reality became a mass of conflicting forces, relevances, and limited and purely utilitarian and instrumental truths. The cosmos ceased from this viewpoint to be either the magnificent order of the omnipotent and triune God, or the marvelous machine of earlier scientists. Instead, like the city dump, it became a miscellaneous and meaningless collection of a vast number of partial and obsolete semblances of order, all meaning nothing. This is the world of polytheism: it knows no overall truth and order, only fragments and limited connections in the shambles of time and space. Polytheism is a fact of cultural decay and collapse.

A key fact, thus, of polytheism is that at best the area and scope of

meaning is severely limited. There is no universal scope, sway, or meaning in the world of polytheism, except by imperialistic aggression. From Alexander the Great to the present, the world of polytheism has no means of a common truth and order except by imperialistic conquest. In such a world, neither order nor meaning have a universal sway; hence, force tries to bind those factors which are held to lack the cohesiveness of truth and a common creator.

As a result, polytheistic religion keeps to its own corner. Zeus, Venus, Mercury, Apollo, and the other "gods" made no attempt to gain either exclusive or universal jurisdiction. Moreover, even within the narrow limits of the Athens city-state, none of the "gods" attempted to control the state, education, or sexual life. The "gods" did not prescribe either an economic nor a political order. Polytheistic religion is more prone to demanding gifts and bribes for the temple than to making claims over men and nations.

Thus, whenever and wherever a religion becomes polytheistic, it ceases to be catholic and to make universal claims. It then limits its jurisdiction to a corner of life, and it is content with crumbs from the rest.

Now, with the rise of the Enlightenment, the churches of Europe began to limit their spheres severely. It can be argued with good cause that the churches had overstepped their boundaries at times. There is a very important distinction at this point. The church, in terms of Scripture, has no jurisdiction and control over other institutions and spheres of life except a "spiritual" one, i.e., the proclamation and application of God's Word and authority to every realm. To limit the church, however, emphatically cannot and does not mean the limitation of Christianity and the triune God. Rather, the church must declare that every sphere of life must be under the rule of God's Word and under the authority of Christ the King.

Put very, very simply, this means that a man must be a Christian in church, home, school, state, vocation, and all of life. In going from one sphere to another, a man does not move from the realm of Christ, to that of Mammon, Baal, Molech, or any other "god." Similarly, neither the school, state, nor any other order of life can exempt itself from the catholic or universal sway of God's rule and law. It is a sin to steal, bear false witness, or have other gods wherever we are.

With the Enlightenment, the churches limited their sphere, and God's sphere, to the spiritual realm. Before long, God became the absentee landlord of the physical universe. Tithing, for example, moved from a general and necessary requirement to a voluntary and increasingly more infrequent

practice. Less and less could the "spiritual" realm, God, command the "material" realm, the state and economics.

Polytheism was born, thus, within the church. The work of Jesus Christ was progressively limited to soul-saving, and, with the steady rise of Arminianism, even here man gave an assist to God.

As a result, the cosmic Christ was traded for a polytheistic Christ, and the Bible was read, not as God's law-word, but as a devotional book for pietists. The state (and most of life) was thus "freed" from God to follow a humanistic course. Humanism, as the new catholicism, began to claim the school and all other agencies and institutions, until humanism too began to decay within and thus resort to force to gain its will without, i.e., in the physical world of men and nations.

The God of Scripture, however, as the Lord and Creator of heaven and earth, claims and has absolute and total jurisdiction over every area of life and thought. For any area to claim independence from God is revolution and sin. It is an even more serious offense for Christ's church to deny the universal jurisdiction of Christ the King. Such a step adds treason to revolution, and it incurs and invites the wrath of Almighty God.

A theology of the state is thus a Biblical necessity. God as creator declares Himself to be the sovereign over all men and nations; His law has universal sway. The nations are summoned in Psalm 2 to cease their conspiracies and wars against Him and His law, or, failing to do so, to be smashed in pieces like a potter's vessel by a rod of iron. Jesus Christ is proclaimed "King of Kings, and Lord of Lords" (Rev. 19:16).

A Christian theology of the state must challenge the state's claims of sovereignty or lordship. Only Jesus Christ is Lord or Sovereign, and the state makes a Molech of itself when it claims sovereignty (Lev. 20:1–5).

The church of the twentieth century must be roused out of its polytheism and surrender. The crown rights of Christ the King must be proclaimed.

2

RELIGION AND THE STATE

PROBLEMS OFTEN CANNOT BE ANSWERED OR RESOLVED BECAUSE THE problem itself is never clearly recognized. Too often, attempts to formulate a problem preclude an answer. A classic example of this is the so-called problem of free will. The question of free will can never be resolved until it is recognized that because man is a secondary cause, i.e., he is not God, his will can only have a secondary, conditioned, and contingent freedom. Man is not free to decide the time of his birth nor his race or sex, nor can he choose to grow younger instead of older. At every point his life is circumscribed, and he himself is a consequence of many causes. God alone has absolute and primary freedom. When we recognize that man is a secondary cause and not capable of an absolute or primary free will, then it is possible for us to define secondary freedom and to understand the nature of man's will. Until then, the problem of free will cannot be defined or understood because it has not been formulated for understanding and resolution.

The same is true of the so-called problem of church and state. The term refers to a tension within society which is very real and which has long troubled most nations. The tension is particularly strong in the twentieth century and requires attention and resolution. However, the term "church and state" simply serves to obscure rather than present the problem. This fact has been too seldom recognized, although Wilson calls attention to it in part:

> When defined in this fashion it is apparent that in one respect the phrase "Church and State" is unfortunate because its connotations are excessively formalistic. It suggests that there is one spiritual authority structure confronting a single temporal authority structure. There have been periods in western history when such a model would have been a plausible description of the existing pattern and certainly useful for purposes of analysis. In fact the colonial period of our history exhibits attempts to realize classical kinds of relationships between a single spiritual authority structure — and a single temporal authority — the Colonial State. But our colonial period also illustrates how different sorts of ingredients in American society, i.e., ethnic diversity and evangelical separatism worked to outmode classical Church-State patterns.[1]

> It ought to be equally obvious that there is no single authority structure to embody the temporal life of America — i.e., a single state is no more an empirical reality than a single church. Like religious pluralism, governmental pluralism involves on one level simply the multiplicity of authorities which possess overlapping jurisdictions within our society. Thus federal, state, county and local governments are juxtaposed and all contribute to the structuring of the common life. Sometimes they are mutually reinforcing; on other occasions they counterbalance each other . . . Accordingly the term "Church and State" breaks down completely if the attempt is made to use it in a traditional fashion.[2]

There is more than a little merit to Wilson's contention. "Church and State" no longer is a valid phrase for the description of the problem. At one point, disagreement with Wilson is possible; increasingly, as the U.S. Supreme Court asserts the jurisdiction of federal decisions for every local branch of civil government, it becomes possible to speak of the state at least as a unity.

Wilson's historical summary of the six phases of the problem is a good one, although his analysis of the most recent phase, since World War I, can be seriously argued. The development can be simplified to three basic phases: *first*, there was, in the colonial period, a policy of establishment. A single church, or sometimes more than one denomination in a state,

was established and financially supported by the state. The *second* phase began also in the colonial period, the disestablishment of churches and the establishment of Christianity as a religion (i.e., a religious rather than an ecclesiastical establishment). The United States was held to be a Christian nation, with no church given any legal status over another. The *third* phase, which developed rapidly after World War I but began after the Civil War, insists on an ostensible neutrality of the state towards religion with religious liberty for the churches. Wilson's documentation of the history of the American development is an able one, but it tends to overlook the basic issue.

The medieval formulation of the problem is still with us, and to view the tension in traditional "Church-State" terms, as Wilson does, is to miss the contemporary problem and to revert to a now obsolete imperial papal debate. The papacy and the empire, as well as the papacy in conflict with the nations, sought to institutionalize the problem. Both parties were agreed that a Christian order was a necessity. True, individual rulers at times were hostile to such an order, and Frederick II clearly had a non-Christian order in mind, but for the most part, the issue was not a Christian versus a pagan order, but who should have predominance and priority in the control and maintenance of a Christian social order. This, historically, is the "Church-State" problem. Increasingly, the "Church-State" problem in this sense is either marginal, irrelevant, or nonexistent in the modern era. *First*, the state is less concerned with furthering a Christian social order and is often hostile to it. In brief, the state has simply walked away from this historic problem of Christendom. *Second*, less and less is there a single church in any Western country claiming the right of establishment. In some countries where an established church exists, there is no support for that church from tax funds, and no legal recognition of Christian order in the courts, while a control remains over the appointment of bishops and other church officers. In no historic sense is the ancient struggle between church and state for priority in a social order a problem in modern society. *Third*, there is no agreement on either the ecclesiastical or civil fronts that a Christian social order is the necessary one. Very often, there is a general assent to a claimed and supposed "neutrality" on the part of the state. *Fourth*, increasingly, religious liberty is being replaced by religious toleration. The difference is very important. Religious liberty has meant, historically, the freedom of the church and of the believer in his worship from state control and jurisdiction. It has meant that the state cannot interfere in a sphere where

it has no authority nor jurisdiction any more than it can interfere with the internal affairs of a foreign power. Religious toleration has meant that the state claims the right to govern and control religion and to declare which church or which religion has the right to exist. Religious toleration places the power in the hands of the state. The original constitutional pattern was religious liberty, not toleration.

It should be added, moreover, that the original constitutional settlement did not propose a "separation of Church and State," although that phrase is increasingly used by the courts to sum up the constitutional position.[3] Because all the states had their own religious settlements or establishments, the First Amendment simply barred Congress or the federal government from entering into an area where jurisdiction was reserved to the states. The states had the right to make such establishments or settlements as they or their subordinate bodies, the counties and cities, chose to make. Only after the Fourteenth Amendment was interpreted by the Supreme Court to apply to all states was there a denial of the power of the states to make such establishments.[4] To return to the so-called problem of "Church and State," there is no possibility of any resolution of the basic issue until the question is properly formulated. To speak of a church and state problem is to foreclose any solution.

What, then, is the basic problem? Not only is every church a religious institution, but every state or social order is a religious establishment. Every state is a law order, and every law order represents an enacted morality, with procedures for the enforcement of that morality. Every morality represents a form of theological order, i.e., is an aspect and expression of a religion. The church thus is not the only religious institution; the state also is a religious institution. More often than the church, the state has been the central religious institution of most civilizations through the centuries. The war between the Roman Empire and the early church was a religious warfare, a struggle between two claimants who represented rival religions and wanted to order society in terms of their faith.[5] The claims of each faith were total claims, as all religious claims are. Thus, American Puritans held that the Bible is "the revealed truth and the source of all reason and morality."[6] Similarly, humanists today believe that the affirmation of the autonomy of man and his mind constitutes the source of all true reason and morality.

To return to the basic problem today, the real issue is not between church and state, but is simply this: the state as a religious establishment

has progressively disestablished Christianity as its law foundation, and, while professing neutrality, has in fact established humanism as the religion of the state. When the religion of a people changes, its laws inevitably reflect that change and conform themselves to the new faith and the new morality.[7] There has been deception on the part of the courts, by their profession of religious neutrality, as they have substituted one religion for another, humanism for Christianity. The basic reason, however, has been the theological collapse of the churches, and this has been true of all of them. In the dominant evangelical circles, this collapse came first. Hudson has referred to this as "the deeper malady, . . . the theological erosion which had taken place during the nineteenth century." In evangelicalism, "Doctrinal definitions tended to be neglected in the stress that was placed upon 'heart religion' and the 'conversion experience.'"[8] This theological collapse led to the untenable belief in religious neutralism and to the surrender of Christian schools for statist education. As a result, humanism became the established religion of state and school, and, by infiltration, of the churches as well.

As a result, in most countries today, and no less in the United States, humanism is the established religion of the state and is progressively the source of legal revisionism. Humanism is also the established religion of schools and most churches, and most of society. Christianity is quite logically progressively excluded from state, school, and church and has a weak and scarcely tenable position in modern life. It probably lacks extensive and organized persecution in most countries because orthodox Christianity has become progressively weaker and less and less relevant.

Any revival of Christian strength will thus precipitate major conflict, in that it will constitute a threat to the humanistic establishment. In recent years, few have feared the church, because the church has been impotent and itself an ally of humanism. There are evidences now that this may change.

3

RELIGION AND THE CHURCH

AS WE HAVE NOTED, THE PROBLEM OF "CHURCH AND STATE" IS STILL formulated as though the old imperial-papal conflict were applicable to the present age. Church and empire both represented Christianity; both sought to establish Christian order in terms of their priority and their concepts.

In that struggle, the empire tended to identify God and its own world order too closely; at times, the imperial and national settlements seemed to resemble the pagan doctrine of the divine state, salvation by means of political order. To be an enemy of the emperor or of the king was then to be an enemy of Christ.

The church, on the other hand, worked to separate God from the world, even as the emperors worked to unite God and the world. In the words of Friedrich Heer,

> It was the concern of Gregory VII and his reformers, as equally of the scholasticism developing in Paris during the twelfth century, to separate God from the world (first from the "wicked" world, then from the rational, immanent world, within itself obeying only the laws of nature): the Gregorians were vehement in their approach, radical and aggressive (in the monkish and ascetic fashion): the schoolmen sober, scientific and rational. Sustained by the old confidence (with its roots in primitive

> magic) that a single great harmony united God, the world, the cosmos, man, animal and object, a confidence which at popular level was still unbroken, Hohenstaufen propaganda set out to demonstrate that God and the world belonged together, as did emperor, imperial clergy and pope. Emperor and Pope reign side by side as equals . . . *Regnum* and *sacerdotium* belong inseparably together. Anyone who seeks to separate them or to play one off against the other is an enemy to God and the Empire.[1]

Just as the empire tended to identify itself too closely with God, so, too, the church made a like identification. To be an enemy of the pope was thus to be an enemy of Christ.

Falco, in commenting on the age of Constantine, described the tension as inescapable:

> Most important of all, it was from this point on that the fundamental problem of which the history of the Middle Ages consists asserted itself: the problem of the coexistence of two universalities, bound together inseparably, in as much as they had the same object and purpose in spite of their different status. The priesthood was the depository of a salvation-bearing transcendent Truth, and was forced by historical circumstances to impress its discipline and rule on the temporal world and to become worldly itself and practice politics; the early empire, from reasons of power and prestige, and from the deepest exigencies of the faith on which its own legitimacy was founded, was obliged to assume a religious mission and to be Christian in all its actions.[2]

This tension did not develop to the same degree in the East, because the churches there were more deeply infected by Platonism and otherworldly thinking. It developed in the West because the Roman influence was more profound in both church and state, an imperial perspective which centralized and simplified as its answer to problems. The Roman weakness for simplification led to the inability to cope with problems. By centralizing and simplifying, Rome made its problems insoluble. As the diversity and decentralization of feudalism gave way to Roman imperialism in church and state, the conflict developed.

In the twentieth century, there is no lack of attempts in church and state to return to a centralized, simplified order. The United Nations represents one such effort, as does Marxism, within the State. The World Council of Churches and the Vatican Council II represent a like effort within the Church.

There are, however, radically decentralizing forces at work. Moreover, the growing complexity of life precludes any successful simplification and centralization. The efforts, therefore, to return to a unification and centralization of church and state as in the medieval past represent a futile and sterile, if costly, enterprise.

The more immediate problem is thus not the ancient church-state problem but rather the relationship of religion, and, more specifically, the Christian religion, to the church and to the state. Because both ecclesiastical and civil institutions have become humanistic, they have both abandoned their historic Western roles under God for a new doctrine of social order. It is important therefore to examine the relationship of religion to the church, having surveyed earlier the relationship of religion to the state.

The church is very specifically a Christian institution. There is properly no church in other religions. Temples exist, and believers exist, but no community of believers organized apart from the state as an organic body with a transcendental origin and calling. The non-Christian view of society is unitary; there is a unified social order under the state, and religion is a department of state and exists only as an aspect of the life of the state. Various cults could be permitted by the state, but only insofar as they served the basic purpose of the state. The non-Christian state thus was and is an aspect of that dream of reason which found its first dramatic expression in the Tower of Babel, a dream of a unified order in which man totally controls and unifies every aspect of life under his own dominion.

The church inescapably invited war by its very existence as a Christian institution: it broke radically with the old unitary and immanent concept of society. It shattered the humanistic unity of society by declaring itself to be the representative of a transcendental king and order, Jesus Christ and the Kingdom of God. It held, moreover, that the state, and every aspect of society, is similarly duty bound to represent God's order, not man's. The church therefore was more than new wine in an old wine skin; it was new wine demanding new wine skins, demanding that all things be made new in terms of Christ.

The church was thus an anti-Babel institution and committed by its

nature and calling to a radical decentralization of man's society because it saw that unity is to be entirely in Christ. No human agency can centralize and wield the royal powers of the Kingdom of God.

Feudalism, in its decentralized aspects, was thus more than an historical accident. The relative freedom of the Western church enabled it to develop institutions, orders, and schools which established agencies for the application of the faith. Many of the medieval religious orders were agencies of a radically decentralizing character, in that they took the faith to the people, worked to reorder life in Christ from the local level, and emphasized the faith of the individual as the starting point. Precisely because the church was decentralized, the church could be and regularly was reformed from within by new movements and orders. As the church centralized, it lost its capacity for reformation, and reformation then involved a break in the church.

Today, in both Protestant and Catholic circles, as well as in Eastern Orthodox churches, the old, pagan unitary concept of society is increasingly in evidence. The religion of the church is increasingly humanism, and, as a result, it involves a radical denial of the very nature of the church. The trend of thought and action in the Vatican and in the World Council of Churches is an implicit dismantling of the church in the name of progress.

But the mission of the church is more than decentralization, which is a by-product. It is the great commission, the obligation to "teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost: Teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you" (Matt. 28:19–20). This is the commandment of the Lord who declared that "all power is given unto me in heaven and in earth" (Matt. 28:18). This commandment requires teaching all nations and all peoples, and it is the reconstruction of man and society in terms of the regenerating power of God in Christ.

4

THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF THE STATE

OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO ANY DOCTRINE OF THE STATE IS ITS anthropology, its concept of man. In analyzing the various doctrines which have been held over the centuries, it is best, rather than discussing every variation of theory, to deal instead with the major kinds of theory. In terms of this, let us consider *first* a very important tradition having deep roots in antiquity, the classical view of man. This classical view was marked, in Greek thought and elsewhere, by deeply rooted dialectical tensions. Thus, man was seen as a union of two alien elements, of form, idea, reason, or spirit, with matter, will, particularity, or flesh. The one represented a higher element, and the other a lower one. Thus, man's life was a focus for a dialectical tension deeply imbedded in all reality. How one regarded man depended in part on whether one held that reason or will had the ascendancy in man. Plato gives us Socrates's view. In Kathleen Freeman's summary,

> Socrates came to two chief conclusions: that Virtue is Knowledge, and that No Man Sins Willingly. He assumes that every man is seeking what he believes to be for his advantage and welfare; but he is often mistaken in his choice of action, and does wrong in the belief that he is getting something for himself. If he knew the truth, he would realize that in making

> a wrong choice — committing a sin for the sake of some immediate apparent advantage like pleasure or power — he is really doing himself not good but harm. If he could see further, he would reject the immediate wish because of the harmful consequences to himself. Thus, all virtue consists in recognizing what is truly for our good, all sin in mistaking something harmful for something good. If we have the necessary knowledge, we are bound to choose correctly, for no one but a lunatic would willingly choose what is to his hurt. The wrong choice, or sin, is always to our hurt; the right choice, or virtue, is always to our advantage.
>
> Socrates thus eliminated the will, making it automatically dependent on the reasoning faculty. Man, to him, is a creature with intelligence which can be developed by enquiry and search until it recognizes the good. His goal is happiness, and this is achieved when his intelligence by recognizing the good enables him to choose it. Therefore he will do well to let nothing interfere with his study of the good. Bodily desires must be controlled, the pursuit of wisdom must be set before any worldly advantage, and he must devote his life, in company with his friends, to the elimination of ignorance about the nature of the virtues and virtue as a whole.[1]

This would appear to be a very optimistic view of man, but, in reality, it meant a thorough pessimism both about virtue or knowledge, the two being equated, and about man. Socrates declared, "It has been proved to us by experience that if we would have pure knowledge of anything we must quit the body."[2] Pure knowledge and pure virtue are thus impossible without an end of the dialectical tension between mind and body, i.e., without death. Pure knowledge or virtue can be approximated in this life only by men who live the life of reason, the philosophers. The whole point of the *Republic* of Plato is that the world, or the state, for its salvation, needs the rule of philosopher-kings. The classical view of man has been described as a distrust of man, but it is in reality a distrust of nonphilosophical man and an assertion of a radical trust in man the philosopher. Because of this virtual monopoly of knowledge or virtue by the philosopher, it follows that rule or kingship belongs to him. This classical view was also the position of the Enlightenment philosophers up to Rousseau, and it is again the

position of Marxists, Fabian Socialists, Behaviorists (like B. F. Skinner), and many others.

The dialecticism underlying classical anthropology led to conflicting views of sociology and psychology. The nature of man, in classical anthropology, is one of dialectical tension between form and matter, mind and body, between that which partakes of universals and that which is of the world of particulars. The state for Socrates was the world of unity, and "the greater the unity of the state the better." Aristotle, however, recognized that a total emphasis on unity meant the obliteration of man by the state, so that he insisted on some emphasis on the individual:

> I am speaking of the premise from which the argument of Socrates proceeds, "that the greater the unity of the state the better." Is it not obvious that a state may at length attain such a degree of unity as to be no longer a state? — since the nature of a state is to be a plurality, and in tending to greater unity, from being a state, it becomes a family, and from being a family, an individual; for the family may be said to be more than the state, and the individual than the family. So that we ought not to attain this greatest unity even if we could, for it would be the destruction of the state.[3]

However, Aristotle, while conscious of the danger of a totalitarian state, had no real philosophical safeguard against it, since for him also the emphasis on unity was very important. He held, moreover, that "the state is a creation of nature, and that man is by nature a political animal."[4] If man is created by God, then man is defined by God and is a religious creature. However, if man is a political animal, then man is the creature of the state. Thus, for Hellenic thought, and for all those in the classical tradition, man is a creature of the state.

On the other hand, Aristotle, in his psychology of man, was, like Plato, essentially an anarchist. Man — in his unhappy union of mind and body — was caught in a world of particularity, and, as an individual or particular, was governed by a psychology of particularity. For Aristotle, "The good" is "that at which all things aim."[5] The end of the good of both man and the state is that which is good for man. However,

> For even if the good of the community coincides with that of the individual, the good of the community is clearly a greater

> and more perfect good both to get and to keep. This is not to deny that the good of the individual is worth while. But what is good for a nation or a city has a higher, a diviner, quality.[6]

This is clearly totalitarian, and stresses again the centrality of the state in the life of man. Man is the creature of the state, and the state enables man to attain the highest good. However, Aristotle defines the highest or final good as happiness, and happiness is self-sufficiency:

> It is a generally accepted view that the final good is self-sufficient. By "self-sufficient" is meant not what is sufficient for oneself living the life of a solitary but includes parents, wife and children, friends and fellow-citizens in general. For man is a social animal. A self-sufficient thing, then, we take to be one which on its own footing tends to make life desirable and lacking in nothing. And we regard happiness as such a thing. Add to this that we regard it as the most desirable of all things without having it counted in with some other desirable thing. For, if such an addition were possible, clearly we should regard it as more desirable when even the smallest advantage were added to it. For the result would be an increase in the number of advantages, and the larger sum of advantages is preferable to the smaller.
>
> Happiness, then, the end to which all our conscious acts are directed, is found to be something final and self-sufficient.[7]

Self-sufficiency as the highest good is an anarchistic goal, and Aristotle tried to limit it to the society of man rather than to the individual. The Greek city-state aimed at self-sufficiency, as did the mercantilist state of eighteenth-century Europe, and the neo-mercantilist world of the twentieth century.

Aristotle's limitation was, however, arbitrary. Why not self-sufficiency as an individual role? This is indeed the direction of Greek psychology and life, an emphasis on the self-sufficiency of man. The Neoplatonists, Stoics, Cynics, and others all emphasized in various ways man's self-sufficiency.

Classical anthropology thus had an ambivalent position, moving from totalitarianism to anarchism quite readily. The nature-freedom dialectic of modern philosophy gives it the same tendency, an emphasis on the

totalitarian savior-state, a world-state, and an omnipotent state on the one hand, and, on the other, the protectionist, autonomous nation-state and the anarchistic individual. Both man and the state claim to be universals and absolute particulars. Both man and the state see themselves as the final judge and arbiter of all things, and both decide issues in relationship to themselves.

Another aspect of the anthropology of this classical view of man, common to all non-Biblical doctrines, is its view of man as a product of blind chaos and chance, an evolutionary and accidental product. Man thus has no constant or God-given nature. Dialectical reality may impose certain limitations on man, or, as in Freud, a long primordial history may leave its mark, but man is essentially a product of his environment and has no necessary or constant nature. Man is thus plastic man, readily molded to whatever form the molder desires. Man is a blank sheet of white paper, an open and plastic mind, and whoever controls the childhood and education of man thereby controls the future. Plato, Aristotle, Locke, Pavlov, Freud, Dewey, and all other statists thus have insisted on the control of the child and his education. This doctrine of plastic man begets totalitarianism, whether of the church (because Aquinas shared this view), or mainly of the state, because it holds that total power can produce total change. Holding this view, the philosopher-kings can dream of creating a totally new world order simply by attaining total control over man and his education. Not surprisingly, the acceptance of the theory of evolution quickly produced worldwide totalitarian movements. Marx and Engels were delighted with the publication of Darwin's theory in 1859, and both recognized at once that it made their socialistic philosophy inevitable. An evolving, changing man is malleable man, and the road to utopia, to a new paradise on earth, is total ability to change man. When man holds to a fixed, God-given nature in man, then he cannot believe that totalitarian powers in the state can undo God's handiwork.

This ancient, classical view of man, still very much with us and greatly developed by the Enlightenment and evolutionary philosophies, is a fertile ground for a radical statism and a radical anarchism. In its totalitarian form, it offers us a savior-state as man's hope. The modern state, and all its political parties, in varying degrees, offers us rival plans of salvation by acts of statist law. Cradle-to-grave security, the conquest of poverty, disease, death, and war, all these and more are promised by candidates whose program is openly messianic and radically salvationist.

On the other hand, existentialist anarchism must deny the state and other men. For Sartre, other men, neighbor and stranger alike, are the devil, since he is his own god. For existentialists, the freedom of man is expressed, (1) by the unmotivated act, to demonstrate a radical independence from God and man, and (2) the best unmotivated act is the act of arbitrary cruelty, because it emphasizes our independence from God and man.[8] The modern state similarly declares its independence from God by means of a brutal contempt for God and His law. It fosters a theory of elitism which reduces all men other than the philosopher-kings, or scientific socialist planners, to the status of experimental animals.

A *second* kind of approach, one more modern and more pervasive in our culture, is the democratic view of man. To a large degree today, this view prevails in Western civilization, and the elitist or classical view uses the façade of democracy to operate. Behind the iron curtain of Communism, the façade of ballots, democracy, and the dignity of all men disguises a radical scientific elitism. In the democratic anthropology, strong elements of which are derived from Rousseau, man is naturally good, and only institutions and a bad environment lead to evil or sin on his part. Ostensibly this doctrine of man gives man great dignity; in reality, it reduces man radically. If man is naturally good, and yet he is historically perverted and evil, then man is in essence a very weak being whose natural goodness is at best frail, and man at best passive in relationship to nature. The democratic anthropology replaced God with nature, and made man the creature of nature and the world of men. Even more than the classical or elitist view, the democratic anthropology views man as plastic or malleable, and it has led to a heavy emphasis on propaganda, education, and statist controls towards remaking man. Since evil is not in men but in the institutions surrounding men, the road to salvation means revolution, the overthrow of those institutions, to free man for the bliss of an anarchistic paradise, a stateless world in which man and society function perfectly without benefit of clergy or of state. Of course, in the bastard forms of this theory, where blended with elitism, an elite group of planners, or a dictatorship of the proletariat, will guide the people's state through the "Great Society" or statist phase to the "Great Community" or anarchistic phase. Socialism will give way to stateless communism.

Pythagoras had said, "Man is the measure of all things," and both the elitist and democratic anthropologies have held to this position. In both, however, the practical or theoretical but always inescapable consequence

has been that a few men are the measure of all things and play god over all other men.

In the democratic view, *vox populi*, *vox Dei*, the voice of the people is the voice of God. There has thus been no appeal beyond that infallible voice, whether incarnate in the democratic majority or in the democratic consensus.

The democratic view has led to the proliferation of institutions and the institutional and organizational control of man. If bad institutions such as the church have made man bad, then good institutions will make man good. John Dewey attacked the church, i.e., the orthodox, Bible-believing church, as a hopelessly aristocratic institution, because it believes in heaven and hell, the saved and the lost, and good and evil, all hopelessly aristocratic concepts.[9] More than two decades later, Conant made the same statement about the family; every family seeks the best for its own children, thereby ensuring inequality of opportunity.[10] Thus, church and family, being antidemocratic, must go. Some educators have said the same for Christian schools and colleges. Society must be rid of antidemocratic institutions to make man wholly subject to democratic institutions. Every congress, parliament, assembly, or legislature regularly creates new agencies or institutions towards this beneficent remaking of man.

Precisely because the Christian church represents the contradictory view of man, the democratic state is implicitly or explicitly hostile to Christianity. The rise of democracy has seen, on the one hand, the progressive abandonment of Christianity by many states in favor of humanism, and, on the other, a radical persecution of Christianity. Christianity is not compatible with totalitarianism, nor with the developing forms of humanistic politics from monarchy to democracy. As a result, in the modern state, the usual choice of a voter who is Christian is between the lesser of two statist evils. The anthropology of both the left and the right is anti-Christian. The conservatives, being usually less advanced and less systematic, represent the statist evil in milder form: their position is still not theologically founded, except in a minority of cases.

The *third* kind of doctrine which has influenced our world is Biblical anthropology. In terms of this faith, man was created wholly good by God (Gen. 1:31), and although fallen and reprobate outside of Christ, is still not to be regarded as normal in his fallen or sinful estate. Sin is an abnormality and a deformation of man, destructive of man and his society. It is in essence suicidal. "But he that sinneth against me wrongeth his own soul: all

they that hate me love death" (Prov. 8:36). Man must be viewed in terms of his original righteousness, but the fact of his total depravity outside of Christ cannot be ignored. Man is not plastic man. He cannot be made a creature of the state or of his environment. Man is changed, not by the state, nor by the church or school, but primarily by God's eternal counsel, effectual calling, and regenerating grace (Rom 8:28–32), and secondarily by his own will. God acts, and man responds to that act which in itself creates man's response.

Pagan psychologies have often influenced the church. Aquinas held to the blank-paper view of man, following Aristotle here.[11] For him the intellect was a passive power.[12] As a result, the church took the road of power and control over man as the means of saving him. Arminianism, the Protestant version of Scholasticism, shares this same faulty anthropology in varying degrees and is thus prone to be favorable to statism. The various Reformed churches, now largely Arminian, hold to a similar trust in the state as the saving institution. From a Biblical perspective, however great and terrifying the power of the state (or any other institution) may become, its ability is still strictly limited, because only God can change man, and society can only be remade as man is remade and then acts in terms of the creation mandate to exercise dominion under God. It was this confidence that motivated Luther, when he wrote,

> And though this world, with devils filled,
> Should threaten to undo us,
> We will not fear, for God hath willed
> His truth to triumph through us,
> The prince of darkness grim,
> We tremble not for him;
> His rage we can endure,
> For lo! his doom is sure,
> One little word shall fell him.

In terms of a Biblical anthropology, man is not plastic man. He is not nor ever can be a creature of the state, of sociologists and psychologists, nor can he be a creature of church or school, nor of his parents, even if he tries to be, so that he can neither be made by them, nor blame them. Responsibility is located, not in parents, church, state, school, or environment, but in man himself. It was an aspect of their sin that led Adam and

Eve to attempt to palm off their guilt and responsibility to one another, to the tempter, or to God (Gen. 3).

The essence of social "primitivism" is the absence of a sound doctrine of responsibility. "Savage" man does not blame himself for errors of judgment or for bad health. He asks a medicine man or a witch doctor to find the person who has cast a bad spell on him. Among the Iroquois, there were at times wholesale executions of people suspected of casting evil spells.[13] Biblical psychology has made social progress possible by bringing personal responsibility to the forefront: it has stressed the responsibility of man and has forbidden its transfer to society or to institutions. Ezekiel declared,

> The soul that sinneth, it shall die. The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son; the righteousness of the righteous shall be upon him, and the wickedness of the wicked shall be upon him. (Ezek. 18:20)

The implications of the Biblical doctrine of man and his psychology are antistatist and require freedom for man to develop or fail in terms of his responsibilities under God. They are also anti-anarchist, in that it is not man who is the ultimate governor, but God. Man has power, but by the permission of God only, and man's power is limited power, so that, wherever man and his institutions are established, there we must have an area of limited power. To aim at more is both to sin against God and to invite His inevitable judgment. The usurpation of powers is an invitation to judgment.

Modern politics, because it is premised on a false doctrine of man, is thus inescapably anti-Christian in its character. It will work to subvert Christianity, either explicitly or implicitly, consciously or unconsciously. At present, the basic choice which confronts the Christian voters is not one of basic philosophy but of degrees of adherence to that philosophy. Every political party rests on non-Christian principles, and the only real question is, which party is least systematic in its anti-Christian philosophy?

A metaphysical presupposition is also at stake. The myth of evolution has given modern man a radically different perspective on reality. In terms of Scripture, the whole of the universe, and all things therein, and all things in heaven, are the handiwork of the sovereign and triune God. All things move in terms of God's sovereign purpose, in terms of a glorious

and unchanging harmony, so that Asaph could declare, "Surely the wrath of man shall praise thee" (Ps. 76:10), and St. Paul concluded, "And we know that all things work together for good to them that love God, to them who are the called according to his purpose" (Rom. 8:28). This faith means that all things in creation need one another, are interdependent, and serve a purpose beyond themselves, so that their own will can never be made the final will. In eras influenced by Christian presuppositions, even non-Christians adopted ideas and philosophies which were secular adaptations of theocentric philosophy. Thus, while the philosophy of laissez-faire ascribed the ultimate harmony to nature, it did see an ordained harmony of interests in all creation; it was a secular adaptation of the Christian doctrine of providence. The same was true of free-trade thinkers: they assumed an ultimate harmony of interests which was untenable without the presupposition of the sovereign, predestinating God of Scripture. William Cullen Bryant, while not an orthodox Christian, clearly recognized this fact. A strong man, he noted, can lift his own weight and much more, but, he said, a man who can lift 200 pounds, although he weighs himself only 160, still cannot lift himself; "another must perform the office. The force must come from without." So, too, the harmony of interests rests not on man's intentions but on the nature of reality.

> There is a great law imposed upon us by the necessities of our condition as members of human society, the law of mutual succor, the interchange of benefits and advantages, the law of God and nature, commanding us to be useful to each other. It is the law of the household; it is the law of the neighborhood; it is the law of different provinces included under the same government, and well would it be for mankind if it were in an equal degree recognized as a law to be sacredly regarded by the great community of nations in their intercourse with each other. Were that law to be repealed, the social state would lose its cohesion and fall in pieces. There is not a pathway across the fields, nor a high-road, nor a guide-post at a turn of the way, nor a railway from city to city or from State to State, nor a sail upon the ocean, which is not an illustration of this law. It is proclaimed in the shriek of the locomotive. It is murmured in the ripple of waters divided by the prow of the steamer. The nation by which it is disregarded, or which endeavors to obstruct it by artificial

> barriers against the free intercourse of its citizens with those of other countries, revolts against the order of nature and strikes at its own prosperity.[14]

The widespread acceptance of the evolutionary mythology soon undercut the belief in the harmony of interests and replaced it with the theory of the conflict of interests. Evolution means the struggle for survival, of specie against specie, each creature against all others, so that all the universe is a product both of blind chance and a war unto death of all creatures. It means a dog-eat-dog universe, every man for himself, and a kill-or-be-killed world. Tennyson, confronted with evolution, tried hard to maintain some kind of higher harmony, but he still had to see nature red in tooth and claw, a world of destruction and ruthlessness. Evolution means a total conflict of interests, which, in politico-economic terms, as Marx and Engels at once recognized, means class conflict. Now that statist education is totally influenced by Darwinism, not surprisingly all classes and groups believe in the conflict of interests. Capitalists are as dedicated to an anti-free-market economy as are workers. Industrialists advocate tariffs, assume that conflict is inescapable, and act as though labor were an enemy. Labor treats capital as an enemy, and agriculture holds the city and its capital and labor forces alike to be its enemies. Class warfare has become the basic premise of politics, and, by 1960, the Negroes had picked up the same mythology, as have other so-called minority groups since, notably Mexicans, Indians, and women. The conflict-of-interests faith creates a warfare society, a state of permanent war as natural and inevitable. In a warfare society, the power of the state grows rapidly, in that the state both incites the warfare by legislation which assumes a conflict of interests, and then presents itself as the referee.

A good example of class conflict legislation is the minimum-wage law. Supposedly, it was to help unskilled labor by assuring a reasonable minimum wage. In reality, it led to unemployment and the black revolution of the 1960s, as well as to youth problems. Whereas previously unskilled youth could be employed and given on-the-job training, now the cost was too great for such apprenticeships. The percentage of unemployed youth, black and white, has risen steadily, and conflicts, delinquency, and other problems as well. Statist interference, based on a conflict-of-interests philosophy, has been responsible.

The conflict philosophy is inescapable on an evolutionary premise. It can only be undercut by the Biblical doctrine of creation.

The philosophy of statism is anti-Christian to the core. The necessity of our day is not political action but a return to a Biblical faith. On any but a Biblical doctrine of man, the state increases its power and plays the role of god and savior over man.

5

SALVATION AND THE STATE

CHARLES NORRIS COCHRANE POINTED OUT THAT THE AUGUSTAN EMpire of Rome began with a claim to represent an eternal order, to be in fact Eternal Rome. The emperor declared, "May it be my privilege to establish the republic safe and sound on its foundations, gathering the fruit of my desire to be known as the author of the ideal constitution, and taking with me to the grave the hope that the basis which I have laid will be permanent."[1] The coins of the era proclaimed Augustus the imperial savior of the world. Virgil declared that the turning point of the ages had arrived. The Roman college of priests, headed by Augustus, distributed holy incense to the people for purification from sin. Stauffer, in analyzing the coins of Augustus, wrote:

> The symbolic meaning is clear: a new day is dawning in the world. The divine saviour-king, born in the historical hour ordained by the stars, has come to power on land and sea, and inaugurates the cosmic era of salvation. Salvation is to be found in none other save Augustus, and there is no other name given to man in which they can be saved. This is the climax of the Advent proclamation of the Roman empire.[2]

The hope of antiquity was thus summed up in Rome, the dream of political salvation. As Cochrane summed up the issue between Rome and the Christians:

> The history of Graeco-Roman Christianity resolves itself largely into a criticism of that undertaking and of the ideas upon which it rested; viz. that it was possible to attain a goal of permanent security, peace, and freedom through political action, especially through submission to the "virtue and fortune" of a political leader. This notion the Christians denounced with uniform vigour and consistency. To them the state, so far from being the supreme instrument of human emancipation and perfectibility, was a straitjacket to be justified at best as "a remedy for sin." To think of it otherwise they considered the grossest of superstitions.[3]

It is easy for us to forget that, while Roman and other cultures of antiquity talked of gods, it was to the state they looked for salvation, in most cases. Moreover, the continuity between the gods and men made the state often a focal point for the manifestation of divinity, either in the office of the ruler, or in his person, or in the state as such. In one way or another, pagan culture offered a humanistic plan of salvation. In Greco-Roman culture, the idea of political salvation appeared in developed form and in sharp contrast to Christianity.

Tertullian, in his *Apology*, appealed to the ruler of the Roman Empire in defense of the Christian community. Why, he asked, were the law-abiding Christians treated as criminals? And why were they treated as worse than criminals? The reason for all this, Tertullian stated, was their refusal to pay the required honors to the emperor.[4] Christians did not lack respect for the emperor; in terms of God's Word, they prayed "for kings, and rulers, and powers, that all may be peace" for them (1 Tim. 2:2). Tertullian continued:

> There is also another and a greater necessity for our offering prayer in behalf of the emperor, nay, for the complete stability of the empire, and for Roman interests in general. For we know that a mighty shock impending over the whole earth — in fact, the very end of all things threatening dreadful woes — is only retarded by the continued existence of the Roman empire. We have no desire, then, to be overtaken by these dire events; and in praying that their coming may be delayed, we are lending our aid to Rome's duration. More than this, though we decline to swear by the genii of the Caesars, we swear by their safety,

> which is worth far more than all your genii. Are you ignorant that these genii are called "Daemones," and thence the diminutive name "Daemonia" is applied to them? We respect in the emperors the ordinance of God, who has set them over the nations. We know that there is that in them which God has willed; and to what God has willed we desire all safety, and we count an oath by it a great oath. But as for daemons, that is, your genii, we have been in the habit of exorcising them, not of swearing by them, and thereby conferring on them divine honour.
>
> But why dwell longer on the reverence and sacred respect of Christians to the emperor, whom we cannot but look up to as called by our Lord to his office? so that on valid grounds I might say Caesar is more ours than yours, for our God has appointed him. Therefore, as having this propriety in him, I do more than you for his welfare, not merely because I ask it of Him who can give it, or because I ask it as one who deserves to get it, but also because, in keeping the majesty of Caesar within due limits, and putting it under the Most High, and make it less than divine, I commend him the more to the favour of Deity, to whom I make him alone inferior. But I place him in subjection to one I regard as more glorious than himself. Never will I call the emperor God, and that either because it is not in me to be guilty of falsehood; or that I dare not turn him into ridicule; or that not even himself will desire to have that high name applied to him. If he is but a man, it is his interest as man to give God His higher place. Let him think it enough to bear the name of emperor. That, too, is a great name of God's giving. To call him God, is to rob him of his title. If he is not a man, emperor he cannot be.[5]

Tertullian could with justice argue that Christians were Rome's best citizens, its most honest citizens, subjects, and officials, its best soldiers, its most law-abiding people, and its best tax-paying people. All of this meant nothing. The Christians, by denying the idea that salvation is a political concern, thereby undercut the foundations of Rome. Even when Rome adopted Christianity, it did not cease its efforts to become the instrument of salvation: it merely sought a stronger religious tradition as its means of establishing Rome's salvific authority and power.

The Christians, by declaring Christ to be man's savior, undercut the foundations of Rome. The church councils stressed the uniqueness of Christ as Lord and Savior. By His unique incarnation, Jesus Christ is man's only Savior. He is also man's Lord and King. Rome was here more astute than modern churchmen. Salvation and lordship are inseparable facts. Man's lord is also man's savior, and vice versa. By separating lordship from Christ, many churchmen have in effect denied His saving power.

The early church proclaimed Christ as Lord and Savior. The theology of the Roman state held the emperor to be lord and savior. The good character of Christians did not commend them to Rome: it only made them a more effective threat. The vices of our enemies trouble us, but their virtues threaten us even more. So it was with the early Christians.

The matter has not changed much since then. In the twentieth century, pastors and Christian school administrators are amazed at the hostility and venom of state and federal officials. After all, it is the Christian schools that produce the best students and the finest citizens. In a time of growing delinquency, anarchy, and crime in the state schools, and social disintegration, why do men not welcome the stability which Christian schools give to society? The answer is that, at their worst, the state school delinquents and the criminals in society are preferred to Christians by these humanists, because these lawless elements do not constitute an intellectual, theological, and moral challenge to their statist plan of salvation. The Christians clearly do. Humanism today has a militant plan of salvation by statist action. To institute that plan means silencing Christians and obliterating Christian institutions.

In education, Horace Mann worked for state control of education, because he believed in the parenthood of the state and salvation by the state.[6] In the twentieth century, a spiritual heir of Horace Mann, Harold O. Rugg, held that the United States, "Uncle Sam," should be "busy converting himself into Uncle Savior."[7] Salvation was seen as basic to the life and work of the state and its agencies.

Because salvation is a total concept, a savior has dominion and authority over every realm of life. If his lordship is not total, his salvation is not effectual. Therefore, anyone who claims to be a savior must of necessity assert an overlordship over every realm of life and thought. The Roman Empire was thus logical in its claims, as were all pagan states in antiquity. They claimed to be the power and the umbrella under which all men and institutions exist and whose law covers and governs every realm. In terms of this

faith, the state is the god in whom we live, and move, and have our being. The modern state, like the pagan state, asserts that salvific overlordship. It asserts the right to control every area. If it exempts any area, it does so by its sovereign grace, so that the exempted area is merely tolerated, not free.

Churchmen, by withdrawing the idea of salvation to the soul, so that Jesus Christ is the savior of men's souls and not Lord of heaven and earth and the only Savior of all things, have thereby in effect denied that Jesus is the savior. None can be savior who is not also lord.

The implications of this heretical doctrine of salvation which has captured the churches were sharply seen, in all their bankruptcy, in the famous *Playboy* interview with the then candidate for president, "Jimmy" Carter. A national hue and cry was aroused by Carter's statement that he sometimes lusted after women other than his wife. Nothing was said about his denial of Biblical law, and his insistence that his faith would not govern his politics. Carter said, in part, "At home in Plains, we've had homosexuals in our community, our church. There's never been any sort of discrimination — some embarrassment but no animosity, no harassment."[8] Carter declared the radical irrelevance of Christianity to life over and over again in the interviews, and very little criticism was directed against this aspect of the account. The faith was surrendered, and few marked its surrender because they shared in it. Clearly, like Carter, those who saw no evil in his denial of the determining nature of Biblical faith for all of life, including politics, were nominal in their profession of faith in Jesus Christ as savior. They had another lord, and they went to the polls to vote for their preferred savior, the state and its politicians.

6

LEGITIMACY

AGAIN AND AGAIN, THE PROBLEM OF LEGITIMACY CONFRONTS MAN. In the personal realm, to be illegitimate means to be a bastard. Men may try to legalize that status, and many civil governments have done so, but the taint of illegitimacy is more than a legal question: it has reference to a basic order of life which has been violated.

Much of the time, men do not question the legitimacy of their social order nor of their political leaders. They simply live with them, for better or worse. However, when the religious foundations of a society begin to crack, then all kinds of questions arise, and their basic thrust is to challenge the legitimacy of the order.

What order has ever begun legitimately? Apart from those ordained by God by the revelation of Scripture in times past, i.e., the rule by Moses, Joshua, and others, judges and kings in their turn, legitimacy is a major problem to every culture. To illustrate, an Englishman once tried to set me straight, by citing one or two royal acts, on the illegitimacy of the American War for Independence. No offense intended, of course, but the United States, he felt, had begun by an act of lawlessness and thus had lawlessness in its flesh and bones. I not only defended the legality of the War of Independence but called attention to the various invasions of England by alien forces, the murders and usurpations of the throne, and much more, stating that England had a long history of illegitimacy! He countered by citing the American treatment of Indians, something often cited also by

radical students and various other disturbed personalities such as clergymen, teachers, and the like. I pointed out that the Indians had in turn invaded and murdered the previous inhabitants of North America, a pygmy people. Perhaps the pygmies had in turn exterminated others before being themselves the victims of genocide. If one race's title to the land was illegitimate, did it make a previous group's title of necessity legitimate? Europe has seen invading groups of Basques, Celts, Germans, Huns, Latins, Mongols, and others overrun one area after another. No people can claim clear title to their land. What happens, then, to legitimacy?

The issue is an important one today, because we do have a crisis of legitimacy. Peter Drucker believes that legitimate rule is rule which derives its claims from the basic beliefs of society. In other words, legitimacy is a religious issue, not an historical or genealogical one. According to Drucker, "No illegitimate ruler can possibly be a good or wise ruler."[1] The man who rules illegitimately rules in violation of the basic presuppositions of the society; the ruler may be right, and the people wrong, but the ruler's rootlessness in the situation forces him to rule oppressively. In the modern world, all governments, civil, ecclesiastical, and others, are increasingly viewed as illegitimate, because their humanistic foundations are being radically questioned and challenged.

According to Charles Drekmeier, "scientific-technical progress has become the major basis of legitimation in industrial societies."[2] Earlier, and still to a degree, it was *vox populi, vox Dei*, the voice of the people is the voice of God. Politicians still bow to this democratic principle while in practice avoiding it.

The absence of legitimacy can create a revolutionary climate. Men will view a social order they regard as illegitimate as *corrupt.* The actual corruption can be less than it was in earlier and happier years, but this makes no difference. It is not the particular cases of corruption which loom large but the general belief that the whole "system" is in principle corrupt. It is viewed as corrupt because it no longer is in accord with the basic beliefs of men. Revolution can follow only if men have another set of principles as the basis for legitimacy. The age of revolution, from the French Revolution to the present, was marked by a rejection of the relics of Christian law-orders and the militant application of humanism as the principle of legitimacy. This revolutionary humanistic impulse is still with us, in groups from small socialist militants to the Rockefellers and their messianic humanism, but its force is largely spent.

To overturn an order on principle, one must have a principle, and the modern mood is increasingly nihilistic and anarchistic rather than premised on a faith in humanism. Under the influence of existentialist humanism, modern man's mood has shifted from faith to despair. Harvey has called this new outlook *random-direction.* It was once the mood of the avant-garde artists and writers, but is now increasingly prevalent all around us, as it was, Harvey reminds us, in the declining years of Rome. "Random-direction makes an island of every man. It gives him total autonomy." Criminals are random-directed, because it means no responsible involvement.[3] The random-directed man cannot carry on a revolution; he has no faith and is a one-man revolution against everything. Moreover, his lack of a focus makes him eloquent only in *protest*, not in revolution.

Legitimacy is a religious concept. *The* legitimate order, whether it be a church, state, family, school, industry, or anything else, must have roots in the basic beliefs of a society. If those beliefs are false, the social order will have only tenuous and seeming legitimacy, one which defeat can easily shatter. A valid order can survive setbacks and defeats; a pseudo-legitimacy cannot. Thus, the legitimacy of fascism was a false one, and it could succeed only as long as it offered success. The fascist countries did not witness great numbers clinging to fascism when it was defeated; men then hastened to disavow it and to claim that they had always been dissidents.

In czarist Russia, the old order was, on the whole, an economic success and provided reasonable order, but, with the wartime blockade, Russia collapsed. It became immediately apparent how deeply nihilism and anarchism had corroded the life of the country, because, while virtually all expected some kind of continuity, the order around them collapsed. One Mennonite in Russia, who tried to convert a prominent anarchist in his area, a Makhnovist, was told by him:

> Do not try to change me with advice to read the Bible and to believe in God, or with anything of that kind of advice. We Makhnovists, as partisans and anarchists, have only one program, only one desire and aim — to enjoy living off somebody else's property, to rob and to kill as we please. We will not change, and we will be a menace to others as long as we live. Nothing will change us, not the Bible, nor God, neither Hell or Heaven. We will live this way so long as possible. And when

> that is no longer possible we will commit suicide, and only when Mother Soft Earth has covered us, will we be harmless.[4]

In this anarchistic situation, the well-organized Communists succeeded. Their legitimacy, however, is weak, and their collapse will lead to even more drastic renunciations and reprisals than was the case with the fascists.

Legitimacy is everywhere weak because, *first*, religious faith is everywhere weak, and, *second*, because the principle of legitimacy on the whole is derived in almost all societies from false and humanistic premises. Where a false legitimacy rules, there too a false premise for law and order exists.

Thus, only insofar as a social order is based on the absolute authority of God and His law is there any possible legitimacy with validity. Apart from that foundation, a social order is built on sand (Matt. 7:24–27). On any other foundation, society is crisis prone and disaster bound. Because "the earth is the Lord's" (Ps. 24:1), any other foundation than God's Word and authority is inescapably and inevitably subject to judgment and condemnation. Biblical law is thus basic to legitimacy, and Biblical law will be the recourse where men believe in the God of the Scripture.

7

THE STATE, SIN, AND JUSTICE

AS WE SAW EARLIER, THE PHILOSOPHER OF EDUCATION HAROLD O. Rugg said in 1955 that "Uncle Sam" should be "busy converting himself into Uncle Savior."[1] This assertion of the salvationist character of the state was first strongly asserted by President Woodrow Wilson, and, since the long years of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, has been basic to American foreign and domestic policies. It has also been the premise of other states, most of all the Marxist ones.

The modern state has a moral foundation, but it is not a Christian one. Rather, it is emphatically humanistic. As Quigley noted of the English and American establishments, "their roots were to be found in ancient Athens rather than in modern Manchester."[2] In other words, the roots of the humanistic order were not in economic reality, i.e., in Manchester, nor in the free market. Neither were they in Biblical faith. These statists saw themselves in terms of Plato's *Republic.* Their hostility was reserved for "the darkness of theocratic law," i.e., Biblical law.[3] They did borrow the pattern of their functionings somewhat vaguely from the Jesuits.[4]

In any event, the modern state sees itself in messianic terms and as man's savior. State planning is the substitute for God's predestination; state welfare programs have worked to displace Christian charity, and the state sees itself as the new agency of providence, replacing God.

In Scripture, the state has a specific ministry, the ministry of justice (Rom. 13:1). Its place in the plan of God is a real if limited one. The state

must be the servant of the Messiah; the modern state has made itself the messiah. In so doing, it has repudiated Christianity and the history of Christianity for ancient paganism. Rome saw itself as developing the ultimate order, inclusive of gods, men, and the universe. According to Seneca, in *Ad Marciam* (28.1), "You are about to enter a city, shared by gods and men — a city that embraces the universe that is bound by fixed and eternal laws."[5] This ideal cosmic order was to be the good of the state. Rome was the "Great City" in process of development, and it could therefore be called by Cicero (*Philippics*, 4.6, 14) "the light of the world, the guardian of all nations."[6] Rome was to become the city of Justice, "belonging to all humanity," Mazzolani states.[7] Its role was thus salvation. Cicero (*Philippics*, 5.18, 49) said of Octavian, "In him we place our hopes of liberty; from him we have already received salvation."[8]

In fact, however, Rome became the triumph of the oppressive tax collector. A barbarian raid and a visit from the tax gatherer came to rank equally as disasters, until finally the tax man came to be the greater evil, and none found Rome worth defending. When the sack of Rome came in A.D. 410 at the hands of the Visigoths, no irreparable damage was done to the buildings. Rome waned from a great metropolis to a town because it was bankrupt. Christians often held that the fall of Rome was a moral necessity, and some said that the Lord would not return until the empire fell.[9] Thus, Rome, which presented itself as the hope and the light of the world, in time became anathema to all men, and deserted by all. The modern state, pursuing the same messianic course, faces the same fate.

In the year A.D. 40, the emperor Caligula ordered that his statue be set up in the temple at Jerusalem. The whole Jewish world reacted with horror. Before the order could be carried out, Caligula was assassinated. In A.D. 52–53, Paul wrote his letters to the Thessalonians. In 2 Thessalonians 2:3–10, Paul says:

> Let no man deceive you by any means: for that day shall not come, except there come a falling away first, and that man of sin be revealed, the son of perdition; Who opposeth and exalteth himself above all that is called God, or that is worshipped: so that he as God sitteth in the temple of God, shewing himself that he is God. Remember ye not, that when I was yet with you, I told you these things? And now ye know what withholdeth that he might be revealed in his time. For the mystery

> of iniquity doth already work: only he who now letteth will let, until he be taken out of the way. And then shall that Wicked be revealed, whom the Lord shall consume with the spirit of his mouth, and shall destroy with the brightness of his coming: Even him, whose coming is after the working of Satan with all power and signs and lying wonders, And with all deceivableness of unrighteousness in them that perish; because they receive not the love of the truth, that they might be saved.

According to Caird, Paul's words have the Caligula episode in mind.[10] Paul saw in Caligula's madness the insanity and evil of an ungodly state.

The basic and original sin of man is to be a god, determining or knowing for oneself good and evil (Gen. 3:5). This basic sin, which is sin in its essence, manifests itself not only in man but in man's institutions. During most of history, the state has been man's central institution and therefore the central manifestation in corporate form of man's original sin. As a result, the state has repeatedly presented itself as man's savior and god.

Warfield, in commenting on this text, called attention to the fallacy of popular eschatological views. The great fact about all prophecy, and 2 Thessalonians 2:3–10 is prophecy, is that it is ethical or moral in its purpose. Prophecy does not seek to satisfy our curiosity but to strengthen us morally. The "coming" of the Lord to destroy the man of sin is not necessarily, nor in this case at all, His coming in person (the end-time coming), but His coming in judgment (an end-point coming). Neither the revelation nor the destruction of the man of sin are to be seen thus as an end-time event.

The man of sin is someone in the near future of the Thessalonians and Paul. Warfield considered the man of sin to be "the line of emperors, considered as the embodiment of persecuting power." The restraining power was the Jewish state, whose existence gave some protection to the Christians, in that Rome gave to them, as a "Jewish sect," the same immunity from Roman controls which Jewish faith possessed.[11] Finally, in this interpretation, the apostasy is obviously the great apostasy of the Jews, gradually filling up all these years and hastening to its completion in their destruction.[12] Paul thus saw a close connection between the tempter and his primeval plan, original sin, and statism outside of Christ. The state in Christ is God's instrument for the accomplishment of justice. The state outside of Christ is Satan's instrument for the furthering of his plan to

substitute the will of the creature for the Creator. For this reason, it is impossible for us as Christians to be indifferent to the theology of the state.

8

THE STATE AND JUSTICE

THE STATE HAS A NECESSARY CONCERN WITH JUSTICE. IT IS, AFTER all, perhaps more than any other agency that institution whose duty it is, in St. Paul's words, to be a terror to evildoers (Rom. 13:3). A civil government begins to undermine itself and become its own major traitor and subversive force when it rules with injustice. It is an ominous fact that the modern humanistic state is increasingly more concerned with enhancing its own power rather than protecting its godly citizenry. No external or internal revolutionary group can do more harm to a state than it does to itself by its failure to provide justice.

However, before we can understand the predicament of the modern state, certain foundational facts must be recognized. *First*, the state more often than the church has been man's basic and central religious institution. This was true in pagan antiquity, and it is clearly true again with the humanistic state. Modern man looks to civil government for solutions, help, care, and salvation.

Second, the basic concern of the state should be justice. This is what men expect of a civil government. Negatively, justice requires the punishment of evil works. A social order cannot long endure if criminals have an advantage over the law-abiding citizens. Positively, therefore, the state must be concerned about justice and must work to create a social order in which just men can function freely and ably.

Justice thus is a central concern of the state, the central concern. At this

point, it is necessary to consider briefly a point made almost a century ago by Girdlestone:

> It is unfortunate that the English language should have grafted the Latin word *justice,* which is used in somewhat of a forensic sense, into a vocabulary which was already possessed of the good word *righteousness*, as it tends to create a distinction which has no existence in scripture. This quality indeed may be viewed, according to scripture, in two lights. In its relative aspect it implies conformity with the line or rule of God's law; in its absolute aspect it is the exhibition of love to God and to one's neighbour, because love is the fulfilling of the law; but in neither of these senses does the word convey what we usually mean by justice. No distinction between the claims of justice and the claims of love is recognized in scripture; to act in opposition to the principles of love to God and one's neighbour is to commit an injustice, because it is a departure from the course marked out by God in His law.[1]

Justice and righteousness are thus identical in the Bible, and love means putting God's law, His righteousness, into effect. I cannot love anyone if I am lawless in relationship to him. To love God and man means thus living in terms of God's law, His righteousness, in relationship to them.

Justice in all religions is a religious fact. All law expresses somehow a religious faith, a faith in justice or righteousness. The religion behind the law may be Buddhism, Mohammedanism, Shintoism, humanism, or Christianity, but all laws, and their concepts of justice, are religious facts.

This makes obvious how dangerous and absurd it is to dismiss the need for or the idea of a Christian civil government. There are more than a few pietists who want to restrict Christianity to spiritual concerns and to deny the need for a Christian civil government. One such man has called Christian political action towards a Christian state and God's law "an unscriptural and dangerous view."[2] Such a perspective makes necessary that the Christian accept two warring views of justice or righteousness as normative and live in obedience to an alien religion in his civil life.

This is not all. Righteousness or justice is distinct, and yet at the same time also inseparable, from the doctrine of atonement. God requires justice or righteousness from man, but fallen and depraved man cannot be just.

Man is made just, or justified, before God by the atoning work of Jesus Christ. We are also regenerated and given the gift of the Holy Spirit so that we may now live in and before the Lord with knowledge, righteousness, holiness, and dominion.

Because men and institutions are not Christian does not exempt them from their need for Christ. Neither do men escape the need for justification and atonement by rejecting Christ. Instead, they seek it in sadomasochistic ways, by laying their sins and guilt upon others, or by trying self-atonement by means of self-punishment. Men, in all their ways, seek righteousness and justification. Man the sinner hungers and thirsts after justification, but not from the Lord.

In brief, justice is inseparably related to justification. This was recognized in antiquity, and the various pagan states regularly performed rites of lustration, justification, and atonement to purge the state from sin and guilt. Because the state is of necessity to govern with and to be governed by justice, the state must be justified. Not surprisingly, our word *tyrant* means in its pre-Christian origin one who rules without God (or the gods), and hence without justice.

The pagan states of antiquity found no justification, and all became tyrannies. The modern state avoids the use of historic theological terminology, but it is no less religious than the states of old. Its concern is with justice and justification. In every era of history, and no less so in our own, the more a state pursues justice outside of Christ, the more unjust it becomes.

Foreign and domestic policies in the modern state have a common purpose: the attainment of justification by means of a humanistic doctrine of justice. The result is a passionate politics because it is an intensely religious politics. The result, too, is a social order which is radically at odds with orthodox Christianity and which must sooner or later wage war against Christ's faithful flock.

The modern state seeks justification by means of the works of law, man-made law. Scripture makes it clear that we cannot be justified by our obedience, if it were possible for us as sinners to be obedient, to God's law; how much more clear should it be that humanistic, fiat, anti-God laws can justify no man.

The modern statist views all who do not share in humanism's plan of law-justification and salvation as somehow unjust men. They are at least religiously consistent.

For Christians, justification is only by God's saving grace through Jesus

Christ, who satisfied God's justice or righteousness for us. Because we are now made just in Christ, we know that God's law-word is true, and it is our way of life. Hence, for us to live in Christ is to apply His law-love word and to make it the governing principle of every area of life and thought.

The Christian state thus applies God's law to the social order. Because salvation and justification are from and through Jesus Christ, so too our law and justice. To go to another law is to place ourselves under an ungodly plan of salvation and justification. The humanistic state tells us in effect, concerning its fiat laws, this do, and live. Our Lord says, "I am the way, the truth, and the life: no man cometh unto the Father, but by me" (John 14:6). Our Lord thus makes it clear that in no area of life, including the state, can we "come" to or approximate God's requirements and His Kingdom call other than through Jesus Christ. A rival plan of justification by law such as the humanistic state demands is thus anathema. The justified live in terms of God's justice, God's law.

9

THE STATE AND INCARNATION

ONE OF THE MOST MOVING OF ACCOUNTS IN SCRIPTURE IS THE HEALing of the blind. We have only to imagine ourselves as suddenly sightless to understand the great joy of those whom Christ healed. This fact points up all the more the sorry fact of healthy men with good eyesight who refuse to see. For "Christians" to be wilfully blind is to deny their salvation. This blindness of the church is, however, a sad and prevalent fact. All too many churchmen are so wilfully blind that they would refuse to recognize Satan unless he came to them clearly labeled so, and then they would raise questions about truth in labeling. Confronted with Christ, they would demand an inspection of credentials and ask for letters of reference. The vision of such churchmen is limited to matters of irrelevance.

If this were not so, the church would long before this have recognized a basic fact of the modern age, namely, that humanism has a doctrine of incarnation, and the state is the incarnation of its god. This thinking is not new; it had its classic expression in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831). All political thinking since then has been Hegelian to some degree. While many of his heirs reject him because of differing stresses, they still think in terms of Hegelian presuppositions.

For Hegel, "Reason is the Sovereign of the World." Reason "is *Substance*, as well as *Infinite Power*." Moreover, "Reason is the *substance* of the Universe; viz. that by which and in which all reality has its being and subsistence," and it is also "the *Infinite Energy* of the Universe . . . It is *the*

infinite complex of things, their entire Essence and Truth."[1] In brief, reason, the immanent reason in all being, is Hegel's god. Like the Greeks, Hegel divided the universe into mind or reason, and matter. He then introduced the concept of *spirit,* as opposed to matter. Spirit is self-contained existence, whereas matter has its essence outside of itself. It is clear that spirit or mind is very similar to reason, or identical with it. However, Hegel gives a "higher" definition of spirit or reason: it is "Freedom." "For if I am dependent, my being is referred to something else which I am not; I cannot exist independently of something external. I am free, on the contrary, when my existence depends upon myself. This self-contained existence of Spirit is none other than self-consciousness — consciousness of one's own being."[2]

If this brings us close to home, i.e., to man, it is by intent. Hegel said:

> The Absolute Object, *Truth*, is Spirit; and as man himself is Spirit, he is present (is mirrored) to himself in that object, and thus in his being. But in order that the objectivity of Essential Being may be done away with, and Spirit be no longer alien to itself — may be *with* itself (self-harmonized) — the Naturalness of Spirit — must be removed; so that the alien element may be destroyed, and the reconciliation of Spirit be accomplished.[3]

The incarnation of Christ for Hegel meant that "self-consciousness had reached the phases of development (Momente), whose resultant constitutes the Idea of Spirit, and had come to feel the necessity of comprehending those phases absolutely."[4] Since spirit is mind and freedom, all men can thus become incarnations thereof. The man who follows reason divorces himself from traditional religions and thereby asserts his freedom, and is the man in whom spirit is manifested. Hegel thus clearly had a high opinion of modern science and helped create it, i.e., the enthronement of autonomous man as judge over all things. Hegel, on January 23, 1807, wrote to C. G. Zellerman, saying, "Science alone is the theodicy."[5] If science is the theodicy, justifying the ways of God to men, who is the god?

We have seen that for Hegel man can make himself into an incarnation of spirit or god, although for him god is more than man.

> Man, on the contrary, is God only in so far as he annuls the merely Natural and Limited in his Spirit and elevates himself to

> God. That is to say, it is obligatory on him who is a partaker of the truth, and knows that he himself is a constituent (Moment) of the Divine Idea, to give up his merely natural being: for the Natural is the Unspiritual.[6]

Man thus is only a moment in the divine idea. "The shape which the perfect embodiment of Spirit assumes" is "the State."[7] The state is thus the incarnation of the divine idea, spirit, or freedom. Earlier, Rousseau had identified freedom with the will of the state. Hegel did likewise:

> For Truth is the Unity of the universal and subjective Will; and the Universal is to be found in the State, in its laws, its universal and rational arrangements. The State is the Divine Ideal as it exists on Earth. We have in it, therefore, the object of History in a more definite shape than before; that in which Freedom obtains objectivity, and lives in the enjoyment of this objectivity.
>
> For Law is the objectivity of Spirit; volition in its true form. Only that will which obeys law, is free; for it obeys itself — it is independent and so free. When the State or our country constitute a community of existence; when the subjective will of man submits to laws — the contradiction between Liberty and Necessity vanishes. The Rational has necessary existence, as being the reality and substance of things, and we are *free* in recognizing it as law, and following it as the substance of our own being. The objective and the subjective will are then reconciled, and present one identical homogeneous whole. For the morality (Sittlichkeit) of the State is not of that ethical (moralische) reflective kind, in which one's own conviction bears sway; this latter is rather the peculiarity of the modern time, while the true antique morality is based on the principle of abiding by one's duty (to the state at large). An Athenian citizen did what was required of him, as it were from instinct: but if I reflect on the object of my activity, I must have the consciousness that my will has been called into exercise. But morality is Duty — substantial Right — a "*second* nature" as it has been justly called; for the *first* nature of man is his primary, merely animal existence.[8]

Note the following points which Hegel makes. *First*, his model is Athens and Greece, not Christ and the Bible. He wants "the true antique morality" of paganism. *Second*, "the State is the Divine Idea as it exists on earth," i.e., it is the current incarnation of Hegel's god. *Third*, since by definition god is ultimate and god's will is just and holy, for Hegel it follows that the state is as infallible as orthodox Christians believe Christ and the Bible are. The state's law objectifies or manifests in incarnate written form the spirit, or Hegel's god. *Fourth*, men cannot be free in their personal religious morality, which Hegel dismisses as "the peculiarity of the modern time," i.e., of the Christian era. "Only that will which obeys law, is free," and for Hegel law means statist law, not the personal and peculiar Biblical morality and law. Very clearly, Hegel's thinking here was the foundation for the Marxist infallible dictatorship of the proletariat. The scientific socialist state is by definition the historical incarnation of freedom and reason and can thus do no wrong. Man cannot be free if he challenges this incarnate god, the scientific socialist state. Towards the creation of such a state and such a world order, Marxists, Fabian Socialists, the advocates of welfare democracy, and others work. Fascism is a variation of the same faith. *Fifth*, since God is both the author of liberty and the source of predestination, the modern god-state must be the same. Modern man questions God; he sees freedom and predestination from God as a contradiction, because he denies God. In the modern state, Hegel said, "the contradiction between Liberty and Necessity vanishes." All things are reconciled in God, and, for modern man, the state is god walking on earth.

Sixth, Hegel said, "the State is the universal spiritual life, to which individuals by birth sustain a relation of confidence and habit, and in which they have their existence and reality."[9] In other words, we live and move and have our being in the state. Given this premise, the modern state has moved to control every area of life and thought as a necessary part of its providential government. This is, of course, totalitarianism.

Seventh, Hegel reduced personal freedom to a subjective matter:

> In view of this, *substantial* (objective) freedom must be distinguished from *subjective* freedom. Substantial freedom is the abstract undeveloped Reason implicit in volition, proceeding to develop itself in the State. But in this phase of Reason there is still wanting personal insight and will, that is, subjective freedom; which is realized only in the Individual in his own conscience.[10]

In church and state conflicts of the 1970s and 1980s, it has become apparent that the state's definition of religious freedom is Hegelian and subjective: its area of freedom is restricted to the realm between one's two ears.

In commenting on "The Greek World," Hegel began, "Among the Greeks we feel ourselves immediately at home, for we are in the region of Spirit."[11] His maudlin rhapsodies over the Greeks are amazing reading.

Some scholars reject the continuity with Hegel in modern jurisprudence and in political thought, on the premise that Hegel's approach was metaphysical, whereas contemporary thinking is not. However, by refusing to teach or think metaphysically, we do not thereby escape it; rather, we make our metaphysical presupposition naively and with the illusion of scientific truth.

Legal positivism is Hegelian in ancestry and spirit. The positivists see no reason, right, or truth apart from the state. Chief Justice Holmes was an example of such thinking. Such positivism, as McClellan has shown, allows no ground for distinguishing between a just law and an unjust law, a good civil government and an evil one.

> An ally of utilitarianism, legal positivism first took root in Germany. Hans Kelsen, who with Rudolf Stammler founded the neo-Kantian school of jurisprudence, represented every tenet of the traditional conception of rule of law as a metaphysical superstition. A state, he insisted, could not act "illegally" because "Every expression of the life of a State, every act of State, is a legal act."[12]

I have cited Kelsen with more than a little interest. In *The Politics of Guilt and Pity* (1970), I analyzed Kelsen critically. Those portions of the book had been written in the late 1950s, I believe. In the 1960s, I at times referred to Kelsen in various speaking engagements. My only response was a rebuke from one church for criticizing a great scholar of the law who knew more about law than I would ever know. Also, why was I "wasting" time commenting on law instead of dealing with "spiritual" matters? At the same time, my comments about the dangers of humanism in the 1950s and 1960s were incurring rebukes from pastors who saw no harm in it. Since then, the number of churchmen who are alarmed over humanism has become legion. We can therefore hope that in due time these men will awaken to the fact that the modern state claims to be an incarnate god

with a total right to rule over them. Sovereignty means lordship, and the pagan and anti-Christian state has always claimed sovereignty.

10

THE FREEDOM OF CHRIST'S CHURCH

IN THE MODERN ERA, WE HAVE SEEN A SIGNIFICANT SHIFT IN THE concept of *ownership*, from God, to man, and now to the state. It must be made clear that God's ownership has never been clearly and truly recognized by any society, although, in the days of faithfulness, it was the premise of Israel's social order. In Christendom, it has had at times a very limited degree of recognition. Again, private ownership has not had a very long history; the façade of private ownership has usually masked other realities. Today, state ownership of men and the earth, an ancient premise, is increasingly the stress of one civil government after another. We have here the fascist façade of private ownership, with statist taxation, regulations, and controls making it clear that the essential ownership is with the state.

In the American colonies, ultimate ownership of the land belonged to the English monarch. All landholders were technically tenants of the king, feudal tenants, that is. Their heirs could assume tenancy, but the Crown could exercise eminent domain at will. Apart from the Crown, ownership was not possible, i.e., the limited tenancy "ownership." "There was no other route to property title."[1] Although for a time after the War of Independence private ownership prevailed, step by step the state claimed the powers of the English Crown, so that today, despite the façade of private ownership, "the state owns the land outright."[2]

It is not only the land which the state claims ownership over, but the people as well. Court cases involving Christian school children and parents regularly see the assertion of the state's parenthood over old and young, and their claims to radical controls over them.

Scripture, however, tells us that "The earth is the LORD's, and the fulness thereof; the world, and they that dwell therein" (Ps. 24:1). God asserts clearly His title to the earth and all the peoples thereof, as Creator and Ruler. God's judgement on Egypt is based on this claim: "the earth is the LORD's" (Exod. 9:29). It is more than a claim: it is the basic fact of the universe. In all matters, including diet, God's Word is law, because, Paul reminds us, "the earth is the Lord's, and the fulness thereof" (1 Cor. 10:26, 28). When God declares Himself to be LORD, and when Christ is declared LORD, by this word total property rights and ownership over all creation are asserted. The law has as its premise this fact: God speaks the command word, because "I am the LORD your God" (Lev. 26:1; etc.).

God's sanctuary or temple was thus so separate or holy that only the authorized priests could officiate, and only on God's terms. Not even the well-intentioned man could touch the ark without the judgment of death, as in the case of Uzzah (2 Sam. 6:6–7). When King Uzziah attempted to take on priestly functions, God struck him down with leprosy (2 Chron. 26:17–23).

A very important text in this matter is Ezra 7:24. In reestablishing Jerusalem, Ezra sought for and obtained from Artaxerxes and the Persian Empire the ancient immunities of the temple. The decree accordingly read, "Also we certify you, that touching any of the priests and Levites, singers, porters, Nethinims, or ministers of this house of God, it shall not be lawful to impose toll, tribute, or custom, upon them" (Ezra 7:24). According to Ezra 8:20, the Nethinim, meaning "those who are given," were temple servants whom David and the princes had appointed for temple work. Josephus (*Ant.* 11.5.1.) called them temple slaves. If this be true, it is a remarkable fact that, centuries later, even after the destruction of Jerusalem, these people were faithful to their calling. Myers says of the rescript of Artaxerxes (Ezra 7:11–26), "With certain exceptions, this reads almost like some of the Persepolis Treasury Tablets . . . This document was written for the king by someone familiar with Jewish affairs."[3] This is the first clear recognition of the immunity of God's house and work from state control. It is possible that Joseph was behind Pharaoh's grant of Goshen centuries earlier (Gen. 46:31–34) with this tacit goal of religious separation

and freedom. At any rate, what is important here is that Artaxerxes gave full freedom, not only to the temple or house of God, but to the humblest person serving the temple in the most menial capacity. It should be noted also that Artaxerxes not only gave freedom to the house of God, but he recognized *the independent jurisdiction* of the God of Scripture. God's law was to govern Judea, and the death penalty was to be imposed as God's law required. Even more, as Ezra 7:21–26 of the rescript makes clear, a blank check on the royal treasury was granted up to a point:

> And I, even Artaxerxes the king, do make a decree to all the treasurers which are beyond the river, that whatsoever Ezra the priest, the scribe of the law of God of heaven, shall require of you, it be done speedily, Unto an hundred talents of silver, and to an hundred measures of wheat, and to an hundred baths of wine, and to an hundred baths of oil, and salt without prescribing how much. Whatsoever is commanded by the God of heaven, let it be diligently done for the house of the God of heaven: for why should there be wrath against the realm of the king and his sons? Also we certify you, that touching any of the priests and Levites, singers, porters, Nethinims, or ministers of this house of God, it shall not be lawful to impose toll, tribute, or custom, upon them. And thou, Ezra, after the wisdom of thy God, that is in thine hand, set magistrates and judges, which may judge all the people that are beyond the river, all such as know the laws of thy God; and teach ye them that know not. And whosoever will not do the law of thy God, and the law of the king, let judgment be executed speedily upon him, whether it be unto death, or to banishment, or to confiscation of goods, or to imprisonment. (Ezra 7:21–26)

The importance of this amazing rescript is too seldom appreciated. *First*, imperial powers were not given to recognizing the power and sovereignty of the gods of a conquered people. The conquest of a people was seen as the conquest of their god and religion, and their images and sacred vessels were added to the conqueror's temple, as servants of his god. For Artaxerxes to give such deference to the God of Israel was an amazing fact.

Second, the commands or law of God concerning His house and His land were recognized as valid, and the temple was made again the law

center and the governing center of Judea. While Judea remained a part of the Persian Empire, it had an unprecedented area of independence. It is not surprising that neighboring peoples were disturbed.

Third, Artaxerxes gives a *religious* reason for this recognition of immunity: "for why should there be wrath against the realm of the king and his sons?" Persia had a more tolerant policy towards subject peoples than other empires, but we are beyond toleration here. We have a recognition of immunity.

Fourth, not only is the sway of God's law recognized as valid over Judea, but Artaxerxes ordered the proselytizing of other peoples: "Teach ye them that know not."

These immunities claimed by religious Israel were later maintained against Rome. Rome granted, reluctantly, some of these immunities, to avoid rebellion. It did, however, control the naming of the high priest and thus at all times held to its claim of sovereign power over the temple. At the same time, synagogues throughout the empire were free from the major controls required of other religions.

As a result, the early church, viewed by Rome as another Jewish sect, and the church as another synagogue, had like immunities until the time of the Jewish-Roman War. After that war, the persecution of the church was under way.

The church refused to recognize the sovereignty or lordship of Caesar, because Jesus Christ is Lord (Phil. 2:9–11). The research of J. N. D. Kelly indicates that the earliest baptismal confession was that "Jesus is Lord."[4] The struggle between Rome and the church was over the issue of licensure, regulation, taxation, and control. Rome required all religions to be licensed or licit religions. Behind that issue was the question of sovereignty: who is the lord or sovereign, Christ or Caesar?

The issue today is essentially the same. The modern Baal or Molech, i.e., master or king, is the state. To this, no Biblical theology can give assent.

11

ATHEISM, MORALITY, LAW, AND THE STATE

THE RISE OF ANTINOMIANISM WITHIN THE CHURCH HAS MADE POSSIBLE the rise of the humanistic state. Since all morality and law rest on religious premises, for the church to undermine the universal application of God's law has been to surrender any relevance to problems of social order, to deny the sovereign power of God over every realm, including law and the state, and to retreat into practical polytheism. In the United States, 50 million evangelical church members who should be champions of the Lord's crown rights over civil government are indifferent to Christ's kingship. The result is that civil government reflects the principles of atheism rather than Biblical faith.

Both evangelicals and modernists are united in their affirmation of antinomianism. Andrew Jackson Young, while the U.S. United Nations ambassador, expressed this faith in an interview:

> Morality for me is thinking clearly through the alternatives and making a decision that is best for the largest number of people . . . I learned my foreign policy in theology class, not in the church. I was reading Reinhold Niebuhr, Paul Tillich, Dietrich Bonhoeffer . . . My understanding of Jesus Christ is that he came to fulfill the law. And you're trying to talk in terms of a moral law. I don't believe in it.[1]

We are saved by God's grace in and through the atonement of Christ, but we are not saved to be lawless, but to be faithful to God's righteousness or justice as set forth in His law. The law is our means of sanctification.

Humanism has deep roots in history, and the first and classic statement thereof is in Genesis 3:5, every man as his own god, knowing or determining good and evil for himself. Atheism is a late and logical development in the history of humanism. Although an undercurrent in previous Western history, it was only in the nineteenth century, or in the late eighteenth, that it became a vocal and open movement.

In Ludwig Feuerbach (1804–1872), atheism found its philosopher and its classic expression. Feuerbach saw the idea of God as an objectification of human ideas and ideals. Hence, the idea of God for Feuerbach was a product of human experience. What man says about God reveals what man feels about man; thus, when theology says, "God is love," all we have is a revelation of how important love is to man. All theological statements were thus for Feuerbach psychological manifestations. For Karl Marx, using Feuerbach, theological statements were expressions of the ruling classes' exploitive mythology; hence, for him, religion was the opium of the people.

For the eighteenth century French *philosophes*, the criticism of religion was the starting point of philosophy. Autonomous man could only be free with the death of God. Bakunin, the anarchist, held, "If there is a God, man is a slave; but man is free, therefore there is no God." Beginning with the premise of the nonexistence of God and the autonomy and freedom of man, Feuerbach reduced the idea of God to human experience. This reduction placed man's psychology in the forefront as the key to life, and, with Freud, psychology supplanted philosophy and religion as the central cultural force.

With atheism, the logic of humanism came into clear focus. Benjamin Franklin was an early champion of a humanistic morality. His well-known proverb, "Honesty is the best policy," summarized the new faith. Honesty now rested, not in God's command, but on human utility. The key factor is *the best policy*; for Franklin, honesty was indeed the best policy, but for Nietzsche, dishonesty replaced honesty as the moral way, i.e., as the best policy.

The result has been the triumph of humanistic laws replacing God's law, and the rise of *reasons of state* as the rationale of law. The modern state legislates, operates, and plans as if there were no God; its basic and implicit premise is that God and Christianity are dead.

As a result, we have a new establishment of religion undergirding law, the atheistic, humanistic state. At the same time, atheism as an *organized* force has receded, because over-success has made unnecessary any formal atheistic cause. Its premises are now a part of church, state, and school.

The Victorian age broke with Christianity while paying lip service to a surface observance of moral forms. Its religious goals were Hellenic, and ancient Greece and Athens, not Israel and Jerusalem, its spiritual homeland. Step by step since then, the surface forms of Christianity have been dropped until, as MacIntyre[2] has noted, "the point has been reached at which physics and politics — using both terms in their broadest sense — define a world in which theism has no place at all." Autonomous man now makes his own laws; he asserts his freedom from God, and his freedom to accept or reject God. The Arminian emphasis on free will supports and lives at ease with atheism. To cite MacIntyre again,

> But if belief in truths of a factual kind cannot be chosen, then belief that can be chosen cannot have as its object truths of a factual kind. Therefore, if modern Christian theology treats Christian belief as belief that can be chosen, the truths of Christian orthodoxy must be regarded as something other than factual in kind.[3]

Churchmen have progressively watered down the content of Christianity so that it is well said that "[t]heists are offering atheists less and less in which to disbelieve."[4]

At present, law has been severed from God and is in essence atheistic; it presupposes a sovereign man, not the sovereign God. Churchmen, by their acceptance of contemporary non-Biblical law, have given assent to atheism as the religion of society. The result has been the virtual disappearance of atheism as an organized movement, because our antinomian churches advocate precisely what atheism worked to introduce, the supplanting of theocratic Biblical law with humanistic statist law. Atheism in the twentieth century has conquered church, state, and school. The atheistic vision of a social order stripped of God's law has been realized.

The disastrous fact in all this is that pietistic antinomianism has been atheism's greatest ally. The theologians of the church have stripped the world of the glory and government of God. I am regularly told by such men that the idea of a Christian state is theologically and eschatologically

impossible. In the "Gospel age," such men say, the world is under the dominion of Satan. As Arend J. ten Pas shows, in *The Lordship of Christ*,[5] one school of thought denies that in this era Christ can be Lord, or is even to be called Lord.

Our present predicament has been over three centuries in developing. It will not disappear overnight. A serious fallacy in contemporary thought is an inheritance from Greece, the *deus ex machina* concept, i.e., god out of a machine. For the ancient Greeks, the universe generated itself out of chaos. The gods hence did not control all things but were themselves controlled by fate. As superior beings, the gods could at best at times interrupt history, and, out of context, rescue men and causes. Thus, Paris was snatched away from certain death on the battlefield to be dropped into Helen's bedroom and a happier encounter. Too often Christians want a like rescue, one which does violence to God's providential universe and history. There is no conflict between the supernatural and natural in Scripture, because both are God's creation. His way with us, with history, and with all things, is usually, as in Isaiah 28:10, "For precept must be upon precept, precept upon precept; line upon line, line upon line; here a little, and there a little." *In God's universe, walls are built from the foundation up.* To expect otherwise is sin.

The humanists, our modern Greeks, also hold to the *deus ex machina* concept, but without the gods. For them, the sudden, saving intervention in history is by man, and this means revolution. For Karl Marx, revolution is the Greek god whose *deus ex machina* intervention in history rights all wrongs. The results of this faith have been slavery and death, not salvation.

All too many churchmen share this faith. They are prone to think of armed resistance when they have neither labored in terms of God's law nor used the legal avenues available to them. Such a humanistic shortcut is not honored by God.

12

THE THEOLOGY OF FASCISM

A SOCIAL ORDER IS A REFLECTION OF THE LIFE OF A PEOPLE AND their faith, and laws on a statute book are on the whole meaningless unless they first of all are written in the hearts of a people.

A statement such as the above will commonly incur and arouse hostility. Men are children of Adam: when confronted by the consequences of their actions, they regularly resort to the excuses offered by Adam and Eve: Adam and Eve saw themselves as *victims, not sinners.* Adam blamed Eve and God, and Eve blamed the serpent (Gen. 3:7–13). Both insisted on seeing themselves as the victims of their environment and of a conspiracy. If Adam and Eve in paradise could see their environment in these terms, we should not wonder that modern man, in a less favorable environment, is very prone to blaming his environment or a conspiracy for his plight. This ploy removes the burden of sin from man, and it is a strategy dear to the heart of anti-Christianity, whether it be conservative, liberal, or radical in its philosophy.

A social order is a reflection of the religion of a people. If the religion is a false one, his social order will not only be false, but its nature will reflect the nature of that false faith.

Man in the twentieth century is humanistic man, but the humanism of our day has characteristics which mark it, even as the humanism of

the Enlightenment had its own particular emphases. The characteristics of an age are products by and large of the faith of an age. Benito Mussolini declared, early in his career, "It is faith that moves mountains, not reason. Reason is a tool, but it can never be the motive force of the crowd. Today less than ever."[1]

Mussolini, although much maligned, should be called the patron saint of twentieth-century humanism. His ideas have been widely adopted but without acknowledgement. National Socialist Germany used Mussolini's ideas, as have the democracies. In the United States, the postal service, Amtrak, and much, much more represent borrowings from Mussolini. Fascism is everywhere condemned since World War II, but everywhere imitated, even in Marxist countries. Fascism is, of course, a form of Marxism: it is in origin *national* socialism, but its basic philosophy is as readily usable for *international* socialism. Biographers of Mussolini stress his faults and avoid dealing with the implications of his life, because it strikes too close to the heart of modern man.

Mussolini lacked a radical commitment to anything other than himself. He recognized this same trait in other men. He knew that an either-or commitment is what men flatter themselves into believing they hold, but he knew that in truth he and other men wanted to eat their cake and to have it too. Men were practical atheists while practicing churchmen. They defended the free market while seeking socialistic subsidies. They championed freedom while asking for a benevolent slavery. They wanted socialism with freedom, religion without the responsibilities of faith, and private property with all the imagined benefits of socialism. The meaning of such a desire is *fascism.*

Fascism is growing progressively everywhere precisely because of the hostility to an antithesis. Like Israel of old, men halt between two opinions. They refuse to make the choice called for by Joshua:

> Now therefore fear the LORD, and serve him in sincerity and in truth: and put away the gods which your fathers served on the other side of the flood, and in Egypt: and serve ye the LORD. And if it seem evil unto you to serve the LORD, choose you this day whom ye will serve; whether the gods which your fathers served that were on the other side of the flood, or the gods of the Amorites, in whose land ye dwell: but as for me and my house, we will serve the LORD. (Josh. 24:14–15)

The characteristic sin of the united Israel, and, later, of the northern kingdom, was syncretism, the attempt to join two alien faiths into one under the pretense of Jehovah worship. It is this unwillingness to be either one thing or the other which leads to religious syncretism and to its political analogue, fascism.

In theology today, men profess to believe in the God of Scripture while denying His sovereignty and His predestination. They are thereby trying to affirm both God and Satan, the principles of the fall and of salvation, at one and the same time.

In philosophy, for example, Walter Kaufmann, in *Without Guilt and Justice*, affirms the radical autonomy of man. He proclaims the death of God and sees therefore the necessity of abandoning the concepts of guilt and justice. Guilt and justice are in essence theological concepts which presuppose the existence of the God of Scripture, and Kaufmann is logical in rejecting them in favor of autonomy. Do we have here a clear awareness of the antithesis between God and apostasy from God? Far from it. Kaufmann believes that we can accept the tempter's offer in Genesis 3:1–5, and abandon God, justice, and guilt, and still have integrity, honesty, and morality![2] A Christian world without Christ is an impossibility. A moral world based on autonomous man is a contradiction. Prof. Kaufmann should affirm de Sade, logically, but he wants all the comfort and order of Princeton University, a product of Calvinism, without that faith. Kaufmann's world is an impossible one, but it is the world of fascist premises, the attempt to have the best of all possible worlds.

Fascism governs current economics, which operates on the premise that a *mixed economy*, part socialist, part free, is the happiest solution.

In Mussolini, this spirit of fascism was called *opportunism*. Mussolini was a practicing atheist who worked for the church, and planned to die a Catholic, although, up to the last, he postponed even a formal reconciliation with the church.[3] At the same time, he spoke eloquently about the importance of the faith, declaring, nine months before his death.

> We are Catholics by conviction. I am a Catholic by conviction, because I believe that Catholicism is the religion which possesses a doctrine capable of resolving all the problems of life, individual and social, national and international; and in the conflict between the spirit and materialism it sustains and desires the primacy and the victory of the spirit.[4]

In their association with Evangelist Billy Graham, a generation of American political leaders has taken a similar stand.

Because politics is the outworking of the faith and life of a people, we cannot have genuine and valid changes in political life without having first of all a change in their faith. Fascism, as a compromise philosophy, is a form of Marxist socialism which seeks to preserve the façade of freedom. Property remains nominally in private hands, but by taxation, regulations, and controls, it becomes state property in which liabilities remain with the nominal owners.

Paul, in writing to Timothy, spoke of an ungodly generation marked as "Having a form of godliness, but denying the power thereof: from such turn away" (2 Tim. 3:5). Men with such a faith will call false pastors; they will vote for politicians who, in the name of freedom, institute socialism. Politics is an expression of faith. Fascism is the mark of a people who want syncretism, but want it bearing the label of freedom. A syncretistic faith begets a syncretistic politics.

The twentieth century began with an extensive socialist movement throughout the Western world. That movement had a popular following before 1917; later, its followers were the intellectuals. The grim realities of the Russian Revolution did not sit well with the workers. German and Italian socialists revised their Marxism: if the people wanted the form of ownership and freedom with the results of Marxist socialism, then the two could be combined. The result was fascism. The name, *fascism*, was discredited after 1946. The democracies have adopted its reality, however, combining the forms of freedom and ownership with the reality of statist control, sovereignty, ownership, and power. Fascism is socialism for the hypocrites.

CITIES OF REFUGE

VERY CLEARLY, THE CITIES OF REFUGE ARE AN IMPORTANT ASPECT OF Biblical law. They are frequently mentioned in the law: Numbers 35:6, 9–34; Deuteronomy 4:41–43; 19:1–13; Exodus 21:12–14; Joshua 20:1–9; 21:13, 21, 27; and 1 Chronicles 6:57, 67. Basic to the fact of sanctuary is the *altar* (Exod. 21:14; 1 Kings 1:50–53; 2:28). Our concern with this law will be limited to its meaning for the doctrine of church and state.

First, it is clear that the asylum granted was religious; it was tied to the life and death of the high priest, and it was related to the altar. The final court of justice was thus theological. The laws by which man must live come from God, and thus the last appeal in law is to the source of law. We have thus something of a superior or supreme court function here. Justification, declaring a man just or righteous, comes from the altar of atonement, and the God of the altar is the source of all law and hence of all righteousness or justice. The city of refuge said in effect that, against the beliefs and conclusions of men, God provides an asylum or sanctuary. As a result, both freedom and justice are made central to society, in that men are made immune to the totalitarian disposition of fallen man.

Second, this asylum or sanctuary applied only to the man involved in an accidental death in which he had no guilt. To escape the kinsman who sought vengeance, he was to take refuge in one of the specified cities. This

refuge was his security until the death of the high priest, at which time he could leave the city. In the meantime, he was secure within the city. The sanctuary thus represented justice.

Third, the elders of the city of refuge exercised a judicial function. They reviewed all the evidence concerning the death and either granted sanctuary or delivered the man to the avenger of blood (Deut. 19:12; Josh. 20:4–5). The city of refuge thus provided a court of law, but, unlike other city elders, the city of refuge had elders with an added function, judicial functions of a specialized nature.

Fourth, not only were the cities of refuge located at various points in the realm to give ready access to a fleeing man, but the roads were to get particular care to allow quick access (Deut. 19:3).

Let us turn again to the fact that sanctuary or asylum was a religious fact. In a variety of cultures, sacred places are places of asylum. Thus, among the Aruntas of central Australia, there was a spot near each totem center which was sacred. Nothing there could be hurt, not even plants, let alone man. Such places of asylum existed among many North American Indian tribes. The Barotse of South Central Africa had a sacred city of refuge; among other peoples, the temple was sacred. In Morocco, the tombs of saints and mosques offered asylum. Ancient Greece, the pagan Slavs, the ancient Irish, and others knew and observed the right of sanctuary.[1] However, Westermarck called it "obviously erroneous . . . that places of refuge were established with a view to protecting unintentional offenders from punishment or revenge."[2] The legal and moral purpose of God's law is thus quite different.

Next, it is necessary to note that the sacredness which gave asylum belonged at times to rulers. Thus, in the Theodosian Code we find the following:

> Title 44: Those Persons Who Flee for Sanctuary to the Statues of the Emperors (De His Qui Ad Statuas Confugiunt)
>
> I. Emperors Valentinian, Theodosius, and Arcadius Augustus to Cynegius, Praetorian Prefect.
>
> We suffer those persons who have taken refuge at the statues of the Emperors, either for the purpose of avoiding danger or of creating ill will, neither to be taken away by anyone before the tenth day nor to go away of their own accord; provided that, if they had definite reasons for which they had to flee to the statues of the Emperors, they shall be protected by law and the

> statutes. But if they should be revealed to have wished to create ill will against their enemies by their own artifices, an avenging sentence shall be pronounced against them.[3]

The date of this edict is July 6, A.D. 386. It shows some influence of the Biblical doctrine. It was logical that the imperial power, which earlier had been a divine power and the emperor a god, should grant sanctuary, because sanctuary is a religious fact. A few years later, the code showed a like recognition of the church as a sanctuary:

> TITLE 45: THOSE PERSONS WHO FLEE FOR SANCTUARY TO THE CHURCHES (DE HIS QUI AD ECCLESIAS CONFUGIUNT)
>
> I. Emperors Theodosius, Arcadius, and Honorius Augustuses to Romulus, Count of the Sacred Imperial Largesses. If public debtors should suppose that they may take refuge in the churches, they shall either be dragged out of their hiding places at once, or payment of their debts shall be exacted of the bishops who are proved to have harbored them. Your Eminent Authority shall know, therefore, that no debtor hereafter shall be defended by clerics, or else the debts shall be paid by the clerics for a debtor who they suppose ought to be defended. Given on the fifteenth day before the Kalends of November at Constantinople in the year of the second consulship of Arcadius Augustus and the consulship of Rufinus. — October 18, 392.

Clearly, the right of sanctuary in a church was recognized. What was denied was the right of debtors, perhaps because of exorbitant taxes, to seek that sanctuary.

On February 12, 405, another edict granted sanctuary to all who fled from the Donatists, such as slaves who were being forced into rebaptism; Catholic churches were recognized as sanctuaries against forced conversions.[4]

In time, the right of sanctuary extended to the church grounds. In England, where as early as King Ethelbert in A.D. 600 sanctuary was recognized, it came in time to extend beyond the church grounds. At Beverley and Hexham, the area of sanctuary extended to a mile from the church and was marked by sanctuary crosses, some of which still stand. Under the Normans, a royal charter confirmed the English doctrine of sanctuary and

allowed the refugee to "abjure the realm," i.e., to leave the kingdom within a specified time and swear an oath not to return without the king's leave. In some churches, the place of sanctuary was a special seat, in others, simply a door knocker. All violations of sanctuary were punishable by excommunication. England abolished the right of sanctuary by act of Parliament in 1697. In other European countries, it ended in the eighteenth century, especially in the latter years.[5]

In Scotland, the right of sanctuary was abolished at the Reformation, with one exception. Debtors could take refuge at Holyrood House and its precincts. This refuge did not apply to Crown debtors nor to fraudulent bankrupts. After twenty-four hours, the debtor had to record his name at the abbey court to gain further protection. This condition of asylum continued through the nineteenth century.[6]

All too often, commentators have viewed the cities of refuge (and the right of sanctuary) as marks of a primitive culture.[7] On the contrary, they had and have reference to the fact of a fallen world and the need for justice as against an evil society. The sanctuary provided a check against the sins of men and rulers, against injustice from men and the state.

A most significant fact about the cities of refuge was that they were Levitical cities, cities set aside as places of residence for the Levites (Num. 35:1–8). The Levites were the teachers of Israel in the things of God (Deut. 33:10). It was their duty thus not only to teach the law but to make the law a refuge from oppression.

Biblical law is case law. The *case* given for the law of refuge is accidental death. If in such cases refuge applied, it applied all the more to cases of flagrant injustice. Not surprisingly, the church from its earliest days recognized the fact and very early gained a recognition of it from people and rulers alike.

We are told by historians that, as the power of Rome faltered, the "vacuum" was filled by Christian bishops. Thus, when Troyes was threatened by Attila's Huns in the middle of the fifth century, the people looked to the bishop for rescue. In time, bishops came to have armies and to defend their areas. For about six hundred years, churchmen commanded this kind of authority.[8]

It was more than a vacuum that gave the bishops their power. Roman rule had become tyranny. The church represented God's law and a sanctuary against tyranny. It was this simple fact which gave the church and the bishops their power and authority. Subsequently, as the church became

itself an oppressor at times, authority shifted to feudal lords. With their corruption, it shifted to the Vatican, and so on.

The church was a sanctuary, not merely because of its continuity with Israel, but because it represented God's law, God's justice on earth. Today, the modern state is an increasingly oppressive tyranny. Only as the church becomes the voice of God's law and a sanctuary against injustice can the power of the current tyranny be broken.

There are now no cities of refuge. In 1981, a retired man, seeking a place safe from crime, nuclear or other wars, and violence, located an island with a remarkable record of peace, and moved there. In 1982, war struck his place of refuge, the Falkland Islands!

The modern state is failing. Peter Drucker has observed, "I see government as obese and muscle bound and having lost its capacity to perform. It's senile to the point of becoming incontinent, and it ought to be in diapers."[9] The modern state has no future. If man is to have one, the church must provide it by total faithfulness to Christ our King.

14

EXTRATERRITORIALITY

A VERY IMPORTANT BIBLICAL CONCEPT VERY MUCH OVERLOOKED IN our day is extraterritoriality. Before dealing directly with this subject, it is necessary to examine its background.

An important Biblical word is the Greek *paroikos*, stranger or alien, and *paroikia*, the stay or sojourn of a noncitizen. H. Bietenhard defined *paroikos* thus: "the noncitizen, one who lives among resident citizens without having citizen rights yet enjoying the protection of the community."[1] This is technically correct, and yet misleading.

To understand *paroikos*, the word from whence we get *parish* and *parochial*, we must understand how Israel viewed the stranger or foreigner. God's law repeatedly refers to the stranger and requires particular recognition of their freedom. They are not to be oppressed, and discrimination against them is forbidden. "One law shall be to him that is homeborn, and unto the stranger that sojourneth among you" (Exod. 12:49). This law was given to Israel in Egypt, before their departure, to stress the fact that justice is without respect of persons. The protection of the law must extend to aliens: "Ye shall have one manner of law, as well for the stranger, as for one of your own country: for I am the LORD your God" (Lev. 24:22; Num. 15:15–16). Racial or national differences could not be used to bar aliens from knowledge of God's law, nor from the Passover (Num. 9:14; Deut. 31:10–12; Josh. 8:34–35). Because the foreigner, if not seeking admission into the covenant, had another religion, he was not required to abide by the

ritual laws the covenant requires. He could enter into long-term debt, for example (Deut. 15:3; cf. 23:21), and disregard the dietary laws (Deut. 14:21). The foreigner could not ascend Israel's throne (Deut. 17:15). However, his status was that of a privileged guest.

All this has reference to the ordinary foreigner, whether rich or poor, prominent or insignificant. Let us now glance at another fact, the embassy and ambassadors. From ancient times, the embassy has had extraterritorial rights. On embassy grounds, the law of the mother country prevails; the embassy is a bit of foreign soil in the host country. The ambassador and his associates and staff have immunities from local law, and to touch their persons has often been regarded as an act of war. When Hanun of Ammon took David's embassy, cut off half of their beards (shaving off one side), and cut off their garments to expose their buttocks, it was regarded by David as an act of war (2 Sam. 10:1–14).

St. Paul says of himself and others, "we are ambassadors for Christ" (2 Cor. 5:20). To emphasize the hostility to the gospel, Paul speaks of himself as "an ambassador in bonds" (Eph. 6:20). The idea of an ambassador being in *chains* (*halusis*) emphasizes the evil of Paul's bondage. It is more than an injustice; it is a radical violation of any idea of law and is an act of war. Some scholars say that Paul's use of the word *ambassadors* is metaphorical. There is no reason whatsoever to believe so. Paul sees himself as the representative and ambassador of Christ the Lord.

Let us now go on to another fact. A *paroikos* and *paroikia* could and sometimes did represent a great power. That great power would insist on immunities and freedom for its citizens above and beyond either the status of a foreigner or an embassy. Thus, the Ottoman Empire granted *capitulations* soon after the conquest of Constantinople to Venice and Genoa. These *capitulations* gave extraterritoriality and other privileges and immunities to these two powers. In the nineteenth century, Western powers by pressure and force wrested *capitulations* from a number of powers which had been oppressive of the rights of foreigners. Among those from whom *capitulations* were gained were Turkey, Egypt, China, Persia, Morocco, Siam, and Japan. While abuses did result, these immunities had been demanded because even greater abuses had prevailed. Since World War II, all *capitulations* have disappeared. However, at the same time we have had a breakdown in the immunities of embassies and their staffs. The most notable such instance was the Iranian seizure of the American embassy during President Carter's tenure of office.

The word *capitulations* belongs to the era since the rise of Ottoman Turkey, but the fact is an old one. The empires of antiquity required more than ordinary immunities for their embassies, and Rome was no exception. It is today a matter of diplomatic concern how, at state dinners, ambassadors are seated. The greater the foreign power, the greater its privilege and rank, and the more important its seating. In our time, some concern has been expressed over the power exercised by various major powers through their embassies over various smaller states. The United States, the Soviet Union, France, and Britain, for example, have by subsidies, pressures, and assistance exercised controls in and over many lesser nations. There is nothing new in all this. The greater the power, the greater the practical, working privileges and immunities of its embassy. Even more so in antiquity, every great power saw itself as having power, immunity, and freedom within all satellite states.

Let us take as an example Bithynia before its conquest by Rome. Let us assume that some Roman leaders were in Bithynia, and some men of like stature from Bithynia in Rome. Each and every one on both sides would be a stranger or alien, a *paroikos*, but there would still be a difference. The Roman stranger would expect and demand as his right a variety of privileges which the other would not. Precisely because of the greatness of Rome, the ideas of alien, ambassador, and privileged immunities would merge.

This is exactly what happened in the early church. All the powers and liberties of God's temple now accrued to the church. God as absolute Lord could not be controlled or governed in His person, *paroikia*, or embassy by any human power. To touch Christ's church was as evil as laying lawless hands upon the ark.

The most obvious fact about the early church was that it saw Christ's realm as sacrosanct and beyond the jurisdiction of the state. The whole matter was summed up for them in their baptismal affirmation, "Jesus Christ is Lord" (Phil. 2:9–11). The Roman saw himself as a Roman wherever he went, always under Roman law; he was thus a *paroikos* who carried with him a very great power. A foreigner in Rome was on a humble footing, but a Roman in another land was an extension of Rome. It was especially galling to Rome to see the Christians enter Rome with the same assumptions.

The case of Paul is a particularly telling one, and it was likely both baffling and irritating to Romans. Paul was a Roman citizen, born a Roman (Acts 22:25–29), and yet, with this high status, he gave higher status to his

apostleship. Paul used his Roman citizenship to gain freedom to advance the claims of the gospel and the freedom of Christ's realm. In Roman eyes, he should have given priority to Rome and to Caesar over the church and Christ.

The church, however, declared its allegiance to the lord of all, Jesus Christ. It refused to turn over to the state those powers and realms which constitute Christ's *paroikia* and embassy on earth. The *paroikia* of the Great King cannot be controlled by other powers.

15

THE MESSIAHSHIP

THE EARLY CHURCH FACED A PROBLEM, NOT IN THE RECOGNITION OF Christ's deity, but His humanity. There were too many eyewitnesses to the miracles and power of Jesus Christ. As long as witnesses were alive, both Rome and Judea preferred to be silent about facts which could not be answered. Late in the first century, it was the joy of the surviving witnesses to the life of Christ to greet each other joyfully, saying: Have you seen? We have seen. Have you heard? We have heard. Have you touched? We have touched. John, in his first letter, begins by referring to his privilege of having been one who saw, heard, and touched the Lord of Glory:

> That which was from the beginning, which we have heard, which we have seen with our eyes, which we have looked upon, and our hands have handled, of the Word of life: (For the life was manifested, and we have seen it, and bear witness, and shew unto you that eternal life, which was with the Father, and was manifested unto us;) That which we have seen and heard declare we unto you, that ye also may have fellowship with us: and truly our fellowship is with the Father, and with his Son, Jesus Christ. (1 John 1:1–3)

Believing that the risen Jesus is the Christ or Messiah and the very Son of God was not the problem. It was believing that this person was also

man. As a result, one group, the earliest group of heretics, if we except the Judaizers, insisted on reducing Jesus' humanity to an illusion, an appearance assumed for a time by God. These were the Docetae, and their faith, Gnostic in origin, Docetism. The *deity* of Jesus Christ was easiest of all to believe for all in the early years.

Also, Jesus was recognized by the church as the Christ, the Messiah. Add to this the fact that most of the members of the early church were Jews, and for them "Christ" was not Jesus's last name but His royal title. At its minimum, the Jews of our Lord's day believed that the Messiah would be a royal descendent of David, endowed by the Spirit of God to establish a new and greater kingdom. The foundation of His throne would be justice in terms of God's law; His realm would be worldwide, and it would be a Kingdom over this world.[1]

The early church took this faith and hope and expanded it in terms of the combined teaching of both Testaments. The prophecies of Isaiah were especially popular preaching texts, verses such as Isaiah 2:1–4, which see all nations ruled from Zion, the true church, and world peace under the government of the Christ. Isaiah 9:1–7 not only prophesied the birth of Jesus Christ but declared Him to be the king of the increase of whose government there shall be no end. The law, the writings, and the prophets were joyfully read with their promises of the triumph of the Christ. Whatever their eschatologies, the early church, until Augustine and his amillennialism, saw only a very literal triumph by Christ over the nations of this world. For the early church, Jesus Christ was very literally "King of kings, and Lord of lords" (Rev. 19:16). For them this world was very seriously a realm to be conquered for Christ and by Christ.

This presented a problem in dealing with the state, Jewish, Roman, Parthian, and all else. If Jesus Christ is king and lord, God incarnate, and believers are members of His royal household and kingdom, then what place is there for allegiance to any other state? Indeed, what right does any other state have even to exist?

We cannot understand Paul's answer in Romans 13:1ff. apart from this problem. A very serious impediment to the understanding of the letters of the New Testament is the failure of many to think of their context. None of the apostles dealt with abstractions; they wrote in answer to specific questions and problems. The questions Paul deals with in Romans 13 are obvious in the text: Can we be obedient to any ungodly rulers or authorities now that the Messiah has come? Do we not disobey Christ our Lord

if we obey these ungodly rulers? What is our obligation to these rulers, if any? In Israel and Judea, the authorities had been, in name at least, ministers of God, whatever their waywardness. Roman and other rulers represent the world of will-worship and idolatry. Was it no compromise to pay taxes, or to obey civil laws and magistrates? These were not the questions of rebellious men but the earnest inquiries of believers who wanted to be faithful to Jesus Christ and were ready to die for Him whose death had given them salvation for time and eternity.

Paul's answer takes on a clearer meaning when we recognize its context. *First*, Paul categorically demands submission to all higher powers. This is a religious principle required by God who has ordained all such powers for His sovereign purposes. While all obedience to human authorities is subject to God's prior authority and in terms of His Word, submission is the general premise, because we are not our own; we are the Lord's, and He sets the terms of our life by His law-word.

Second, we are to obey for conscience' sake (Rom. 13:5), i.e., because God requires it. We obey ungodly rulers, not because the state requires it, but because God requires it. We are subject, therefore, not "for wrath" or fear of punishment, but on religious grounds, i.e., in terms of God's explicit Word.

Third, these rulers are called ministers or deacons of God, called to serve Him as a ministry of justice. They "are ordained of God" (Rom. 13:1). They are thus no less under God than we are. To resist lawful authority is to resist the ordinance of God and to receive damnation (Rom. 13:2). We are to "render therefore to all their dues" (Rom. 13:7), and Paul spells this out specifically.

Fourth, it is clear what the ministry of rulers is to be, i.e., to be a terror to evil works (Rom. 13:3). Thus, just as God through Paul lays down the duty of obedience for the subject, he also lays down the duty of obedience for the ruler, to be a terror to evildoers. The state has a duty to maintain order, and the name of that order is justice. Obedience is thus required from both the state and the peoples thereof, *obedience to God.* Those Gentiles who, while not having received the law from God given through Moses, do still, because God's law is the law of life, keep that law to some degree, do thereby manifest that law which God has written in the being of all men (Rom. 2:14–15). Thus, unbelief on the part of rulers is not a ground in itself for civil disobedience, as long as the state is a terror to evildoers and the protector of the just. When it is hostile to Christ's work and seeks

to hamper or destroy it, "We ought to obey God rather than men" (Acts 5:29). Also, when the state becomes a terror to good works, it has ceased to merit our obedience. As a minister of God, the state must be "a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil" (Rom. 13:4).

Fifth, from all this it is clear that the state has been placed by God on a theological basis. As much as any man or the church, it has the duty to serve and obey God. No more than any man is the state exempt from God's law and judgment. While the Christian can be a subject to a state which is not Christian, he must recognize that God sees the state as *His* ministry, not an agency for the welfare of rulers or the people. If the state is the minister of God, then it must recognize the Lord Christ, the Messiah, and, like all things else, serve and obey Him.

The early church resisted Rome's attempts to license and control the church in the name of Christ's *lordship.* The Messiah is lord over all things, including the state, and it is blasphemy for the state to seek to control Christ's body, the church, His embassy on earth. It is one thing for us to submit with respect to our persons, property, and work, another for the state to claim submission from the church. There is not one word in all the New Testament to give any ground for this.

How can Jesus be the Messiah, the world ruler, if the state governs and controls His embassy? The Messiah is the judge over the nations (Isa. 2:4). How can He in any sense be made subject to them? If He is King over all kings, and Lord over all lords (Rev. 19:16), how can the subjects command their Lord Messiah? The simple fact is that it was not morally or theologically possible for the early church to justify submission, nor is it possible now.

Our Lord both recognized the existence of the state, and also its demonic lust for power apart from Him (Luke 22:25–30). Christ called His disciples and appointed unto them a kingdom, the messianic Kingdom of God (Luke 22:29–30). This was not a realm to surrender to Caesar. Indeed, He called the realm of the ungodly state "the power of darkness" (Luke 22:53). Paul calls attention to the ungodliness of civil government outside of Christ (1 Cor. 2:8; 6:1). This realm is to be converted and placed under Christ, not Christ under anything of man. For the Messiah to be under any human power was for the apostolic age unthinkable. Conflict between Christ's church and the caesars was thus inescapable.

THE IMPERIAL PREROGATIVES OF JESUS CHRIST

THE NEW TESTAMENT IS EMPHATIC ABOUT THE IMPERIAL PREROGATIVES of Jesus Christ. St. Paul speaks of this as the inescapable and inevitable fact of history:

> Wherefore God also hath highly exalted him, and given him a name which is above every name: That at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of things in heaven, and things in earth, and things under the earth; And that every tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father. (Phil. 2:9–11)

There shall be no exceptions to Christ's universal sway. *Before* the end of the world, all things shall be under Christ's dominion, and all men, and then the last enemy, death, is destroyed.

> Then cometh the end, when he shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Father; when he shall have put down all rule and all authority and power. For he must reign, till he hath put all enemies under his feet. The last enemy that shall be destroyed is death. (1 Cor. 15:24–26)

This is only natural, for Christ is the one of whom we must say, "And he is before all things, and by him all things consist" (Col. 1:17). He is the Word made flesh: "All things were made by him; and without him was not anything made that was made" (John 1:3). John tells us that Jesus declares, "I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the ending, saith the Lord, which is, and which was, and which is to come, the Almighty" (Rev. 1:8). The word from heaven to earth is, "The kingdoms of this world are become the kingdoms of our Lord, and of his Christ; and he shall reign for ever and ever" (Rev. 11:15). There are no exceptions to this universal sway, for Jesus Christ is the universal king and lord, "King of kings, and Lord of lords" (Rev. 19:16). For any state to attempt to control Christ's realm is an unmitigated evil.

There is still another term applied to Jesus Christ which is an attribute of God (Eph. 1:17), and central to ancient Oriental concepts of absolute royal power, the possession of the glory. Jesus Christ was very clearly seen by the New Testament writers as "the Lord of glory" (James 2:1).

Oriental kings and emperors of great power were seen as the face of God on earth. They were the personal representations of God in time. They were the threshold and hence the mediators of God. As such, they were the possessors of the divine glory. The king was seen as "the revelation of the Glory," and, "The form of the court of the king is preserved in the shape of our churches." The altar is the throne of grace, and "the sanctuary, 'within the rayle,' the place reserved for the circle of the 'friends' of the king."[1] This concept of kingship is essential to an understanding of the world of the Old Testament nations and the world of the New Testament era. The deity in all being manifested its glory in the great kings and in their states. Every reference to the glory of God is also a denial of the glory of earthly kings. When Herod, who should have known better, sought to claim the glory, God struck him down for this profanation within the still standing temple realm. Herod had clothed himself in garments designed to reflect the sun, being made wholly of silver, according to Josephus. The servile mob hailed Herod Agrippa as a god, declaring him to be obviously more than a man.[2]

> And upon a set day Herod, arrayed in royal apparel, sat upon his throne, and made an oration unto them. And the people gave a shout, saying, It is the voice of a god, and not of a man. And immediately the angel of the Lord smote him, because he

> gave not God the glory: and he was eaten of worms, and gave up the ghost. But the word of God grew and multiplied. (Acts 12:21–24)

Buckler called attention to the status of those whom the King of Glory took into His household. *First* they were called *friends*, as Jesus does all who keep His commandments (John 15:15). The word translated as *friends* is *philos* in the Greek, and, when used by a monarch, means *princes of grace*, because all whom a king makes a friend he makes a prince of the royal household and family. This same word is translated as *princes* in the Septuagint version of Esther 1:16.

Second, all who are taken into the royal family by grace are clothed by the Great King as His children. The necessity of being clothed by the Great King is clearly set forth by our Lord in the parable of the wedding feast (Matt. 22:1–14). The king's robe of glory, His holiness and justice, cover His adopted children. To refuse His covering is to refuse Him.

Third, the princes of grace, who by adoption are made members of the royal household, sit at the royal feast. The Lord's table is the royal feast, the visible witness of His providential care for His own. Buckler pointed out

> To partake of the royal feast is to pledge one's self to be a "member" of the king's body. In the words of the prayer of consecration, "that we receiving these thy creatures of bread and wine . . . may be partakers of his most blessed Body and Blood."[3]

Fourth, those who put on Christ put on also the royal righteousness as opposed to a servile righteousness. The royal righteousness manifests the glory of God in joyful obedience to His law-word, whereas servile righteousness is fearful and slavish obedience.

Fifth, by defeating on His cross the power of sin and death, Jesus Christ, the Lord of Glory, defeated the power of the prince of darkness in the very world he had corrupted and captured. Now this world could be reconquered, and the glory of God manifested in every area of life and thought.

Sixth, to ensure the continuity of Christ's Kingdom on earth, the church was established to extend over all the earth the crown rights of the Lord of Glory, and to make disciples of all nations (Matt. 28:18–20). So great is the supernatural power of Christ's true and faithful church that the very gates of hell cannot prevail or hold out against it (Matt. 16:18).

Seventh, to make clear this fact, God the Lord at Pentecost used an ancient symbol of royal glory to manifest His Spirit. According to Acts 2:1–4,

> And when the day of Pentecost was fully come, they were all with one accord in one place. And suddenly there came a sound from heaven as of a rushing mighty wind, and it filled all the house where they were sitting. And there appeared unto them cloven tongues like as of fire, and it sat upon each of them. And they were all filled with the Holy Ghost, and began to speak with other tongues, as the Spirit gave them utterance.

A great blazing light or fire is the ancient symbol of glory. At Pentecost, it was not one fire nor one tongue of light which appeared, but *tongues* of flame. Previously, a tongue of fire had been carried before great kings such as Cyrus, Darius, and Alexander the Great, to signify their claim to be the light of glory. These were all man-made flames, because they were man-made claims to the divine Glory. Now at Pentecost it was God the Spirit who brings the fire, and it comes to all who are the called of God. To cite Buckler again,

> The Holy Spirit is the divine, Royal Glory of the kingdom of God, established on earth by our Lord. The doctrines of its divinity and place in the Trinity as of the same being (*homoousian*) with the Father and the Son, from whom it proceeds, is the Church's assignment to its source of the Glory which is hers through her Lord. From the possession of the Glory proceeds the royal righteousness. It is this fact, which is symbolized in the sacrament of confirmation, which is, in reality, the chiefest of all sacraments, for it is the Epiphany of each son of man.[4]

The ascendancy of the King of Glory, Jesus Christ, to all the pretended kings of glory is most obvious. To suggest that Christ's realm should be controlled or licensed by pretenders is absurd and blasphemous. The modern state, through many symbols, claims to be the bearer of the true glory. This is less true technically of the United States than of other countries, because our Constitution omits all claim to sovereignty, although this claim has been reintroduced by the courts. In spite of this, we do have the reference to the flag as "Old Glory."

This is not all. Every faithful believer is the Temple of the Holy Ghost. By grace, he is made the habitation of God's glory. He thus possesses what kings and states have claimed but do not have, the glory of God. Hence, while the Christian is commanded, under God, to submit to rulers, this can never be a total nor an unqualified submission, because the believer is in the world, but not of the world (John 15:19). The ungodly are of this world (John 8:23). Our Lord is clear that His Kingdom is not *of* or derived from this world (John 18:36). This world therefore has no right to control it.

We must never forget that, in the Old Testament, the Temple, and Holy of Holies, was God's palace and throne room. How seriously this fact had to be taken is apparent in Psalm 24. This psalm celebrates God's absolute sovereignty over all things (vv. 1–2); it gives us the grounds of admission to the royal presence (vv. 3–6). Then the gates of Jerusalem, but, metaphorically, all creation, are summoned to open to the King of Glory (vv. 7–10). The "everlasting doors" are to open to the everlasting King of Glory:

> The earth is the LORD's, and the fulness thereof; the world, and they that dwell therein. For he hath founded it upon the seas, and established it upon the floods. Who shall ascend into the hill of the LORD? or who shall stand in his holy place? He that hath clean hands, and a pure heart; who hath not lifted up his soul unto vanity, nor sworn deceitfully. He shall receive the blessing from the LORD, and righteousness from the God of his salvation. This is the generation of them that seek him, that seek thy face, O Jacob. Selah. Lift up your heads, O ye gates; and be ye lift up, ye everlasting doors; and the King of glory shall come in. Who is this King of glory? The LORD strong and mighty, the LORD mighty in battle. Lift up your heads, O ye gates; even lift them up, ye everlasting doors; and the King of glory shall come in. Who is this King of glory? The LORD of hosts, he is the King of glory. Selah. (Ps. 24:1–10)

The New Testament tells us that Jesus Christ is this Lord of Glory. It is thus the duty of the modern state to let Him in and to submit to Him, not to control Him.

17

THE EDICT OF MILAN

THE WORD *liturgy* COMES FROM THE GREEK *leitos*, PUBLIC, PLUS *ergon*, work. Religion was in antiquity an aspect of the public work of the state, its attempt to ensure good rapport with gods and men alike. It was the function of religion to be the social cement of the state.

Centrality in the cosmos belonged not to the gods but to the state, the divine-human order. Because the state was the central religious institution, and in many cases the only one, the meaning of man's life was comprehended in the state. To be a stateless man was to be separated not only from the religious community but from religion itself. The life of man was defined by the state, which appointed the bounds of his habitation and life.

For the Christian, there can be no life outside of God. We live, and move, and have our being in Him (Acts 17:28). When a Greek made that statement, he saw god as the complex of directions in universal being which came to focus in the state. For the Christian, God is not an entelechy of being but the creator of the universe and separate from it. For him, the life of man is comprehended by God, not by the state. God transcends the natural order, and man, created in the image of God (Gen. 1:26–28), must never see himself as comprehended by nature. His law comes from God, not from himself or the natural world, and hence God is His lawgiver, not the state. God gives His law to the state, the church, man, the family, the school, and all the created order.

Because of this theological fact, religious freedom could be a fact in Israel, but not under paganism. On the other hand, paganism could not tolerate religious freedom, for to do so was to undermine its concept of the state and civil government. It could only grant religious toleration and establishment. Toleration and establishment are different aspects of a single fact. The state which assumes that it has the prerogative to govern and control religion as the sovereign will, by the varying edicts of toleration, establish that religion. It can, in fact, establish *many* religions, as did Rome. However, since *toleration* is a legal fact, that which is tolerated is thereby established by state power. Rome showed great tolerance towards a variety of foreign religions, all with the stipulation that Rome's priority, sovereignty, and jurisdiction were recognized. As a result, every licit or legally licensed religion conceded the priority, sovereignty, and prior jurisdiction of Rome. All became subcults to the cult of Rome. They were tolerated and therefore established.

As such, these subcults helped provide the social cement so important to Rome's empire. Rome's supervision over these religions was usually indulgent, because, given their subordination to Rome, their successful operation could aid the social cohesion so important to Rome. All, by their establishment, contributed to the cult of emperor worship. For all but the Christians, such an arrangement simply meant sound social order and control.

As a result, the Christians were persecuted as enemies of the state and of mankind. Tertullian, in his *Apology*, denied that Christians were "the most guilty of men." Rather, they were the most law-abiding citizens, a people who prayed for the emperor, and were faithful and honest subjects (*Apol.* 2.29–32; A.D. 197). This argument was not convincing to Rome; for the empire, good citizenship meant less moral honesty and more a religious subservience to the genius of Rome.

When the persecution ended, with the Edict of Milan in March 313, a major step towards freedom was taken. Other religions were to continue as before, tolerated. The church was to be free. Lactantius gives us the text of the edict:

> When we, Constantine and Licinius, emperors, had an interview at Milan, and conferred together with respect to the good and security of the commonweal, it seemed to us that, among those things that are profitable to mankind in general, the reverence paid to the Divinity merited our first and chief attention,

and that it was proper that the Christians and all others should have liberty to follow that mode of religion which to each of them appeared best; so that that God, who is seated in heaven, might be benign and propitious to us, and to every one under our government: and therefore we judged it a salutary measure, and one highly consonant to right reason, that no man should be denied leave of attaching himself to the rites of the Christians, or to whatever other religion his mind directed him, that thus the supreme Divinity, to whose worship we freely devote ourselves, might continue to vouchsafe His favour and beneficence to us. And accordingly we give you to know that, without regard to any provisos in our former orders to you concerning the Christians, all who choose that religion are to be permitted, freely and absolutely, to remain in it, and not to be disturbed any ways, or molested. And we thought fit to be thus special in the things committed to your charge, that you might understand that the indulgence which we have granted in matters of religion to the Christians is ample and unconditional; and perceive at the same time that the open and free exercise of their respective religions is granted to all others, as well as to the Christians: for it befits the well-ordered state and the tranquillity of our times that each individual be allowed, according to his own choice, to worship the Divinity; and we mean not to derogate aught from the honour due to any religion or its votaries. Moreover, with respect to the Christians, we formerly gave certain orders concerning the places appropriated for their religious assemblies; but now we will that all persons who have purchased such places, either from our exchequer or from any one else, do restore them to the Christians, without money demanded or price claimed, and that this be performed peremptorily and unambiguously; and we will also, that they who have obtained any right to such places by form of gifts do forthwith restore them to the Christians: reserving always to such persons, who have either purchased for a price, or gratuitously acquired them, to make application to the judge of the district, if they look on themselves as entitled to any equivalent from our beneficence. — All those places are, by your intervention, to be immediately restored to the Christians. And because it appears

> that, besides the places appropriated to religious worship, the Christians did possess other places, which belonged not to individuals, but to their society in general, that is, to their churches, we comprehend all such within the regulation aforesaid, and we will that you cause them all to be restored to the society or churches, and *that* without hesitation or controversy: Provided always, that the persons making restitution without a price paid shall be at liberty to seek indemnification from our bounty. In furthering all which things for the behoof of the Christians, you are to use your utmost diligence, to the end that our orders be speedily obeyed, and our gracious purpose in securing the public tranquillity promoted. So that that divine favour which, in the affairs of the mightiest importance, we have already experienced, continue to give success to us, and in our successes make the commonweal happy. And that the tenor of this our gracious ordinance may be made know unto all, we will that you cause it by your authority to be published everywhere.[1]

Care was taken in this edict to speak of all other religions as included in its provisions. However, since all were licensed and content with that status, it made no difference to their status. The object of the edict was the Christian church.

Several emphases are very obvious in the text, and all need to be cited to do justice to it. *First*, the primary concern is plainly stated, "the good and the security of the commonweal." The welfare of Rome now dictated that the Christians, a very considerable body of believers, be included in the life of Rome. It no longer made sense to wage war on so important a group. The edict was thus clearly pragmatic to some degree. The step was described as "highly consonant with right reason," and thus a sound administrative decision.

Second, the freedom or indulgence granted to the Christians is described by the edict as "ample and unconditional." It was freedom for "the open and free exercise" of their faith. The edict places no qualifying clause on the freedom of the church, nor did it intend to. It was a treaty of peace, and the church had won. Rome saved face while surrendering to the church. Some have viewed this step in terms of subsequent attempts to control the church. This is to misread history, and also to ascribe to Constantine a long-term plan and policy. The simple fact is that freedom was granted.

Moreover, a radical step was taken in that, not only was the freedom of the church recognized, but of all *individuals*, a radical break with the past. "At the same time . . . the open and free exercise of their respective religions is granted to all others, as well as to the Christians: for it befits the well-ordered state and the tranquillity of our times that each individual be allowed, according to his own choice, to worship the Divinity." This meant freedom of religion for all. The pagan cults were content with the old settlement and had no desire for freedom. Freedom was now the right of individuals and groups.

Third, restitution was ordered. All previously expropriated and confiscated church buildings were to be restored. The state would compensate the present owners. At the same time, the immunity and restoration was made to include all Christian organization and agencies. There was thus freedom for what some now call "parachurch" organizations.

Fourth, we come to a significant aspect of the edict which can no more be ignored than can its pragmatism. Constantine speaks of the "experience" of "the divine favour." The reference is not specifically Christian. It is quite possible or likely that Constantine's religious experience, whatever it was, had a syncretistic character. The fact is that the Christians were the beneficiaries of it, which tells us where Constantine saw the source of the divine favor to be. Neither in the edict nor subsequently was any other religion a beneficiary.

However pragmatic, and however much dictated by circumstances, the Edict of Milan is a landmark in the history of religious liberty.

Subsequently, confusion entered in. Constantine gave subsidies to some churchmen; he entered into matters of church discipline; he legislated in favor of the church, and so on. However much men today may deplore some of these steps, it is important to recognize that both Constantine and the church of his day saw the matter differently. The difference then between the emperor as a man and the emperor as the head of the state was a vague line, if at all a line. The imperial and personal treasury of the ruler was essentially the same; the emperor's concerns easily became state concerns. Both Constantine and the church saw his actions as evidences of personal concern and friendliness. Because he was their great friend, it was easy to rely on him. As a result, what began in the edict as religious liberty became in time the toleration and establishment of the church alone, to the exclusion of other religions, and then to the exclusion of heretics. This led to the struggle by Arians and other heretics

to gain this status of establishment and to exclude the orthodox, as in the days of Athanasius.

Toleration always means also intolerance. If a particular religion or branch of a religion is tolerated, then the state has set the tenable grounds of existence. It can by law exclude every group which does not meet those tenable grounds. Whenever the state says which church or cult can exist, it thereby establishes that particular group and excludes others.

A pattern was thus set which had repercussions in the history of the West to the present.

18

RELIGIOUS LIBERTY

TOO OFTEN, RELIGIOUS TOLERATION IS SEEN BY HISTORIANS AS A BE-neficent goal in history, by which they mean that various states in Europe ceased to persecute Protestants or Catholics. Thus, tolerance succeeded intolerance. Superficially, there is a limited measure of truth to this. After 1660, in Europe, religious intolerance began to wane. As early as 1598, with the Edict of Nantes, France granted religious toleration to the Huguenots after much bloodshed. Poland came to a like settlement without the same conflicts.

However, the fallacy in this popular view of the growth of wisdom in the form of toleration is that this toleration was not based on a belief in freedom but a growing indifference to Christianity. Instead of the church, the state was now central to life, and the state now silenced dissent concerning itself. The Western world was in process of shifting its intellectual foundations from Christianity to humanism, and, as a result, the locale of intolerance shifted. There is no toleration, for example, in state schools and universities for avowed creationists, and their persecution and elimination are justified on the basis of "sound scholarship." In Marxist countries, which are more consistently humanistic, such open dissent leads to slave labor camps. Toleration and establishment thus continued their sway. At the same time, the more important the state became, the more trifling and subservient the established church became.

The American colonies began with some quasi-establishments. Technically, the Church of England held the right of establishment in all of them.

In practice, each colony, or in some cases local areas therein, had its own establishment, settlement, or liberty. Bridenbaugh, in *Mitre and Sceptre*, has shown that the prospect of bishops being sent to the colonies, with a rigorous establishment to follow, contributed greatly to the break with the Crown and the War of Independence.[1] This threat led to more than a little rethinking of the subject in the colonies. At the same time, the Baptist leader, Isaac Backus, did much to further the doctrine of religious freedom.[2] A major consequence of this was the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution:

> Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.

The clergy of the colonies strongly favored this amendment.

The establishment-toleration pattern was also being recognized as a dangerous one, although it lingered in Massachusetts for some time. While an established church clearly could be powerful, it was at the same time subservient to the state in most if not all cases. There were two other serious problems with an established church: it was both a silent church, and a more readily corrupt church.

For most of the history of the United States, the First Amendment and its restraint was applicable only to the federal government, not to the states. In recent years, using the Fourteenth Amendment as justification, the U.S. Supreme Court has, in the name of "no establishment," struck down such things as public school prayers. The First Amendment in itself has simply two emphases. *First*, there can be no establishment of religion. For the framers, this meant no establishment of a *church*, or of a specific pattern of doctrine (such as Calvinistic or Arminian). Since there were no other religions of any significance to consider, what was in mind was the exclusion of the possibility of any *church* becoming the *federally* established church. When the Internal Revenue Service takes upon itself, as it does today, the power to determine which religious group shall be tax-exempt, it is establishing a church or a religion. Until recently, a church was a church simply because it was one, not because the IRS said so!

Second, Congress is barred, the federal government barred, from any

interference with the free exercise of religion. This provision specifies that the freedom belongs to the church and to all forms of the free exercises thereof, in societies for religious purposes, public exercises, and so on.

Since the Constitution was intended to be a document of *explicit* powers only, all powers not specifically granted therein were barred to the federal government. The framers thus saw no need for the First Amendment. A limited federal government had no jurisdiction whatsoever in the sphere of the churches. However, the sentiment was so strong for an explicit assurance of the areas of immunity from state control that the Bill of Rights was passed.

Some scholars have felt that it would have been better had no Bill of Rights been passed, since the doctrine of explicit powers only would have meant that the federal government has no jurisdiction except where specified by the Constitution. However, the Constitution gives no powers to the federal government over education, medicine, welfare, and much else, all fields into which the federal government has intruded. No law is a sufficient safeguard against a change of faith and character.

Every law system is an enactment of and an establishment of religion. Law is inescapably moral: it sets forth ideas or concepts of what is evil and forbidden, and what is good and permitted. Law reflects thus a religious world and life view. To change the nature of a legal system means to change religions. Law by nature cannot be morally neutral, because it condemns certain forms of behavior and protects others. This fact was known to the framers of the Constitution, because statute law was then uncommon as compared to the use of the common law.

Common law, as Rosenstock-Huessy pointed out, "did not claim a national origin, but was the dowry of Christian baptism."[3] The common law included some elements of Roman law, but it was essentially Biblical and ecclesiastical law.

When we turn to the young republic, we find that the common law had this meaning. Even Thomas Jefferson recognized this fact. "In the principle that Christianity was part of the common law, 'Jefferson saw the transmitting of the maxim from English to American shores as the transplanting of the seeds of establishment.'"[4] Precisely. Jefferson did not want a Biblical foundation but an Enlightenment one. Some kind of establishment is inescapable.

On the U.S. Supreme Court level in the early years, Justice Joseph Story was emphatic that Christianity and the common law were the foundations

of the Union, liberty, and social order. Story saw Jefferson's attack on the place of Christianity as part of the common law as indicative of disloyalty to the Union and an intellectually untenable position. It should be noted that Story was a Unitarian leader, politically a Democrat and a moderate liberal, not a champion of the old orthodoxy.[5] In England, in 1676, Justice Matthew Hale had summed up the matter of the common law thus: "The Christian religion is a part of the law itself."[6] Kent, in his *Commentaries*, spoke eloquently of the common law as the fabric of life. He cited Du Ponceau's moving words:

> We live in the midst of the common law, we inhale it at every breath, imbibe it at every pore; we meet with it when we wake and when we lay down to sleep, when we travel and when we stay home; and it is interwoven with the very idiom that we speak; and we cannot learn another system of laws without learning, at the same time, another language.[7]

Because of the religious nature of law and society, men like Story could accept and defend an institutional separation of church and state while recognizing, in McClellan's words, "At bottom, church and state are forever united; their total separation impossible."[8] No preference should be given to any particular "sect" or denomination, Story held, but neutrality with respect to religion is impossible. Christianity, he believed, should be supported by the state, not with funds, nor by forcing any man's conscience, but by recognizing it as the foundation of law and social order. Laws against blasphemy, Sabbath laws, and the like were for Story a part of this support.[9] Not until 1947 and 1952 did the U.S. Supreme Court move openly towards disestablishing Christianity and establishing humanism as the foundation of American law.

Story, in his *Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States* (2nd ed., vol. 2, p. 591), summarized the matter thus, and the courts concurred for a century and half:

> The real object of the First Amendment was not to countenance, much less to advance, Mahometanism, or Judaism, or infidelity, by prostrating Christianity; but to exclude all rivalry among Christian sects, and to prevent any national ecclesiastical establishment which would give to a hierarchy the exclusive

> patronage of the national government. It thus cut off the means of religious persecution (the vice and pest of former ages), and of the subversion of the rights of conscience in matters of religion which had been trampled upon almost from the days of the Apostles to the present age.[10]

Cord cites three other purposes of the First Amendment. *First*, a limitation was placed on the powers of the federal government, denying it the prerogative of establishing a national church or religion. *Second*, the federal government was barred from encroachments on the freedom of conscience. *Third*, the First Amendment left the relationship of church and state under the control of the individual states.[11] This last restraint both recognized the matter as within the jurisdiction of the states, and at the same time left alone the local establishments and/or arrangements existing in the various states.

It should be noted that the free exercise of religion was seen by the courts for generations in terms of common-law Christianity. *Reynolds v. United States* dealt with Mormon polygamy; Reynolds felt that his First Amendment rights had been violated by the prohibition of polygamy. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled against Reynolds. It saw that virtually every crime is somewhere practiced by a religious group. Among the aspects of some religions are or have been human sacrifice, cannibalism, ritual prostitution, bestiality, murder, homosexuality, and more. Absolute freedom of conscience and religious practice would destroy all law and social order and make civil government impossible. Such a view of religious liberty, said Chief Justice Morrison Waite (1879), would "in effect . . . permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. Government could exist only in name under such circumstances."[12]

We can thus say that religious liberty is *within the context* of a particular religious and moral tradition. Absolute religious freedom means the total license to practice every kind of crime and perversion. A law structure embodies a moral code and an implicit religion. The freedom it gives is within the boundaries of that religion: it cannot allow practices which are criminal in terms of its presuppositions.

However, the American settlement does not permit that any particular church be granted a privileged status by the federal government, nor that any particular theology be preferred. Common-law Christianity means that the law structure of the country is Biblical, not Buddhist, Mohammedan,

nor anything else. There can be no separation of religion and the state. The question is simply, which religion will undergird law and society?

19

THE MEDIEVAL STRUGGLE

OUR HISTORY BOOKS ARE LARGELY WRITTEN BY HUMANISTS, AND, AS a result, the required textbooks give us a sorry picture of the medieval church. The church did indeed stray in doctrine and morals and did require reformation, but this fact does not justify misrepresenting its history. We are commonly told of the rapacious popes who sought arrogantly to rule both church and state. We are not told that not all popes shared this opinion, nor that some of the steps of men like Innocent III had some justification. The plain fact is that the state more often controlled the church than the church did the state. This aspect of the story is too seldom stressed.

Very early, the Holy Roman Empire saw itself as the true Jerusalem. Otto I saw himself and the state as representative of Christ and His Kingdom. A liturgical vessel of his era, the tenth century, bears the inscription, *Jerusalem visio pacis.* The emperor on a coin held the Holy Ghost in the form of a dove in his right hand, so that he, and not the church, was the authority of Christ on earth.[1] As a result, the local churches as well as the papacy were controlled by the emperors, or, in some cases, by kings.

Very early, too, the monarchs were seen as corporations. The church is the great and true corporation as the body of Christ (Rom. 12:4–5; 1 Cor. 10:17; 12:12; Eph. 1:22–23; 4:12; 5:23; Col. 1:18; 2:19; 3:15). Kantorowicz, in commenting on the political thought of Coke as applied to law, observed, "It is evident that the doctrine of theology and canon law, teaching that the Church, and Christian society in general, was a *'corpus mysticum* the head

of which is Christ' has been transferred by the jurists from the theological sphere to that of the state the head of which is the king."[2] As the church is the bride of Christ, the king's realm became his bride. The marriage metaphor became popular in the later Middle Ages, and the king received, at his coronation, a ring.[3] The church, in the early era, was made so subservient that Carolingian emperor Charles II was praised by Pope John VIII (872–882) in an assembly of bishops as the *salvator mundi*, the savior of the world, whom God had established as prince in imitation of King Christ, "so that what he (Christ) owned by nature, the king might attain by grace."[4] In the days of Queen Elizabeth of England, Nicolas Sanders called attention to the fact that Christ's images were being destroyed, but "breake . . . if you dare the image of the Queenes Maiestie or the Armes of the realme."[5]

Frederick II, whom Innocent III fought, compared his birth to that of Christ. The emperor was the image of God, and the source of justice and law. He was infallible, in some sense divine, and so on.[6] The modern state no longer uses such language, but it uses more modern and Hegelian terminology to assert even more radical claims. From the foregoing, it should be clear that the errors of Rome were modest when compared to the errors of the state. These medieval rulers still saw the reality of a God beyond them who judged them. The modern state recognizes no such God and is thus more lawless. Basic to all paganism is the limitation of essential reality to this world, and hence its predisposition to divinize power in the form of the state. We must remember that, within this century, and in the last days of the nineteenth, in New Guinea some tribes who saw no difference between monarchy and divinity worshipped Queen Victoria as their holy Mother.[7]

To understand some of the aspects of the medieval conflict, let us remember that Constantine rendered personal aid to the church and a pattern was thereby established. Our concern is with the sources of a major conflict between the medieval church and state. We have seen that the royal claims to oversight over the church as Christ's representatives were the source of much conflict. It should be noted that, given this problem, the churches were still regarded as by nature tax-exempt.

Pepin and Charlemagne, and also many feudal lords, granted lands to bishoprics and abbeys in many areas. These were often underdeveloped forest lands, which the church cleared and settled to the advantage of the realm and the people. To free the clergy from business concerns, it was often required that a lay overseer be appointed to administer the land grants.

Such grants and provisions were well intentioned, but they had unexpected consequences. Lay overseers grew independent and saw the properties as their own.

A more critical problem was the obligations attached to land. The church had been given the lands to provide an immune income to support the cost of maintaining the rural parishes. However, the lords who gave the land began to control, and did for a thousand years, the elections of bishops and abbots. The land represented wealth and power, especially as developed often by monks with a Christian dedication. The land also represented potential military service, in that vassals were expected to support their lord with a given number of men for battle.

Younger sons of the feudal lords were commonly "elected" to the office of abbot or bishop, in order to keep the control over an important domain in the family's hands. This development made Christian faith a poor second to feudal considerations. Some bishops and abbots held dual offices, in the church and in the state. There were extreme cases such as that of a French bishop who held that he observed strict celibacy as a bishop while being married as a baron. It led to such technical divisions of person, such as the trial of Odo of Bayeux by William the Conqueror as an earl, not as a bishop. Indeed, the suggestion to do so came from Lanfranc.[8] Such a dual capacity was set down in legal terms after 1100.

A bishop, on taking office, underwent *investiture* with the temporalities of his office, and *consecration* into his ecclesiastical office. By controlling the election and the investiture, the kings effectively controlled the church. The result was moral decay in the church. The same decay set in a few centuries later, prior to the Reformation, when the church was rich, but the states were richer and more powerful.

Europe in the tenth century saw the church as an agency controlled by the state. The church was not as bad at Rome as under the pornocracy, when women who were worse than prostitutes controlled the papal elections, but it was still largely subservient and powerless.

A papal revolution was effected by one man, Hildebrand, Gregory VII. It began as the passion of this one man, intense, dedicated, at times very difficult as a person, whose views are at points untenable from our perspective, but his greatness is very real. Gregory VII found the control of the church by the state intolerable. It has been suggested, but not accepted, that he was of Jewish descent. If Jewish, he may have had elements of the Old Testament freedom for the faith in his thinking.[9]

Hildebrand saw as the marks of the Kingdom of God on earth peace, justice, and obedience. Justice was a passion with Hildebrand. Opposed to this were the aspects basic to manifestations of the kingdom of the devil: mutiny against God or discord; pride; and disobedience. The emperor, Henry IV, was seen as guilty of *superbia*, pride, as were all rulers who sought to control Christ's church.[10]

Hildebrand worked towards the sacerdotal celibacy of the clergy to disentangle them from feudal family ties and make them loyal rather to the church. He denied the apostolic character of the emperor. The church had to be separated from the world.

Gregory VII provided a center for justice beyond the feudal court. Feudal Europe had as a strong aspect of its strength its localism. The local area was the essential realm of government. However, by attempting to reduce the church to an aspect of that local power, feudalism helped pave the way for the papal revolution to free the church.

The papacy grew in power, because it gave freedom to Europe in the form of a church whose life was greater than the feudal lord's. The struggle begun by Hildebrand did not end with his death. With ups and downs in that war, it continues to this day.

The papacy in 1075 with Gregory's *Dictatus Papae* set forth its position in Europe, over the church and over the state, as a kind of supreme court, and the true emperor who alone may use the imperial insignia. The pope may be judged by no one. "The Roman church has never erred; nor will it err to all eternity, the Scripture bearing witness."[11] Some later popes made even more far-reaching claims. Historians are prone to remind us of these extravagances, but less apt to document the unrelenting drive to total power of the various princes and kings. At the time of the Renaissance, the European states had become tyrannies, and the papacy a rich and cynical center of humanism. The battle was not ended, only obscured. It continues now in a more drastic form. The state now makes no attempt nor claim to be Christian.

20

IMMANENCE AND POWER

AN IMPORTANT ASPECT OF THE CHURCH AND STATE CONTROVERSY IS the question of immanence. To begin with, let us define both immanence and its related term, transcendence. As applied, for example, to theology, transcendence means that God is above and beyond all other forms of being, that He is uncreated being, whereas all else is created being. The doctrine of God's transcendence means that there is no common being between God and His creation; He is the Creator, and we are His creation.

An immanent god, on the other hand, indwells within the universe and has a common being with it. The universe has inherent within it this divinity of which all being partakes, and which may or may not be concentrated in a god, gods, a developing spirit or direction within being, or a drive inherent in the universe. Virtually all non-Biblical religions are immanentistic.

However, it must be noted that Christianity does not hold to the sole transcendence of God, i.e., to His exclusively transcendental life. While maintaining a strict insistence on the otherness of God's being, and His uncreated nature, Biblical faith declares this transcendent Being to be also immanent. This immanence of God is God's prerogative, not that of a person nor of an institution. God is immanent in His government, providence, omnipresence, grace, law, judgment, and more. Jesus Christ speaks of His immanent presence: "For where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them" (Matt. 18:20). The

Holy Spirit, too, is immanent (John 16:13; 1 Cor. 6:19). Moreover, just as in Christ's *incarnation*, as Chalcedon's formula stressed, the two natures of Christ, the human and the divine, are in perfect union without confusion, so, too, in the *immanence* of the triune God, the work of God in man and in the world is totally without any confusion with created being.

Basic to non-Biblical doctrines of immanence is precisely this fact which Scripture bars, confusion. The divine and the human or the created are radically mixed and are seen as in continuity the one with the other. As a result, the human being can be a god in process of development. The Greek gods were, in fact, dedicated men, and many cities boasted of their association with Zeus, for example, as his birthplace, his grave site, and so on.

In the latter sense, immanence has far-reaching implications, among other things, for the question of authority. It is, of course, obvious that authority is essentially a *religious* matter, by no means necessarily Christian. If religion, after Paul Tillich, be defined as ultimate concern, then authority is in every society a matter of ultimate concern and clearly religious, even if no specific religion is mentioned. We need not invoke the name of a god or a religion to be totally religious any more than invoking such a name necessarily makes us religious. It is interesting to note that *The Harper Dictionary of Modern Thought*, under the listing *authority*, says, "see under CHARISMA, POWER." Under *power,* we are told that *authority* means that "command inheres in the recognition of some greater competence lodged either in the person or in the office itself."[1] This definition is sanitized of any religious reference but does not escape it. Authority means the right to rule or to exercise power, dominion, or jurisdiction. This *right* depends upon religious sanction. The sanctioning religion may be nontheistic and radically humanistic, but it is no less a religion. *Rights* are grounded in a conception of *right*, a religious belief in the truth, ultimacy, or moral necessity of something.

This leads us to another fact. If the religious sanction or sanctioning power behind authority is immanent, then that authority is all the more powerful. If, as in some cultures in the past, a ruler is believed to be a man-god, a child of the gods, or one who becomes a god by virtue of the office he holds, his authority is then very great. To challenge his authority is to challenge the god of the system. If the king is not divine but merely has divine right, his power is still very great.

For much of history, the king or ruler was seen as a divine power-bearer and savior. The king's presence meant power and victory, so that on occasion

even a child-king was carried into battle to give his people victory. "How irrelevant are our present-day ideas is obvious from the familiar stories about royal children taken into combat; thus, by Tjostol Aaleson young Inge in Norway, and by Queen Fredegund young Clotaire in France, were conducted to decisive battles as guarantors of luck."[2] In England, the king's touch was regarded as a cure for scrofula, because the king as a savior is also a healer. In ancient Egypt, the king ruled the world, even to the weather and harvests; he was the power-bearer. Pharaoh would declare, "I am the god, the beginning of being, nothing fails that goes out of my mouth."[3] So potent was a king that even his dead body conveyed salvation and blessing, it was held. The dismembered body of the Swedish king, Halfdan the Black, was distributed to four districts in Sweden to ensure a rich harvest for them all.[4] Because ultimate divinity and power were immanent in the ruler, the ruler had a status above and beyond all other men. In him the potency of being concentrated itself; he was the manifestation for his age and in his place of immanent deity.

In the modern era, only the language and locale of this royal theology has changed. The sources of the new rationale are deeply rooted in the Roman world. *Vox populi vox Dei*, the voice of the people is the voice of God, is an example of this. Out of antipathy for Biblical religion, modern man does not use the term *God* too readily; instead, he uses an ancient equivalent of it, *sovereign* or *sovereignty.* The word *sovereign* comes from the Latin *super*, above, as in supernatural; it has reference to the power which is above all else. A sovereign is thus a god within his domain.

Every modern state claims sovereignty. It is held to be a necessary attribute of civil government, a faith which is clearly in opposition to Biblical faith. The claim of the state to sovereignty rests on a belief in the radical immanence of divinity in the natural order. In Hegel, we see sovereignty ascribed to an immanent power in the universe, variously called reason, spirit, and freedom. Spirit for Hegel is "defined as that which has its centre in itself"; it is "*self-contained existence*," and self-contained-existence "is Freedom, exactly."[5] This reason-freedom-spirit is divine.[6] "The shape which the perfect embodiment of Spirit assumes — the State,"[7] means that divine immanence in the world is present in the form of the state.

Hegel was not alone in such a doctrine. The various strands of Enlightenment thinking had been converging on the same concept of immanence. For Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the will of every man becomes embodied in a general will, and the state is the manifestation of this general will. For

Rousseau, sovereignty is inalienable. The sovereign is the collective being of the people in the state. The general will and the individual wills do not coincide, because "the will of the individual tends naturally to privilege, the general will to equality."[8] The state thus replaces God, and treason replaces heresy as the great crime. Rousseau required a civil profession of faith to replace the Christian profession:

> But there is a purely civil profession of faith, the articles of which it behooves the Sovereign to fix, not with the precision of religious dogmas, but treating them as a body of social *sentiments* without which no man can be either a good citizen or a faithful subject. Though it has no power to compel anyone to believe them, it can banish from the State all who fail to do so, not on grounds of impiety, but as lacking in social sense, and being incapable of sincerely loving the laws and justice, or of sacrificing, should the need arise, their lives to their duty. Any man who, after acknowledging these articles of faith, proceeds to act as though he did not believe them, is deserving of the death penalty. For he has committed the greatest of all crimes, that of lying before the law.[9]

Thus, while disclaiming compulsion and coercion, Rousseau called for a new and greater inquisition. The elements of such a tyranny are present in every modern state and highly developed in Marxist countries.

Let us consider the implications of immanentism. Such a perspective gives us a god or gods who are totally on the historical scene and have no transcendence; in effect, they compete with man for breathing space. The state as god walking on earth is inerrant, sovereign, and omnipotent. Because in the Bible God is transcendent, man has the freedom of this world, to sin or to obey, to rebel or to serve, or to turn his back on God if he chooses. God's law and judgment exercise some oversight over history, but man can establish his own concept of social order if he chooses. However, who can turn his back on the state as god? Can he secede from the god-state and its laws? Can he say, I choose to sin, and I shall live out my life on my principle of rebellion? The answer is obvious. The state as sovereign has no supernatural life nor power and no independent existence from man. The defection of men is the diminution of the power of the sovereign state. The state as sovereign thus must negate the freedom of men in order

to maintain, enhance, and increase its sovereignty and power. The doctrine of immanence is thus the sure ground of tyranny. The sovereign state assumes in time its inerrancy, as in the Soviet concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Radicals and terrorists hold to a belief in the people, whose general will they are the incarnation of, and hence their fanatical self-righteousness. The arrogance of humanistic judges and courts rests also in this belief that the general will is somehow incarnated in the state apparatus.

This doctrine of immanence has long had a corrupting influence within the church itself, especially in the forms of Platonism and Aristotelianism. As a result, the church has too often drifted into immanentistic identifications of church and state alike with the triune God. On the other hand, to stress the total transcendence of God after the fashion of Karl Barth is also evil. For Barth, God is so radically separated from the world that He functions only as a limiting concept, which is all that he is in Barth's thought. For Barth, God cannot be the Almighty, nor power in itself. "God is the essence of the possible,"[10] which is almost like saying God is the essence of creation's possibility. What else can He be the possibility of? Barth's God is like an empty dead letter office set up to receive letters to Santa Claus. As a result, for Barth socialism and Marxism were important and good agencies. Having reduced God and the transcendent to "the possible," Barth left the state free to be the very present reality and being. Barth's memorials have been churches in shambles and states freed to play God.

In a true doctrine of transcendence, God the Lord as King of creation establishes a framework of law for all things. His laws for man are given in His enscriptured Word, the Bible. These laws provide the structure for freedom and prosperity under God. Men are not coerced to be good, but neither can their attempts to play God succeed. At the same time, it must be noted that both the tempter and man are given the freedom to attempt to be as God, knowing or determining good and evil for themselves (Gen. 3:5). The god-state never allows man to be his own state.

Man is not created in the image of the state but in the image of God (Gen. 3:5), in knowledge, righteousness, holiness, and dominion (Gen. 1:26; Rom. 2:14–15; Eph. 4:24; Col. 3:10). He is capable thus of knowledge and ignorance and error, because God's image in the creature requires this freedom. He can be righteous or just, or he can be dedicated to injustice. He can be holy, or evil and unclean. He can exercise dominion for good or for evil, and he can be under the dominion of sin and other men.

For all of this, there is a day of reckoning, a day of judgment. The

doctrine of the Last Judgment speaks of the final and full accounting at the end of history. The books are opened, and all men are judged in terms of the totality of their lives.

The importance of this doctrine is far-reaching in many directions. Our concern is with its relation to freedom in history. The god-state is at all times an immanent last judgment; only its incompetence protects us from a continual descent upon us. A systematically sovereign state like the Soviet Union will not nor can it say to dissidents, go your way; time and conversion can bring you to our own faith. The Marxist state strikes at once against all who depart from its law order. Because its life is totally immanent or of this world, any departure from the Marxist faith and practice is a little death for the Marxist state. God does not die if I sin, nor is His power diminished in the slightest. My power is diminished, and the way of sin is finally the way of death, my death, not God's, and God can allow my sins whereas the sovereign state brooks no apostasy.

In terms of the humanistic theology of the state, the true church is the great apostate. The hostility of Rousseau to the church was open and intense. Hegel's was no less real, however disguised. The modern state cannot tolerate apostasy, nor any other God. All who assume that the church and state conflict can be resolved without a radical change in the nature of the state are living in terms of illusions.

21

THE REALM OF UNTRUTH

THE TROUBLE WITH ALL TOO MANY OF OUR HUMANISTS IS THAT they do not listen to themselves talk. They ridicule the idea of God, of sin, of justice, of good and evil, and more, and then speak passionately of *themselves* as the defenders of the people and of justice. Humanist and philosopher Walter Kaufmann held that guilt and justice are obsolete and are theological concepts, presupposing God and His absolute law. Hence, we should live beyond all ideas of guilt and justice and good and evil.[1] Attorney Jack Evseroff dismisses the question of right and wrong, and guilt and innocence, with the impatient statement, "What the hell is justice?"[2] More important, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. (1841–1935) of the U.S. Supreme Court once said, "I am not here to do justice. I am here to play the game according to the rules."[3] Few men have equalled Holmes in his influence on law schools and courts. The court decisions of Holmes for more than a generation contributed substantially towards making the United States what it is today. Holmes denied the relationship of morality to law because he denied the reality of morality. For him, only mores and customs existed, not morality.

Such a perspective, now a commonplace one in the courts and the press, has far-reaching implications. If there is neither good nor evil, there is no moral law above and beyond the state to which man can appeal. This is the situation of Marxist states. All power is immanent in the dictatorship of the proletariat, and all right as well. Hence, there is no appeal beyond

the state. Some years ago, Hallowell demonstrated that historicism and positivism in law led to a belief that no right nor justice exists in and of itself (nor in God), and that the state is thus beyond judgment, because there is no standard by which it can be judged. He demonstrated this with reference to the developments which led from liberalism to National Socialism in Germany. This development, he held, was not peculiar to Nazi Germany; it was basic now to all Western countries, wherever the same currents of humanistic relativism have prevailed. Hallowell held that it was not so much that Germans believed in National Socialism but more that they disbelieved in all that liberalism had promised; fascism came in by default, because men had ceased to believe in anything but a purely pragmatic security and order. The liberal promises of freedom and equality were bankrupt, and men wanted only a negative assurance of order and security.[4] In terms of Hallowell's study, and also because of developments in all countries since 1943, one can say that Nazi Germany moved to the logical conclusion of humanistic thought more than a generation earlier than other nations of the West.

Another man who saw the necessary logic of this development was George Orwell, especially in *1984*. While definitely not a Christian, Orwell, as Christopher Small points out, viewed the world in essentially religious and theological terms. For Orwell, "political life is par excellence the realm of untruth."[5] In 1946, Orwell, in an article, declared, "we shall get nowhere unless we start by recognizing that political behaviour is largely non-rational, that the world is suffering from some kind of mental disease which must be diagnosed before it can be cured." This "mental disease" he diagnosed as a "desire for pure power," which "seems to be much more dominant than the desire for wealth." As Small summarized it, "A vicious habit of mind can be linked with vicious political practices, the subjective can be expressed in the objective facts of political life."[6] Thus, Orwell saw in modern life a new idolatry, and a gross one, the idolatry of the state.[7]

For Orwell, the state is the area of untruth, or of lies. Orwell, of course, was viewing the modern state, and he thus, in terms of the current ethos, saw the future of that untruth as *1984*, total tyranny. Not being a Christian, he had given up hope in a state or civil order grounded in truth and acting in justice.

Our Lord said of Satan that he was the father of lies (John 8:44). The promise of Satan is that every man is his own god, determining good and evil for himself (Gen. 3:5). For him, there is no objective God-ordained

truth nor a God-given law establishing good and evil. Rather, man determines for himself what constitutes good and evil in his experience, and he gains freedom, according to Walter Kaufmann, by rejecting any God-given and objective standard or law.

In a humanistic society, the realm of untruth becomes society at large, because the rule of numbers in modern states means that the will of man prevails, not an objective standard. Hence, untruth becomes the majority opinion and will, and the state becomes a lie, and its foundation a lie. Men are held to be naturally good, although they are not; original sin is replaced by environmental sin, and we sin only because an evil environment so conditions us. Salvation is by political action, education, and sociology, and the state is the agency of salvation. At every point, the state as savior offers man a rival plan of salvation and sanctification, and the state must of necessity oppose Christianity. The failure of churchmen to take seriously the role of the humanistic state as savior has contributed markedly to the decline of the church.

Because of the myth of neutrality, the state has been allowed by churchmen to develop its nature as a lie with almost no interference until the late 1970s. No person or institution can be neutral, least of all the state. As a law order or structure, it is inescapably committed to a moral and religious life. This has become increasingly an open humanism. To call it secular humanism makes it no less religious; secular humanism is religious humanism practiced by laymen, just as secular Christianity is the practice and application of Christian faith by laymen. The state is usually a secular institution in that it is normally under the control of laymen rather than under the control of Christian, Muslim, Buddhist, humanist, or Shinto clergies, but it is no less religious for that.

Because the clergy has tended to see itself and its church, temple, or shrine as too often the exclusive expression of its religion, it has failed to appreciate the religious nature of the state and the vitality and centrality of secular religion. By viewing the state as a nonreligious agency, the church's clergy has contributed substantially towards making the state a realm of untruth. Precisely because the state is central to modern life, it has become *the great lie.*

The Biblical doctrine of the *logos* or word declares that Jesus Christ is the logos, word, structure, or truth by whom all things were made, "and without him was not anything made that was made" (John 1:3; cf. 1:17). Jesus Christ is God incarnate; He is God, and the revelation of God (John 1:1–2, 18).

Plato, however, had a radically different doctrine of the *logos.* For him, the *logos* was the word, pattern, idea, or reason which permeates the world and governs it. It is the immanent power in being. Plato, thus, in his *Republic* developed his concept of the state as the locale and the embodiment of reason. Because of this, it was necessary for philosopher-kings, men of reason, to rule the state.

For Plato, the true state is identical with *reason* and *justice. This means establishing what is due to and from every person.* This means a division of labors economically and politically in terms of natural aptitudes. Hence, the philosopher-kings will judge and rule, and all others will do their appointed task. (This is, of course, the structure of the Soviet Union.) The rulers of the state, as the voice of reason, will put the physically unsound to death, as well as all who *in their judgment* "are incurably corrupt in mind." These philosopher-kings or guardians, as the voice of reason, "will be the last to bring harm upon the commonwealth," because as voices of reason they are by nature unselfish. By virtue of education, and fear of execution, "the governors and the governed will share the same conviction on the question who ought to rule," namely, the guardians. These men are saviors of society.[8]

The modern state uses the language of Hegel, Marx, Dewey, and others more than the idiom of Plato, but the same goal prevails, man as his own god ruling over other men through the state. The state is the order of reason and the good, a humanistic and relativistic good, to be sure, but ostensibly the only good man can know.

Inescapably thus, the Christian must regard the modern state as the realm of untruth, or, more bluntly, the embodiment of the great lie (Gen. 3:5). The triumph of the modern state will be the death of Biblical faith. It is, however, the Lord who shall prevail, and the modern state which will be broken.

When our Lord calls Satan a *liar*, (John 8:44), the word in Greek is *pseustes*, the adjective of which is *pseudes*, which we have in English as the prefix *pseudo.* A *lie* is *pseudos*, and *pseuma*; the latter as in Romans 3:7 means an acted lie, and the lie acted on is a false premise concerning God. The lie is a dissociation from God and His law-word. False prophets or preachers are called liars in the Old Testament, as are idols. In this sense, because all men are sinners, all men are liars. When David in Psalm 116:11 makes this statement, it can be better translated, as in the Berkeley Version, "I said in my *alarm*," all men are liars. David's problem briefly was not that

his observation was wrong, but that he failed at the same time to see the goodness and greater power of God. In the New Testament, a false teacher, *pseudodidaskalos*, is a lie teacher (2 Pet. 2:1), a man within the church who teaches false premises concerning the Lord. In Titus 1:2, the God who cannot lie is *apseudes Theos*; He is the truth, and cannot lie.

Where men are concerned, "A lie is not simply a single act: it is an attitude of existence which determines the whole of life. Because it resists the one who gives life, it is the deceitful accomplice of death."[9] As long as the state rejects Jesus Christ, the truth (John 14:6), and refuses to live by every word of God (Matt. 4:4), it is the realm of untruth; it is a lie. Our Lord declares,

> I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end, the first and the last. Blessed are they that do his commandments, that they may have right to the tree of life, and may enter in through the gates into the city. For without are dogs, and sorcerers, and whoremongers, and murderers, and idolaters, and whosoever loveth and maketh a lie. (Rev. 22:13–15)

22

AUTHORITY TO RULE

AN ACADEMIC ORIENTATION CAN PRODUCE SERIOUS DISORIENTATION; this is why the shift of theology from the pulpit to the seminary has been disastrous for the faith. It is an easy matter for a classroom professor to talk about God, another thing for oppressed Job to cry out:

> For I know that my redeemer liveth, and that he shall stand at the latter day upon the earth: And though after my skin worms destroy this body, yet in my flesh shall I see God: Whom I shall see for myself, and mine eyes shall behold, and not another; though my reins be consumed within me. (Job 19:25–27)

To hear a raped woman, weeping, say that she cannot understand why this horror has taken place, but that her faith and her consolation is in the Lord, is to come face to face with living theology; the memory of such confessions of faith humbles and shakes one.

This classroom approach has done great harm to our understanding of Romans 13. As we have seen, Paul does not give us an abstract theological premise for the state. He was answering a very pressing problem for Christians: Two *lords* claimed dominion over them, Christ and Caesar. With Christ as their Lord, what was their relationship to Caesar? Paul reduces the state and Caesar from lordship to servitude to God, to a diaconate. The state's calling and duty is to be a terror to evildoers and to be God's

minister. The Christian's calling is not to revolution but to work out the implications of regeneration and to make all things new in Christ.

Too often, however, the church has seen Romans 13 as a blank check for the state. This has been especially true of Protestants since the rise of pietism, and at times true also of Catholics as well. Too often, the modern mind sees a stripping of freedom and power from the church as the same as reformation. At the time of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, the princes of Europe all claimed sovereignty and were resentful of the church's freedom and power. The evils within the church gave them excuses for rebellion, although none of these rulers were paragons of virtue. A number of states, resentful of the papacy's power and tax gathering, both things coveted by them, were able to push Rome into granting concordats. These concordats recognized the imperial power and jurisdiction of these states within their own realm; the church in those states went extensively under the control of the crown; patronage, presentation, and supplication were transferred to the crown. The church was to be a congregation of the faithful but not an independent power. France and Spain were most notable among those gaining such powers and in effect ruling the church within their domain. Wherever concordats were not obtained, the princes were favorable to the Reformation and were receptive to Lutheranism and, in England, to a national church distinct from those of the continent.[1]

The Anabaptists despaired of any hope in civil government. They sought a radical separation from the world which, while stressing a voluntary church and a "spiritual" reformation, was marked by a surrender of civil order as evil and beyond redemption. Extremists in Anabaptism sought to establish their own civil order of the saints by revolution, but most withdrew and regarded both the state and the church which worked within the framework of civil order as false and even evil. To most princes and churchmen, it was the Anabaptist solution which was evil. It was imperative, thus, for Calvin to avoid any association of his movement with Anabaptism, with which he emphatically disagreed.[2]

As a result, Calvin strongly stressed civil obedience while allowing for ordered change through civil magistrates. The Renaissance was an era of statism, tyranny, and corruption. Revolt made sense to many and was very much in the air. For Calvinism to have fanned the fires of civil revolt would have been fatal. An analogy to the present can be made. I find, wherever I speak, churchmen, as they hear of the persecution of Christians, and encroachments on religious freedom in the United States, are quick about

asking if it is not about time to resort to arms! I find it imperative to emphasize civil obedience. I stress the fact that a very, very large number of church members do not vote; very, very few ever contribute to a political campaign, and fewer are active in politics. When the means of peaceful solutions can readily give us the victory, to talk about suicidal violence is morally wrong. We have a battle to wage peacefully in the courts and in legislative bodies. Calvin was concerned with avoiding an ungodly disaster; so, too, must we be concerned.

Moreover, there is no merit in either an armed revolt nor in a peaceful conquest of the courts and legislatures if there is no valid doctrine of authority and civil government. The Middle Ages raised the question of legitimate authority. Too often, in the modern era, churchmen have accepted the state per se as the valid authority.

Much of our understanding of the concepts of earlier eras is warped by our misunderstanding of their terminology. Thus, the twelfth-century monk and scholar, Gratian, wrote:

> Mankind is ruled in two ways: namely, by natural law and by customs. The law of nature is that contained in the Law and Gospels, by which each is ordered to do to another what he wishes to have done to himself, and is prohibited from inflicting on another what he does not wish done to himself. Wherefore Christ said in the Gospel: "All things whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do ye also to them. For this is the law and the prophets."[3]

Natural law to contemporary Catholic and Protestant scholars has a different meaning, and the difference is even more marked in men like Strauss. For Rufinus (1170), "natural law, which, [was] all but lost in the first man, has been restored in the Mosaic law, perfected in the Gospel, and adorned in custom."[4] In other words, the Bible and its law is natural law because it comes from the God whose law is in all being. Henry de Bracton (d. 1268) said, "Now the author of justice is God, and thus justice is in the creator. And accordingly, *ius* and *lex* mean the same," i.e., because justice and law are identical in God.[5] Hence, Aquinas could hold that a tyrannical law is a perversion of law.[6]

Aegidius Romanus (1302) made lordship or rule contingent upon grace. In Lewis's words, "To Aegidius Romanus, any disposition of lordship made

by earthly law was valid only if the person enjoying it was duly subordinated to God his Lord and was in receipt of His grace."[7] By establishing authority and rule in grace and in faithfulness to God's justice, certain things followed. Infidels and excommunicates could hold property but had no valid title to it. The same applied to ungodly rulers within Christendom. Since kings and commoners paid tithes to the church, they thereby recognized the church's general lordship over all earthly goods.

At first, Aegidius's doctrine greatly strengthened papal power. It made a distinction between ownership and lordship or dominion. True dominion belongs to the realm of grace, supremely to God. However, in the hands of Archbishop Richard FitzRalph this doctrine underwent further development. FitzRalph used it to attack the Fraticelli or Spiritual Franciscans. The Fraticelli attacked ownership and separated property and dominion from grace; hence, a propertied church was out of grace. Wyclif held that "no one is civil lord, no one is prelate, no one is bishop, while he is in mortal sin."[8] The church therefore had no dominion if lacking in grace, and likewise the state; both might have ownership, but not legitimate authority, since all authority and dominion come from God and are subject to His law-word and faithfulness thereto.

This leads us to a fact which modern man is unwilling to face. If dominion, authority, and rule come from God, by His ordination, and can only be truly exercised in terms of His law-word and in His grace, then any departure from God's Word and the doctrines thereof is dangerous to man and society. Accordingly, for centuries Christians viewed, to use Kieckhefer's term, "heresy as civil disorder."[9] At times this civil disorder was met by peaceful and missionary, evangelizing methods, at other times by brutal repression. That question is not our concern here. The fact which cannot be avoided is this, that anyone who uses Romans 13 in any sense is establishing civil government in God and God's authority. The necessary consequence of this is to require civil government to be faithful to the foundation of its authority. To separate *delegated* authority from the delegator, God, is impossible. Every delegated authority goes with conditions, and the conditions govern the tenure of authority. According to Deuteronomy 17:18–20, speaking of the king,

> And it shall be, when he sitteth upon the throne of his kingdom, that he shall write him a copy of this law in a book out of that which is before the priests the Levites: And it shall be

> with him, and he shall read therein all the days of his life: that he may learn to fear the LORD his God, to keep all the words of this law and these statutes, to do them: That his heart be not lifted up above his brethren, and that he turn not aside from the commandment, to the right hand, or to the left: to the end that he may prolong his days in his kingdom, he, and his children, in the midst of Israel.

The prophets are clear that all kings and nations are bound by God the Lord. Isaiah gives us the roll call of judgment over the nations, and Hebrews 12:25–29 give us the declaration of the great like shaking in the gospel era. Revelation also gives us the judgment of the Lord upon the nations, and the great feast of vultures is the counterpart to the marriage supper of the Lamb. Paul in Romans 13 is *not* giving us a different doctrine. He does *not* separate the state from God and give to it neutral and undelegated, absolute powers. In every age, God the Lord speaks with contempt about the arrogance of the nations and promises and delivers judgment. Isaiah tells us,

> Behold, the nations are as a drop of a bucket, and are counted as the small dust of the balance: behold, he taketh up the isles as a very little thing. And Lebanon is not sufficient to burn, nor the beasts thereof sufficient for a burnt offering. All nations before him are as nothing; and they are counted to him less than nothing, and vanity. (Isa. 40:15–17)

Shall this God stand by, *or allow His people to stand by idly*, when the nations arrogate sovereignty or lordship to themselves? If it was an abomination to God for the kings or Molochs of old to make Baalim or lords of themselves, is it any the less so when the modern state does?

The authority to rule comes from God alone. Our Lord declares, "Man shall not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God" (Matt. 4:4). What is true for man here is true for his institutions, for the family, church, and state. When the state severs itself from God and His law-word, it severs itself from its authority. To restore that authority means that we place ourselves, our families, schools, callings, and civil governments under the every Word of God.

23

DONATISM AND THE STATE

THE HERESY OF DONATISM IS AN ANCIENT AND IMPORTANT ONE, precisely because it represents in one form or another a continuing strand in the history of Christendom. The Donatist movement began in A.D. 311, in North Africa, which at that time was a great center of the faith, the locale of intense persecutions, and the scene of remarkable martyrdoms and witnesses. The churches of that area were marked by zeal and a drive for perfection. It was this hunger for perfection which led to trouble. Churches and individuals who had in fear compromised their faith and accepted state controls and licensure were refused, despite repentance, any re-entry into the church. Their sacraments were regarded as invalid, as were baptisms performed by defecting pastors.

It was at this point that a very critical question was raised. If a man's baptism became invalid some years after his conversion because his pastor compromised the faith under pressure, or became immoral, no man could be sure of the validity of his baptism until his pastor died. Again, if the defection of a church some years later rendered null and void the baptisms, communions, and marriages performed prior to that time, it left the faithful members again in a difficult position.

The orthodox position in response to the Donatists was that it was not the life of the pastor nor of the church which saved them, but the triune God, and the grace of God as revealed in Christ. Thus, all baptisms performed in the name of the Trinity were valid, whatever subsequent

compromise, apostasy, or immorality the pastor might manifest. The validity rests in God's act, not in man's act. Donatism, on the other hand, held that there could be no validity in any act by any church which did not separate itself from the world in Donatist terms. After the fifth century, Donatism as a church ceased to be a consequential problem.

The fact is, however, Donatism had raised questions which were never fully answered. The Donatists institutionalized their ideas, and it became a battle between Catholic and Donatist *churches.* Among the unanswered questions, one loomed large. When does a church which has departed from the orthodox faith and has in effect supplanted grace with other doctrines cease to be a valid church? This was a problem which concerned faithful Catholics over the centuries, as such things as the pornocracy for a time commanded the papacy. It also concerned Calvin, who saw the Reformation being exploited by perfectionists. Too many were ready to abandon their churches "on account of every trivial difference of sentiment," instead of doing what "every member" is required to do, "to exert himself for the general edification, according to the measure of his grace, provided he do it decently and in order."[1] Calvin continued to observe:

> But bearing with imperfections of life, we ought to carry our indulgence a great deal further. For this is a point in which we are likely to err, and here Satan lies in wait to deceive us with no common devices. For there have always been persons, who, from a false notion of perfect sanctity, as if they were already become disembodied spirits, despised the society of all men in whom they could discover any remains of human infirmity. Such, in ancient times, were the Cathari, and also the Donatists, who approached to the same folly. Such, in the present day, are some of the Anabaptists, who would be thought to have made advances in piety beyond all others.[2]

The validity of the sacraments, Calvin held, depends upon God, not upon a priest or pastor: "we are baptized, not in the name of any man, but of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, and consequently . . . it is not the baptism of man, but of God, by whomsoever it is administered."[3]

Enough has been said to indicate that Donatism is still a problem within the church as perfectionism leads to divisions. At the same time, there is the problem of a compromising or apostate church. It should be remembered

that *both* Donatists and Catholics, during the persecutions, separated themselves from the compromising churches and men. The dividing question was whether or not these could ever be restored into communion upon repentance, and whether or not any sacraments or ordinances of the defecting churches had been rendered invalid by their action. Our concern, however, is with the application of Donatism to the state.

Very early, as the state manifested hostility to the church, or despised God's law, or in any way warred against the faith, churchmen concluded that the authority of that state or ruler was invalid. An example of this was a pupil of Innocent IV, Henry of Segusio, better known as Hostiensis. The argument was already common that all dominion comes from the triune God and is subject to His sovereignty and law. Those who deny God's law and sovereignty may possess power but not true authority. Hostiensis said, in terms of this:

> It seems to me that with the coming of Christ every office and all governmental authority and all lordship and jurisdiction was taken from every infidel lawfully and with just cause and granted to the faithful through Him who has the supreme power and who cannot err.[4]

Muldoon calls this an extension of Donatism to political office.[5] Innocent IV had not been ready to go so far in his opinion. The rights of the infidels had been carefully spelled out by the papacy.[6]

In spite of this, however, Donatism in some form had been commonplace to both church and state. To cite but one example alone, Henry IV, on January 24, 1076, at a synod of German bishops at Worms (with twenty six out of forty present) declared Pope Gregory VII deposed. This was not an unusual act; many emperors before Henry IV had deposed popes, and Henry's own father had deposed four of them. (A few generations later, the Council of Constance deposed three.) A month later, on February 22, 1076, Gregory VII deposed Henry IV for rebelling against the church and for spiritual disobedience. In 1208, King John was excommunicated.

It must be recognized that there is a difference between these actions and opinions and Donatism, although there are also very real similarities. *First*, Donatism proper held that a church lost its authority when it compromised or denied the faith; none of its previous acts then had any validity. Neither popes nor emperors, in deposing one another, undercut

the validity of previous authority. A particular act or series of acts led to the deposition, and, on repentance, for example, Henry IV was restored. None of his actions prior to the incidents which led to Gregory VII's act were rendered null and void. This is an important difference. The denial of valid authority was limited to a particular and specific action by the medieval thinkers, or, if a ruler or pope were deposed permanently, no attempt was made to challenge the valid authority of that particular state, nor of the church.

Second, Hostiensis is not affirming Donatism in declaring, in terms of Psalm 2, that God the Father gave to Christ at His coming all governmental powers and authorities. Those who rule apart from Christ have power but not godly authority. This does not give individuals the freedom to deny the rule over them of ungodly rulers, and Paul in Romans 13:1–8 is emphatic at this point. The denial of valid authority does not validate revolution or lawlessness. Medieval and Reformation thinkers at times did countenance opposition to tyrants, but it was *normally* under lawful circumstances and with the leadership of civil magistrates. There is a difference between denying the theological validity of ungodly rule and asserting the "right" of revolution. It is a *necessity* to recognize that the validity of all authority and dominion comes from God alone, and in faithfulness to Him; this is a *theological* premise. At the same time, the *moral* premise required of us means that we recognize that the basis of change is not revolution by man but regeneration by the Lord and then faithfulness to His law-word. Donatism immanentized God's judgment and placed it in men's hands. The church then could anathematize any congregation and the validity of all its sacraments. The future of churches, however, is not determined by men but by God; thus, the refusal of Donatism to see the possibility of valid repentance in effect ended history for those whom it anathematized. The medieval limitation of condemnation to specific acts for which repentance and restitution was possible was Biblical; Donatism was not. We can in fact say that the medieval era showed a Christian vitality in the fact that church, state, and council saw fit to cite and condemn specific acts, and, at times, men. This was important to moral progress.

Third, we do have Donatism with reference to the state today in such movements as the tax revolt. Granted the evil of these taxes, the fact remains that the state cannot be substantively changed by revolution but only by Christian renewal. Moreover, the validity of state power can only be questioned if other authorities are questioned. If the state is transgressing

and playing god, where has the church been in all this? Moreover, what about the individuals? All too many who are in the tax revolt have a personal authority as questionable as that of church or state. The state does not reach an apostate condition in a vacuum. Reinhold Niebuhr's *Moral Man and Immoral Society* epitomizes in its title a great modern myth. Man sees himself as innocent and society and the state as evil. Donatism ended in pharisaism, and so, too, does the modern view.

Muldoon was thus wrong in seeing the views of men like Hostiensis as Donatism. Because the triune God is the source of all authority and dominion *in every realm*, the tenure, power, and office of all men is conditional. To be outside of Christ is to be separated from legitimacy; it is imperative for all to recognize this fact, while at the same time insisting that men work only through godly means to effect godly changes.

SUBORDINATIONIST CHRISTOLOGY AND THE STATE

IN *The Foundations of Social Order* (1968), I TOUCHED ON THE IMPLICATIONS of Christology for political life. A subordinationist Christology leads to the subordination of the church and all of life to the state. In paganism, of course, this is especially true, in that no power is recognized as capable of challenging the state.

The term *God* covers a multitude of meanings and definitions. It can refer to a deified man, to the first cause as a limiting concept, to an entelechy in nature, and much else. Only in its Biblical meaning, understood in terms of Jesus Christ, can we have a true meaning for God and a freedom from the monolithic and divine state.

In fallen man's thinking, *reality* is equated with the known, with what man himself is a part of. In a more sophisticated form, this is the "scientific" view that reality is only that which science has confirmed and measured. The world of reality is thus limited to man's ken, and nothing more. Beyond man's reach something as yet unverifiable may exist, or potentiality can be posited, but the real world is the present physical reality. Many cultures have believed also in life after death, but, with rare exceptions, in these religions the *after*world is seen as an extension of the present; in most cases it is a pallid, bloodless, and ghostly world. The Greeks saw the dead as shades; they were barely alive, and, to speak to the living, needed the blood

of a sacrificed animal to drink in order to gain enough vitality to speak. In such a perspective, the gods were not determining powers but themselves subject to fate. The center of action for gods and men was this world, and, in particular, the political order.

The incarnation, and the doctrine of Jesus Christ as very God of very God, and very man of very man, means that the center of history, the motivating power, and the total governor over all things is the triune God, and Jesus Christ is He to whom all power and authority is committed (Matt. 28:18–20). As a result, all human authorities are under Christ and His law-word, the Bible, and He is the judge over all things.

However, if subordinationism is in any way introduced into Christology, then the authority of Christ is diminished, and the power of the state, the high point of the natural or "real" order, is exalted. A telling example of such subordination is Richard Hooker, commonly regarded as the theologian of the Church of England. According to Hooker,

> Seeing therefore the Father alone is originally that Deity which Christ originally is not (for Christ is God by being of God, light by issuing out of light,) it followeth hereupon that whatsoever Christ hath common unto him with his heavenly Father, the same of necessity must be *given* him, but naturally and eternally given, not bestowed by way of benevolence and favour, as the other gifts both are.[1]

The Calvinists of the day saw Hooker's position as a form of Arianism, but the Church of England was not troubled by Hooker's stance. There was also a hint of Nestorianism in Hooker's view:

> The union therefore of the flesh with Deity is to *that flesh* a gift of principal grace and favour. For by virtue of this grace, man is really made God, a creature is exalted above the dignity of all creatures, and hath all creatures else under it.[2]

Chalcedon had insisted on the uniqueness of the incarnation, a perfect union without confusion of the two natures and beyond repetition or continuation in any other person or institution. Hooker, however, saw man as linked with deity because of the incarnation, which "hath deified our nature."

> Finally, since God hath deified our nature, though not by turning it into himself, yet by making it his own inseparable habitation, we cannot now conceive how God should without man either exercise divine power, or receive the glory of the divine praise. For man is in both an associate of Deity.[3]

For Hooker, the power and the glory of God were manifested in right reason and in natural law. The voice of reason and law was for him the state. It followed therefore that God's government is operative through the state and its monarch. This was the rationale for the royal headship over the church. The king ruled both church and state as the vicegerent of the Father and the Son.

The legal implications of royal headship were cited by Makower, a German barrister of the last century:

> In the sixteenth century the reformation robbed the church almost wholly of its independence. The king was now free in filling episcopal sees to ignore the wishes both of the chapters and the pope. Moreover, the preferment at the disposal of the crown was otherwise considerably increased by the confiscation of monastic estates with the rights of patronage attached thereto, and by the reservation of such rights upon the new foundation of secular chapters. The dissolution of the monasteries was the destruction of those centres of ecclesiastical power which until then had been least accessible to royal influence; it operated at the same time to sweep away the ecclesiastical majority in the upper house of parliament. The convocations could henceforth issue binding laws only with the consent of the crown; whereas the crown exercised an uncontrolled right to settle by ordinance the affairs of the church. Appeal lay from the decisions of the ecclesiastical courts to a civil tribunal, whilst in the high commission court the crown set up a judicial body, dependent on its instructions, with punitory powers in matters ecclesiastic. To all this was added, lastly, that general authority to govern the church involved in the idea of the supremacy, an authority which was manifested especially in the visitations carried out under the royal name.[4]

It was this establishment which Hooker and others defended. It is ironic, and an evidence of the provincialism of ecclesiastical debate, that, in the Catholic-Anglican discussions, the center is on the validity of episcopal orders and continuity, not on the question of headship. The early church would not have regarded the headship of Caesar as the mark of a church.

Makower cited some key areas of control. *First*, the confiscation of monastic estates was an act of central importance. In some instances, charges of monastic corruption were probably true, but it is clear that the Crown was determined to disgrace, destroy, and seize all monastic estates at any price, including the sacrifice of truth. These monastic estates were of great importance in providing for the poor and the sick; their confiscation created serious social problems. It now meant, too, that the ecclesiastical majority and authority in the House of Lords was broken. The distribution of much of the monastic estates to newly created as well as already standing peers of the realm gave the Crown partners in this act of lawlessness. These estates, given by the faithful over the generations, not only provided for public welfare on a Christian basis but gave to the church a freedom from the state. Henry VIII smashed this.

Second, the church was now not governed by the church but by the Crown. Instead of canon law, grounded in Scripture, royal law had an "uncontrolled right" to govern the church. To all practical intent, the church was now a department of state.

Third, appointments to episcopal sees also became political, so that theological considerations in all such appointments were at best secondary, and often irrelevant or peripheral. The church became a kind of civil service, and absentee bishops became progressively more commonplace. Bishops could postpone the appointments of their subordinates to profit by the "living" or income due those offices.

As a result, the Church of England was neither free nor relevant for many generations.

Subordinationism can take forms other than that of the Church of England. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, many evangelicals have been and are subordinationists, and the roots of this movement go back to the rise of pietism. While ostensibly affirming an orthodox doctrine of Christ, such churchmen, under the influence of pietism, abandoned the doctrine of Christ's lordship over every area of life and thought. Christ was limited to a "spiritual" realm, and most of the world was surrendered to the lordship of the state. Antinomianism was a part of this surrender.

Christ as sovereign rules by His grace and law. The Jesus of pietism asked for allegiance and stressed an antinomian love. Pious gush replaced sound doctrine. In the place of theology, hymns and teaching stressed, among both Catholics and Protestants, emotional responses to Christ's sufferings. Significantly, Christ's sufferings were stressed far more than the meaning of His victory. Thus, in one Moravian communion hymn we have this meditation on Christ's wounds:

> My soul feeds on roses sweet,
> When she smells wounds-flavour,
> And reviews her safe retreat
> In thy grave, My Saviour.
>
> Draw us to thee, and we will come
> Into thy wounds deep places,
> Where hidden is the honey-comb
> Of thy sweet love's embraces.
>
> My dear bleeding Saviour,
> O let me embrace thee,
> While thousand drops cover,
> Hang on thee and grace thee,
> And catch the juice thy wounds produce.
>
> O Meal! I can't thy sweetness be expressing,
> Because thou art all thoughts and words surpassing.
> Now strikes my hour, now runs my spring,
> The blood stream now does roll,
> Its rushing sound to sleep does sing
> My body and my soul.[5]

Such hymns took over in many churches and replaced doctrine with an emotionalism which was often erotic and morbid. Instead of the atonement, the churches sang mystical songs about the wounds of Jesus. One such hymn declared:

> My dearest, most beloved Lamb
> I who in tenderest union am

To all thy cross-air-birds bound,
Smell to and kiss each corpse's wound;
Yet at the Side-hole's part,
There pants and throbs my heart.
I see still, how the soldier fierce
Did thy most lovely Pleura pierce,
That dearest Side-hole!
Be praised. O God, for this Spear's slit!
I thank thee, Soldier, too for it.
I've licked this Rock's salt round and round
Where can such relish else be found![6]

Sessler commented, "In time there came into use a whole list of meaningless words and phrases which were on all lips." At times, the language became all the more unintelligible as the subject was seen to be holy and sacred.[7]

Many of these extremes waned or were suppressed as in time they drew ridicule and censure. However, in modified form they are still not uncommon. In the late 1930s, I encountered some churches and people who regarded the faith of all who did not share their emotional jargon as suspect. For example, a key word with them was "precious," i.e., "precious Jesus," and failure to use it and to stress Scripture and doctrine was for them evidence of "head knowledge" (very bad) and not "heart knowledge" (very good and alone true).

Then and now, such groups are not interested in the crown rights of Jesus Christ. "Faithful preaching" is for them an emotional exercise. Without knowing what subordinationism means, such churches and people have surrendered the lordship of Jesus Christ to the state.

Briefly stated, where Christ is demoted or limited, His Kingdom and crown rights are limited and demoted. There is then a shift of sovereignty from God to man, which means the triumph of the state. The state as the new sovereign becomes god walking on earth, and the result is the rapid death of all freedom.

Predestination, or sovereign planning and control, then moves from God to man. On predestination, Warfield, in a December 1916 article, had this to say:

> Our difficulties with Predestination arise from a, no doubt not unnatural, unwillingness to acknowledge ourselves to be

> wholly at the disposal of another. We wish to be at our disposal. We wish "to belong to ourselves," and we resent belonging, especially belonging absolutely, to anybody else, even if that anybody else be God. We are in the mood of the singer of the hymn beginning, "I was a wandering sheep," when he declares of himself, "I would not be controlled." We will not be controlled. Or, rather, to speak more accurately, we will not admit that we are controlled.
>
> I say that it is more accurate to say that we will not admit that we are controlled. For we are controlled, whether we admit it or not. To imagine that we are not controlled is to imagine that there is no God. For when we say God, we say control. If a single creature which God has made has escaped beyond his control, at the moment that he has done so he has abolished God. A God who could or would make a creature whom he could not or would not control, is no God. The moment he should make such a creature he would, of course, abdicate his throne. The universe he had created would have ceased to be his universe; or rather it would cease to exist — for the universe is held together only by the control of God.[8]

When the church denies that control to the triune God, it in effect surrenders it to the state. The state is aware of the implications of an Arminian view of Christ, even if the church is not. Arminianism does not eliminate predestination; it denies it to God, and the state seizes it. Every denial of predestination leads to subordinationism.

25

THE CORPORATION AND LIMITED EXISTENCE

ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT CONCEPTS IN THE HISTORY OF WESTern thought is the concept of the corporation. Although in Rome some aspects of the idea existed, what we know as the corporation is a Biblical doctrine. A corporation is an entity which exists apart from the life of its members, is a legal person, and has a continuing existence. The word *corporation* comes from a Latin word meaning *body. A* corporation is thus a *corpus*, a body, with a life of its own.

Israel was a corporation created by God. The generation which died in the wilderness was separated from the corporation by God. Through judgments and captivity, Israel was again and again purged. The people perished, but the corporation always continued. The church, as the New Israel of God, was grafted into the corporation, and the old members were cut off (Rom. 11:17–20). Both the Old Testament Passover and communion, the Christian Passover, celebrate the fact of corporateness. As Paul says, "So we, being many, are one body in Christ, and every one members one of another" (Rom. 12:5).

The early church thus saw itself as a body, a corporation. It was more than the sum total of its members, moreover, because the church was and is created by Jesus Christ, and its essential existence is in Christ, not apart from Him. A church separated from Christ is no longer a church but a

parody of a church. The church thus is not only a corporation, it is a supernatural body or corporation, because its head and ruler is the King of all creation. The church thus has an existence which transcends this earth and transcends time and death.

The state very early saw the threat which Christ represents. Not only is Christ lord and sovereign, but His is a supernatural and transcendent authority and power. The state reacted in two ways. *First*, from the days of the early church to the present, states have warred against the church. The idea of an allegiance beyond the control of the state, and a law from beyond the state, was to them anathema. Warfare between Christ and the caesars of history has been routine.

Second, the state has imitated the church and arrogated to itself the claim to be a mystical body, a corporation, or even Christ's body. Sir Edward Coke, according to Kantorowicz, took the church's doctrine of the mystical body, identified it with the state, and declared the head to be the king.[1] Men like Blackstone stated routinely that the king never dies ("The King is dead; long live the King") because kingship is a continuing corporation, the king is legally never under age, and "is not only incapable of *doing* wrong, but even of *thinking* wrong: he can never mean to do an improper thing: in him is no folly or weakness."[2] Sir Edward Coke declared, "[T]he politic capacity is invisible and immortal," as did Edmund Plowden.[3] The king thus represents an incarnation of sovereignty and authority which is continued in the royal line without cessation. The doctrine of the divine right of kings had deep roots. We see this clearly, for example, in a case of Queen Elizabeth's day, *William v. Berkeley*; Justice Southcote, seconded by Justice Harper, declared according to the law report in part:

> The King has two Capacities, for he has two Bodies, the one whereof is a Body natural, consisting of natural Members as every other Man has, and in this he is subject to Passions and Death as other Men are; the other is a Body politic, and the Members thereof are his Subjects, and he and his Subjects together compose the Corporation, as Southcote said, and he is incorporated with them, and they with him, and he is the Head, and they are the Members, and he has the sole Government of them; and this Body is not subject to Passions as the other is, nor to Death, for as to this Body the King never dies, and his natural Death is not called in our law, (as Harper

> said), the Death of the King, but the Demise of the King, not signifying by the Word (Demise) that the Body politic of the King is dead, but that there is a Separation of the two Bodies, and that the Body politic is transferred and conveyed over from the Body natural now dead, or now removed from the Dignity royal, to another Body natural. So that it signifies a Removal of the Body politic of the King of this Realm from one Body natural to another.[4]

The parody of the doctrine of Christ's two natures is obvious, as is the fact that the king was the claimant to Christ's sovereignty, however disguised. Kantorowicz traced the deep roots of this doctrine in medieval and earlier thought. In 1401, the Speaker of the House of Commons compared the body politic to the Trinity, with the king, the House of Lords, and Commons forming a mystical body.[5]

Because pagan Rome claimed to be a divine order, with the senate possessing the power to make gods, and the emperors declared to be gods by the senate, Rome was ready, after tolerating Christianity, to use Biblical concepts for Christ with reference to itself. This continued in the medieval era, as Holy Roman emperors saw themselves as rulers over the church and as God's vicegerents. More than a few popes, usually those named by emperors, gave assent to this.

Pope John VIII (872–882), in an assembly of bishops, praised the Carolingian emperor Charles II, of whom he had high and false hopes, as "the saviour of the world," whom "God established as the Prince of His people in imitation of the true King Christ, His Son, . . . so that what he (Christ) owned by nature, the king might attain to by grace."[6]

Before the Reformation, rulers had substantially usurped for themselves those rights which belong to Christ and His body. With time, these claims were stated more openly. Philip II of Spain, for example, was very much a cesaro-papist. He saw himself to be the head of the Spanish church, the protector of the Catholic Church, and the counsellor of the Pope. All the Catholic and Protestant monarchs of that era shared like cesaro-papist views.[7]

When religious toleration was promoted by the various European powers, it not only was a part of the establishment syndrome, and the antithesis of religious freedom, but it had a statist purpose, to utilize the energies of all the sects and churches for the purposes of the state. Thus, Frederick the

Great of Prussia, in a decree of June 15, 1740, declared, "All religions are equal and good in so far as those who profess them are honest men, and if the Turks and pagans came and wanted to populate the country, we should be ready to build their mosques and temples." The state should see to it that all religions "lived in peace and worked together and in equal measure for the good of the state."[8] In this statement, Frederick, *first*, placed all religions on a par and under the state, so that the equality of religions was implied at the least before the law. The state would be ready to provide mosques, churches, or temples for all.

Second, Frederick's one condition with respect to all religions was this: "in so far as those who profess them are honest men." As an Enlightenment philosopher-king, Frederick held to the Enlightenment views on virtue as somehow a nonreligious and philosophical attribute. As a result, he separated morality from religion. All religions could potentially possess that honesty which is the mark of reasonable men, but only insofar as they abandoned the heart of their faith for the natural religion of the philosophers.

Third, the purpose of religious toleration for Frederick was to utilize religions "for the good of the state." It should be noted that Frederick stipulated that they should all do so "together and in equal measure." The function of religion had returned to the pre-Christian Roman function, to provide social cement and support the state.

Briefly, what had happened was that, *first*, the state had claimed to be the transcendent and necessary corporation of man and had thus supplanted Christ as sovereign and the church as the institution with the ministry of salvation. The state (and its schools) now became the saving power. Salvationist politics and messianic education resulted (the latter I document in *The Messianic Character of American Education*, 1963).

Second, the state now saw the function of the church to be less and less the service of Christ and more and more the service of the state. The church had to justify its existence in terms of political utility, and, if this utility was not seen, the church had to be destroyed. The French and Russian Revolutions worked most conspicuously toward that goal.

Third, because the state was now the "Great Community" and the ultimate corporation, it began to insist that the church could *only* be a subsidiary corporation by virtue of a grant from the state. In the United States, the Internal Revenue Service began to grant or deny corporate status to churches. This status was given upon sufferance of the state and subject

to its conditions. The church as a corporation now had only a limited existence, one conditional upon the grant and terms of the state. Limitations began to appear as to the extent of the property which could be held tax-exempt. To illustrate, a church has to have so much parking space; if, however, to cite a specific case from one city, a small fraction of an acre remains above the space allowed for parking or landscaping, this space must be taxed!

The modern state has thus made of itself a new Christ and church. It has borrowed Biblical concepts and used them for anti-Christian purposes. Clearly, it is time the Christian protested, and a time for battle.

26

MARSILIUS OF PADUA AND SPIRITUAL RELIGION

MARSILIUS (OR MARSIGLIO DEI MAINARDINI) OF PADUA (1290?–1343), an Italian scholar and professor of philosophy, who taught philosophy and was later a rector at the university of Paris, was the author of one of the more influential books of Western history, the *Defensor Pacis* (1324). The *Defensor Pacis*, or *The Defender of Peace,* was an attack against the temporal power of the church. While his attack was nominally directed against the papacy, the church as a whole was subjected to attack.

While attacked in his day by the papacy, Marsilius in reality triumphed eventually. The whole system of concordats has a Marsilian background. As for Protestantism, the influence of Marsilius has been so great that he can almost be called one of the fathers of Protestantism. Pietism was a logical consequence of his emphasis. His influence on Wyclif, Hus, and Luther warped their thinking. An English translation was made by William Marshall in 1535, to be of help to Henry VIII.

Briefly, Marsilius's emphasis on the purely spiritual powers of the church led to the isolation of the church from all relevance to the material world, to politics, economics, the arts and sciences, and more. Except for those things concerned with the experience of pietism, the world was given over to the state. The sovereignty of Christ over every realm was broken, and the state became the new god over almost all of life. The myth since Marsilius's

day has been propagated and widely held that, during the medieval era, the papacy ruled Europe ruthlessly, and the church exercised vast temporal powers. The fact is that the Holy Roman Empire usually ruled the church. Some popes claimed great powers; almost none exercised them. In the bull, *Unam Sanctam*, 1302, the high point of papal claims is apparent, but, even here, the purpose is substantially to declare the freedom of the church from the state and to set forth the church as God's ordained supreme court of appeals on earth. Historians who express their sense of dismay at Boniface VIII and his bull are less vocal about the outrage at Anagni (1302). The French arrested the pope because of his attacks (in *Clericis Laicos*) on the taxation of the clergy by secular princes; both Philip IV of France and the English Crown were then current offenders, to raise money for their war. A month after his arrest and imprisonment, Boniface died. So much for the high point of papal power. Boniface had asserted the freedom of the church, in medieval terms, of course, and this the powers of his day found intolerable.

It is important for us to understand the thesis of *Defensor Pacis* to appreciate Marsilius's influence. *First*, Marsilius grounded jurisdiction over the material world and the state in reason, rather than in revelation. The goals of the state are thus rational and rest in rational moral ends, not in revealed truth. This position transferred the state from the intellectual governance of theology to that of philosophy. In this stance, there are clear echoes of Plato's philosopher-kings.

Second, Marsilius viewed the state as coercive power whose function is to regulate and control strife. Supreme power is thus the nature and mark of the state. Between the rational-moral view of the state and this coercive thesis, there is no real connection made, other than the state as sovereign power. Marsilius sought every doctrine possible to separate the state from any moral oversight and correction by the church. Thus, the state as naked power was for him, as against the role of the church, the true salt of the earth and the preserver of society.

Third, Marsilius also presented the voluntarist republican doctrine of the state, the state as neither rational nor coercive but as defined by the will of the people. Marsilius looked to every possible justification for the state that would detach it from the church and Christ.[1]

Subsequent history gives us all three of these doctrines in action, and revolutions have adopted one or another. In each, sovereignty is located in the state, not Christ, although each of the three has a differing emphasis.

In the view of the state as reason, the philosopher-kings are sovereign; in the coercive state, the strongest are; in the republican view, sovereign power belongs to the whole people.[2]

John of Paris carried this logic a step further. He asserted the autonomy of nature and morality from grace and religion. He held that man through natural reason can attain true morality, and "the acquired moral virtues can be perfect without the theological virtues, nor are they perfected by them except by an *accidental* perfection." It follows therefore that "even without Christ as ruler there is the true and perfect justice which is required for the state, since the state is ordered to living in accordance with acquired moral virtue, *to which it is accidental that it be perfected by any further virtues*."[3] Not only the church but Christ was made irrelevant to the good society and virtue.

Marsilius had no distrust of either the natural virtues of the people nor of the coercive powers of the state in the hands of philosopher-kings. He was not only an heir of the Greeks, both Plato and Aristotle, but also a type of the academician or professor whose utopia on paper has little relation to historical reality. While technically *Defensor Pacis* is not related to the utopian writings of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, Marsilius was very much their spiritual father, or at least one of them.

As Gewirth noted, "Marsilius' conception of political power is monistic, unilinear, and ultimately unlimited." Hobbesian and Rousseauian theories of sovereignty come from Marsilius.[4] The modern separation of Christianity from politics goes back to him also.

It should not surprise us, thus, to see that Marsilius believed in an inclination to hereditary morality, a morality which was a genetic part of class status.[5] Moreover, Marsilius was also one of the fathers of antinomianism. To free the state from Christ, it was necessary to eliminate the binding nature of Christ's law, the Bible, and especially the Mosaic law. Christ, Marsilius held, gave a new evangelical law, a spiritual one. The way was thus freed for a new sovereign, the state, to require its own law to be given a mandatory status. Whatever remained of the Mosaic law, and whatever law Christ gave, had binding power only in terms of a future life, not this one.

According to Marsilius,

> But there were also certain other commands in the Mosaic law which were to be observed for the status of the future world,

> like those relating to sacrifices or hostages or offerings for the redemption of sins, especially hidden ones, which are committed through immanent acts; and no one was compelled by pain or punishment of the present world to observe these commands. Analogous to these commands are all the counsels and commands of the New Law, for Christ neither wanted nor commanded that anyone be compelled to observe them in this world, although he does give a general command that human laws be observed, but under pain or punishment to be inflicted in the other world upon transgressors. Hence the transgressor of human law most usually sins against divine law, although not conversely.[6]

To illustrate what this means, it is far more grievous before God if we practice abortion when the state forbids it than when the church forbids it, because it is then a sin against the state, the sovereign power.

Marsilius also gave a humanistic meaning to "ownership" or "lordship" (*dominium*) and thus separated it from God and gave it a material and societal meaning.[7]

When George Washington, in his Farewell Address, warned against the separation of morality from religion, he was speaking against the heirs of Marsilius, who had triumphed in the French Revolution, were vocal in Deism, and were gaining a growing following. Today, we live in the shambles of their creating. It is thus imperative that the churches separate themselves from the world of Marsilius and his thinking. The "spiritual" thinking of all too many churchmen smacks of Marsilius's anti-Christianity.

THE CONCILIAR MOVEMENT

OVER THE CENTURIES OF WHAT WE CALL THE MEDIEVAL ERA, THE states of Europe, and the Holy Roman Empire, usually controlled or sought to control the church. The result was the strangling of justice. The local or regional lord or king both controlled the courts of justice and man's access to God and His church. Beginning with Hildebrand, the papacy fought against this. The successes it achieved were due in part to the faith of the people, and to their hunger for justice. The papacy sought to make itself free from the state, *and* to be a supreme court of justice against the state. Its successes in both areas were real but limited.

Internal problems within the church hurt its own cause. These problems became especially flagrant with the Great Schism, culminating for a time in three popes, each claiming to be the one true one. There were calls for an ecumenical council to resolve the matter. Finally, a representative council met at Constance, the highpoint of the conciliar movement.

The Council of Constance (1414–1418) met ostensibly to reform the church and to unify it. It succeeded in unifying the Western church, but it failed in the task of reform. It secured the abdication of all three current popes and the election of Martin V. John XXIII was deposed by pressures exerted and charges filed against him. Benedict XIII (Pedro of Luna) was also deposed, and Gregory XII abdicated. John Hus was condemned and burned at the stake, as was Jerome of Prague. The church was thus unified.

The "reforms" were trifling renewals of long-standing and usually

ineffectual decrees: condemning the abuse of exemptions, and dispensations, and also condemning simony. The canons relating to modesty of dress for the clergy were also renewed.

The conciliar movement had long been advanced as the great hope for the reform of the church and of civilization. The Protestants were not the first to turn their reforming eyes on the early church; they were simply echoing a common medieval theme. Most reform movements over the centuries had invoked the early church. The Protestant use of this idea turned Catholics away from it and led to an emphasis on countering ideas, among them tradition. However, prior to that time, the ideal of the early church had again and again been used by various orders to reform the church. Why did it fail at Constance?

The failure of the Council of Constance cannot be understood apart from the fact that it was called by the emperor Sigismund, king of Hungary, king of Bohemia, king of Germany, and the Holy Roman Emperor. Nicea was called by an emperor also, Constantine, but Constantine sat back and let the churchmen settle the problems. With Sigismund, it was different.

First, although Sigismund is one of the abler men of the era, and regarded by some as almost heroic, his character was flawed. He gave a safe-conduct to John Hus and then broke it on presumably theological grounds, i.e., that one was not bound to keep faith with a heretic. Moreover, Sigismund, the great reformer of the church, was a "deadbeat." According to Richental's *Chronicle*, after the long council, the burghers of Constance, whose preparations and hospitality had been notable, presented two books of accounts to Sigismund, asking to be paid. Sigismund promised to pay, but he never did.[1]

There was another more serious matter, statism and nationalism, two forces functioning as one. The conciliar movement had more than the reform of the church in mind; while some theorists were in earnest, many advocates of conciliar power aimed at the control of the church. Wyclif and Hus, both strong champions of grace, were unhappily also Marsilius's followers to some degree, and thus close to the cause of the princes. Neither was condemned (Wyclif posthumously, of course) for the influence of Marsilius but for other reasons. The rulers put a distance between themselves and reformers like Wyclif, Hus, and Jerome of Prague, but they did not in any way set aside Marsilius's thinking.

Nationalism may have been only in its infancy at Constance, but the

representatives at the council voted as nations, not as one church. This was in part a move to decentralize the church, but, at the same time, it was a move to centralize the state. The various states at Constance met under the headings of five nations, each with a designated meeting place. Their main unity was under the emperor's persuasion, not under the church. While Constance reestablished the unity of the papacy, it bypassed the early church motive which was basic to the conciliar movement. As Mundy pointed out, at Constance "the papacy restored its power over the clergy by giving parts of the Church away to secular princes."[2]

The imperial crusade against the Hussites in the following years failed, and Martin V, faced with the discredit of both the empire and the papacy, called another council, which met in Basel in 1431, under a new pope who succeeded Martin V on his sudden death. Eugene IV was less happy about a council called to restore union between Greek and Roman churches and to reform the church. When the clergy of the lower ranks invited the Hussites to come and talk over an amicable settlement, Eugene IV dissolved the council. The council denied the right of a pope to dissolve it and affirmed its right to depose popes. In 1439, the Basel council set up an antipope, a mistake which had later repercussions; on second thought, few followed him.

In France, in 1438, King Charles VII called the Council of Bourges, to which Pope Eugene IV and the fathers of the Council of Basel sent delegates. It was at this time that the Pragmatic Sanctions of Bourges was formulated and adopted. They declared the authority of a general council to be superior to that of the pope; it was ordered that no papal bull take effect in France until the king so ordered it; the collection of annates from French prelates, and the filling of church offices in France by the pope, was prohibited. The Pragmatic Sanctions formed the basis of the Gallican Church for three hundred years, with some lapses of enforcement.

However, at Bourges a significant argument was advanced which had an impact. The papal partisans stated that, in deposing a pope, Basel had laid the foundation for the deposition of all kings. "The conciliar opposition was unable to combat this argument."[3] Some generations later, Queen Elizabeth of England sought to avoid a legal execution of Queen Mary of Scotland, despite Mary's threat to her crown, because of the precedent it would set. She urged instead the assassination of Mary as an alternative.

Mundy held, "the reform program at Constance was ruined by the conflict among the nations."[4] This was partially true. More important, the

nations had much to lose from a reformed and powerful church; it would establish the church as a major challenge to their claims. The reform motive was largely set aside, and at best reduced to trifles such as ecclesiastical dress. The main accomplishment of the conciliar movement was its assertion of superiority over the papacy and the Sacred College. The conciliar movement died because it failed to reform the church. It succeeded in establishing the priority of the emperor and the nations. The papal monarchy within the church was formally conceded in time, while in practice each head of state functioned as the head of the church within his domain. The world of Henry VIII, less openly acknowledged, was born at Constance. For this reason, the Catholic monarchs, and the Holy Roman emperor, having concordats with Rome at the time of the Reformation, had no interest in reformation as such. Those monarchs lacking in such powers were attracted to the Reformation. The Counter-Reformation had as its initial function the forestalling of the Protestant influence, i.e., enough reformation to keep the national churches in line. The world of Marsilius triumphed on both sides, with only the Calvinists opposed, and strict papal adherents also dissenting.

28

THE INQUISITION

THE INQUISITION HAS LONG BEEN SYNONYMOUS WITH TORTURE, organized evil, and the misuse of religion. The works of Henry Charles Lea, in particular *The Inquisition of the Middle Ages* (1888), have given us massive details of its horrors.

In recent years, however, the long-standing impression has begun to fade for a variety of reasons. Among the central ones is, *first*, the obvious fact that the mass slave labor camps of the Marxist empire, the tortures, mass murders, and more of such states, as well as the evils of National Socialism, have made the Inquisition pale by comparison. The twentieth century has little grounds for condemning past evils in the face of its own monstrous evils. *Second*, various studies have shown that the Inquisition was faced with very real evils: cults given to human sacrifice, cannibalism, and other practices. Thus, the historian Jeffrey Burton Russell, who began with a conventional view of the medieval era, confessed to a changed perspective in his *Witchcraft in the Middle Ages* (1972). Moreover, some of Lea's premises have of late been questioned, as witness Richard Kieckhefer's *Repression of Heresy in Medieval Germany* (1979). However, an evil is not excusable on the grounds of being a lesser evil.

The Inquisition had its formal beginning in 1233 when Pope Gregory IX commissioned some Dominicans to investigate the Albigenses in Southern France. We cannot, however, read back into this beginning its later practices. At the same time, we cannot overlook the civil origins of the later

Inquisition. In France, the Albigensian heresy was for some time seen as a serious problem by the crown. Thus, in 1226, Louis VIII had decreed civil punishment for excommunicated persons, and more than a few royal acts preceded the later Inquisition. Religious heresy tended to be associated with social and political turmoil and was thus of concern to rulers for political, not theological, reasons. As Kieckhefer summed it up, "Whether genuinely heretical or not, religious deviants were seen as a threat to society."[1]

We should remember that only papal approval at times protected new Catholic orders from repressive hostilities. Roman Catholic historians have long pointed out that, officially, the church did not sentence heretics to death or to the stake; it simply found them guilty of heresy, and the state did the rest. The state was usually eager to execute the heretics. Very often, only a small minority of those tried by the church for heresy were actually excommunicated. The seizure of the condemned person's properties was a great inducement to state action. For any religious or political deviation, a guilty man forfeited his assets.

We can perhaps understand better the "reason" for, as well as the error of, the Inquisition by looking at modern parallels to the Inquisition. Marxists and socialists generally see all capitalism as evil; hence, all who are capitalists, all who believe in capitalism, and all whose actions can remotely be called capitalistic, are condemned, imprisoned, or executed. Likewise, many people in the United States regard communism as an evil; it is clear that many communists have been involved in subversive activities; some would have it that all communists without exception should be condemned and dealt with. The same can be said with regard to anti-Semites, Ku Klux Klan members, Nazis, fascists, "Moonies," and other groups. Very definitely, the same was said in the Middle Ages of Albigensians, for example. They were dualists; they despised the flesh and thus placed all sexuality, marital, adulterous, homosexual, bestial, and incestuous, on a common level. Some showed their contempt for Christian morality by practicing illicit forms of sexuality. They despised authorities; they were contemptuous of cleanliness; and they were anything but the people of song and laughter modern myth has made of them. As Ladurie summed it up, "Because everything was forbidden, one act was no worse than another."[2]

In brief, in each case, because a position, view, or group is seen as evil, all within the group are judged worthy of condemnation. The law, when godly, condemns *acts*, not private opinions. While it is true that there is a clear relationship between faith and life, between beliefs, opinions, ideas,

and actions, only God is capable of judging the as yet unrealized act, the belief. As a result, murder and adultery in the heart are called evil by Scripture (Matt. 5:21–28), but only the murderous and adulterous *acts* can be dealt with by civil courts.

The state, however, as it grows in power, has also always grown in its demands for uniformity and conformity. We have seen, in this century in the United States, both segregation and legalized integration; interracial marriages have been both banned and legalized. In any case, the thing avoided has been free association in terms of religious premises.

At the same time, we have seen a growing permissiveness with respect to immoral acts (i.e., acts which are not in terms of Biblical law) and a lack of permissiveness with regard to Christian freedom (i.e., the persecution of Christian churches, their schools, and agencies).

To return now to the Inquisition, the inquisitor Nicholas, bishop of Nazareth, gave John Hus a certificate of his orthodoxy before Hus went to the Council of Constance.[3] The Council of Constance was notable for the fact that civil authorities and academicians dominated it. The emperor, Sigismund, who had given Hus a safe-conduct, proved himself Hus's greatest enemy. Sigismund, when he thought the Czechs had left the council session, declared:

> You have heard of many and heavy crimes which are not only proved against Hus by reliable witnesses but also confessed by him. I deem that each one of them is worthy of death. If he does not retract, I am of the opinion that he should be burnt. But even if he does what he is told to do, even if he retracts, do not believe him. I should not believe him. I advise that he be not allowed to teach or preach in the Kingdom of Bohemia.[4]

This was the same Sigismund and council which felt it necessary to defend as a true Pope John XXIII against Hus. Any other person than John XXIII would have paid with his life for his crimes. It was attested before the Council of Constance by witnesses that John XXIII had poisoned his predecessor, Pope Alexander V, that he had bought his cardinal's office, that he neither fasted nor prayed, that he was a murderer, a poisoner, a heretic who had denied the resurrection of the body and immortality, that for 6,000 gulden he had appointed a five-year-old child preceptor of the Order of St. John, that he had sold extreme unction, absolution, indulgences,

and so on and on, seventy-two articles of specific charges.[5] John XXIII was briefly imprisoned, set aside, and, later, declared an antipope. Before his death, John XXIII was again a high-ranking churchman.

Out of office, John XXIII was no problem to the emperor. Hus, however, and his opinions constituted a threat to the unity of Sigismund's realm.

There is little difference in principle between the condemnation of Hus by Sigismund and the Council of Constance and the seizure of the English monasteries and foundations by Henry VIII. Many Protestants condemn the burning of Hus and approve Henry VIII's seizure of the monasteries, and many Catholics see the burning of Hus as an unhappy necessity and Henry VIII's act as an evil. Both, however, surrender principle in so doing.

The state is not interested in either a dissenting power or a reforming power; both constitute an evil to the state, and a hindrance to its drive for sovereign power. As a result, the state is history's major inquisitor and inquisitorial power. It is clearly true that the states of history have at times used the church, or have convinced the church of the validity of their position, and the church has been compliant to such activities. In 1839, the Marquis de Custine, in his travels in Russia, noted the very great piety of the Russian people. At the same time, he saw the captivity and low estate of the Orthodox Church, reduced to being a national church in the service of the state. He observed, "National churches make citizens; the Universal Church makes men."[6]

When the state triumphs over and uses the church, state law replaces God's law, because law has its source always in the sovereign power. Where the sovereign power is God, Biblical law prevails. Where the sovereign power is the state, humanistic law rules. The result is the triumph of the inquisitorial mentality.

God's absolute government is the source of all creation and of all events. The Council of Jerusalem declared, "Known unto God are all his works from the beginning of the world" (Acts 15:18). Because of His predestination, foreknowledge, and providence, the triune God does not need to enter with coercion into history to accomplish His will. When the state plays god, it has no alternative other than coercion to effect its will. The results are history.

29

THE WAVE OF THE PAST

THE PRESENT IS NOT ONLY INSEPARABLE FROM THE PAST BUT IS USUally better understood in terms of it.

When Constantine the Great began to favor Christianity, paganism in the Roman Empire was dying. The official status of the pagan cults, and the financial support forthcoming from the empire, gave paganism an artificial existence. When Constantine ended the financial support of religions, the pagan temples declined rapidly, because the pagans were not accustomed to supporting them, nor were the interested parties numerous. Pagan beliefs persisted as superstitions, as personal idiosyncrasies of belief, not as a governing faith. Some Christians at times called for the closing of all pagan temples, but Constantine rejected such pleas. His words in so doing should commend him to any modern libertarian, as well as to believers in religious liberty. By edict, Constantine declared:

> Once more, let none use that to the detriment of another which he may himself have received on conviction of its truth; but let every one, if it be possible, apply what he has understood and known to the benefit of his neighbor; if otherwise, let him relinquish the attempt. For it is one thing voluntarily to undertake the conflict for immortality, another to compel others to do so from the fear of punishment.[1]

The only temples closed by Constantine were at Aphaca in Palestine and Aegae at Heliopolis (Baalbek) in Phoenicia, and the reasons here were concerned with the maintenance of public morality, since both temples were long connected with licentiousness. The temples were part of a dying cult. Some bishops kept the issue alive by actions against them, but a more practical force was at work. The deserted temples were falling into ruins, and local peoples began to cannibalize them for building materials, statuary, and bronze and other valuable materials. Constantine himself made use of such materials to build Constantinople; in his case, the temples were legitimately used, being state properties; where no longer in use, their materials were transported to Constantinople for reuse. The pagan priests, lacking employment, became a problem in wineshops, brothels, theatres, and elsewhere, and were regularly haled into court.

Thus, when Julian the Apostate came to the throne, his efforts to restore paganism were futile. His motivating force was not a belief in the pagan gods as much as a hatred for Christianity. The only public support he could draw on was thus a negative force, hatred for Christianity, the longing of seedy pagan priests for public funds, and a love for the old temples.

Julian imitated Constantine in requiring indemnification. All who had taken over temple properties, land, or building materials were to restore them. In the case of the earlier pagan seizures of church properties, expropriation had been the fact. However, the pagan temples had been extensively abandoned; those who had used their materials and contents had done so pragmatically, not religiously, and thus their materials were not in exclusively Christian hands. In some areas, it should be noted, pagan temples did remain open, and some prospered. With Julian the pagans were encouraged to abuse Christians and their properties, and violence was the result. Julian, who saw himself as a philosopher-king, was soon the master of informers, hoodlums, and sycophantic parasites.

At the same time, Julian's legislation sought to cripple Christianity. *First*, tax exemptions were withdrawn. The Christian contention that Christ's Kingdom and church are immune to state controls was denied. Snide regulations which implied that churches might be a menace to public morality were instituted, and men and women were forbidden to meet in the same building. This rule aimed at the destruction of public worship.

Second, educational controls were instituted. The classics could only be taught by the pagans, which meant the introduction of pagan teachers into Christian schools. Moreover, the curriculum had to include anti-Christian

works. One such required text was an anti-Christian and forged *Acts of Pilate*, required reading for all schools.

Third, an imitation pagan church was created, with archpriests in all towns and villages, working under state subsidies. Julian recognized that classical literature was basic to the pagan and anti-Christian outlook. The church had extensively adopted these alien works. Now Julian required that pagans teach these materials in all schools, and that a pagan clergy exist in all communities in imitation of the church. Julian was a member of the secret society of Mithra, which had long imitated Christian forms while opposing Christianity.[2]

Fourth, Julian recalled the banished Arian leaders and bishops and reinstated them, thereby bringing legal and doctrinal disarray into the church.

Smith's comment on Julian's strategy is very much to the point:

> In fact, Julian's attack on Christianity is the model for many attacks by modern dictators. Crippling the machinery of the churches, a crusade against corruption, and a determined anti-Christian educational programme are the main planks in the policy of most present-day anti-Christian governments. The Nazi initiation ceremony for youth consciously aped the Lutheran confirmation service. The Communists have frequently seized power in reaction to a corrupt and inefficient regime. Many modern African dictators like Nkrumah have insisted on the cult of the head of state being enforced in the schools with quasi-religious songs. It is a formidable method of attack.[3]

Smith's observation on the Marxist attacks falls over backwards in its understatement, but, apart from this, his comment is valid. Julian's methodology is very much with us. It is a shrewd one, but is in essence negative. It fights faith with hatred; the results are vicious, but ultimately a failure.

There is another and a curious aspect to Julian's strategy. Enemies of Christianity have long sought to exploit anti-Semitism for their own reasons. Julian began to favor the Jews. The rebuilding of Jerusalem and the temple, long forbidden, was ordered, to the great enthusiasm of the Jews. Since Christ had said of the temple that not one stone should remain standing upon another (Matt. 24:2), the reconstruction of the temple would be, Julian felt, a refutation of Christ.

The project ran into problems. In A.D. 362, violent earthquakes did severe damage to existing cities in Palestine, leveling several of them and leaving permanent changes in the earth's crust. Then another serious problem appeared. From near the foundations of the temple, balls of flame came out of the ground, burning some workmen to death and making all further work impossible. There is no known explanation for this phenomenon, but it did lead to the abandonment of the project.

There is an aspect to Julian's life which we have suggested and which, in his youth, Libanius stated was the hope of many, namely, that Julian might come into power to prevent the collapse of civilization and to remedy its ills.[4] This was a negative hope. To talk about preserving a civilization is to concede that it is collapsing. The past is never more dead than when we seek to preserve it, because we are then involving ourselves in the resurrection business, something only God can do. Today, all too many are seeking to preserve the past: many conservatives, liberals, Marxists, New Englanders, Southerners, and others are all involved in this futile task. The past is only alive when we build on it. In the current church and state crisis, those Christians as well as those humanistic statists who simply want a return to the status quo of their imagination have no future. Those Romans who cannibalized the old temples to improve their homes had more sense than Julian; they were living in terms of reality, the present reality. The Christians who began to apply the Word of God to every area of life and thought began to shape the future. Christians cannot in good conscience or faith be Julians.

MORALITY AND THE STATE

AS WE HAVE SEEN, MARSILIUS OF PADUA (CA. 1275–CA. 1342) advanced a triple justification of the state as the basic and total order of society. *First*, he grounded the state in reason, not revelation; he transferred the state from the governance of theology to philosophy and political science. This meant that philosopher-kings must rule mankind. *Second*, Marsilius presented the state as supreme because it is the supreme coercive power, whose province it is to regulate and control strife and dissension by means of its power. *Third*, the state for Marsilius was the voice and the will of the people, so that it represented the true voice of man.

As F. W. Bussell pointed out, this theory was democratic in name but was in practice imperialist. To declare that the state is the voice of the people, the voice of man, is to deny legitimacy to any opposition, especially when the people are seen as naturally good, and the state is seen as the expression of reason and rational order. Then opposition to the state becomes the expression of unreason and evil. The church can at best be a subject and satellite to the civil state, if not an enemy because of its alien presuppositions. Not surprisingly, in the service of Louis IV of Bavaria, Marsilius became a persecutor of the church and was rewarded with an archbishopric, and his associate Jandun was similarly rewarded. Marsilius's roots were pagan; like Aristotle, he viewed the state as the ethical community and the source of ethical judgment. Hence, it was necessary to eliminate the possibility of interference by the church. The church was thus relegated to an

antinomian spiritual realm. Without God's law, the church had no basis for condemning the state, since the state was now the source of law. The church was limited to rites, mystical experiences, and emotional expressions. Bussell said of Marsilius:

> Marsilius, who with Aegidius follows Aristotle in tracing politics up from the family or household, desires to *rehabilitate* the State, as the home of ethical life, in the ancient spirit of classical times. He seems also to follow him in dividing the six functions (three productive, three protective): *husbandry, crafts, and banking* for the physical life; the duties of *judge, soldier and priest* for both natural and spiritual life. The priesthood is just another department of the State, set up and controlled by the people. His purpose, to demolish grounds for *clerical* interference in politics, was one which could not have occurred to Aristotle in whose time there was no such counterpoise to *secular* absolutism, — or rather the *divine king* Alexander united in his own person, the factors now contrasted and at feud.[1]

It should not surprise us, therefore, that as the centralization of power in the state developed, so too did the Inquisition. In its earlier years, the Inquisition worked to undercut the power of the bishops, who often protected the heretical groups from violence, in order to enforce unity in the state or empire. The state found the Inquisition a most valuable tool, one which is still used with other names and under other forms to compel conformity to the state. It should have made historians pause over the centuries and reflect on the fact that many of the rulers most vigorous in their use of the Inquisition were hardly believers. An early and very important example of this was the Hohenstaufen emperor, Frederick II, who, while himself an obvious and flagrant free thinker, *enacted* death, banishment, and confiscation against heretics within the empire (1220–1230). It was Frederick who influenced the papacy in the same direction. It is notable, too, that the Dominican order was used. This served a double goal. *First*, the use of monks undercut the semifeudal independence of bishops. Thus, the centralization of power in the Vatican was furthered. Earlier, such an urge to centralization had led the papacy to bless William the Conqueror's invasion of England in 1066; a strong English church was brought into tighter administrative relationship and control under both papacy and

Crown.[2] The earlier hostility of the Vatican to the persecution of heretics was thus overcome; it furthered the centralization of power in Rome, and the undermining of the episcopal powers.

The centralization of power in the Vatican made it easier for the state or empire to control the church. Instead of having many independent abbots and bishops to deal with, there was now only the pope to control.

Second, at the same time the state gained greatly by the Inquisition, because it helped break the powers of dissenting forces in the civil order, i.e., the bishops and the heretics. The Inquisition was least successful in the Germanic states, where both princes and bishops were less willing to see imperial and papal powers gain an advantage.[3] There was a financial factor; since a condemned heretic's possessions were subject to confiscation, ungodly princes developed a zeal for finding heresy on all sides. The wealth that accrued to kings from the forfeited estates of heretics was no small inducement to inquisitorial zeal. When, after 1252, the papacy also claimed a portion of the spoils, it became easier for the Inquisition to find people guilty. Secular rulers were always most zealous, however, to gain forfeited possessions. It is noteworthy that, in the Spanish Inquisition, the most rigorous of all, appeals against the court to Rome were forbidden; no mercy from the pope was permitted.

Marsilius's state thus very early became naked coercion. Where reason and coercion are identified as alike the attributes and nature of the state, it is coercion which prevails. In Machiavelli, reason became openly what it had been earlier in most states, *reasons of state*, a justification of whatever the state did as inherently right because the gaining, control, and retention of power and supremacy are priorities for the state.

Because the state in such thinking is the primary and ultimate order, man becomes a creature of the state. In Biblical faith, man is God's creation, and man, together with church, state, and all things else, is under God, and his being is determined by God, hence predestination. For modern thought, man is the state's creature. This is clear in a statement by an Austrian Polish sociologist, Ludwig Gumplowicz (1838–1909):

> It is not man himself who thinks but his social community; the source of his thoughts is in the social medium in which he lives, the social atmosphere which he breathes, and he can not think aught else than what the influences of his social environment concentrating upon his brain necessitate . . .[4]

This means, of course, predestination by the state. Gumplowicz, a close friend of Lester Ward and a positivist, held also, "my doctrine is that justice is the interest of the stronger."[5]

The philosophical idealists of the modern era have held with Marsilius that the state is morality. This was true of Thomas Hill Green (1836–1882), who said:

> A right against society as such, a right to act without reference to the needs or good of society, is an impossibility, since every right depends on some social relation, and a right against any group of associated men depends upon association on some footing of equality with them or with some other men . . . If we regard the state as the sustainer and harmoniser of social relations . . . the individual can have no right against the state: . . . its law must be to him of absolute authority . . . no exercise of power, however abstractedly desirable for the promotion of human good it might be, can be claimed as a right unless there is some common consciousness of utility shared by the person making the claim and those on whom it is made. It is not a question whether or not it ought to be claimed as a right; it simply cannot be claimed except on this condition.[6]

Because for Green the state is the moral order, no action can be moral except by reference to the needs or good of society. At times, in pagan antiquity, the state has held abortion to be an evil, at other times, a good, both judgments having been made in terms of the needs of society. For Green, reference to the law of God as revealed in the Bible is untenable; the point of reference is the social order and the state.

Bernard Bosanquet (1848–1923) could not see the state limited by morality, because for him the state was morality. Hegelian idealism found full expression in his philosophy. Bosanquet held:

> . . . the Nation-State . . . is the widest organization which has the common experience necessary to found a common life. This is why it is recognized as absolute in power over the individual, and as his representative and champion in the affairs of the world outside. It is obvious that there can be but one such absolute power in relation to any one person . . . and . . . his

> discharge from one allegiance can only be effected by his acceptance of another . . .
>
> The Nation-State as an ethical idea is, then, a faith or a purpose — we might say a mission, were not the word too narrow and too aggressive . . . The modern nation is a history and a religion rather than a clear cut idea.[7]

The positivists discarded the idea of morality as metaphysical nonsense; the philosophical idealists identified it with the state. The results in both cases were the same. Moral judgment was rendered null and void in either case. If the state is morality incarnate, how can the state be criticized? Again, if there is no morality, how can the state be criticized? No valid criticism or opposition to the state is then possible.

As Mexican positivist thinkers held, "The clergy and the military exist to serve the nation, that is, the people."[8] In Mexico, morality was held to belong to the social field, to the state, not the church. The same is true of education.[9] The state had come to replace the church. As Zea noted, "Actually, both liberals and positivists were sectarians; both were fighting for spiritual power."[10] The state as man's true order preempted man's freedom and powers, so that Gabino Barreda could say, "the rights of society are more important than the rights of man."[11]

In the various church and state trials in the United States in the 1970s and 1980s, it has been clear that the officials of state believe that only the state has rights, and that the coercive powers of the state are good, and beyond criticism.

31

FREEDOM AND THE STATE

NOT ONLY IS MORALITY TRANSFERRED FROM GOD AND HIS LAW TO the state and its fiat law, but freedom also. Whether it be a Marxist state or a democratic one, freedom is today usually spoken of as an attribute of the state rather than of the people as individuals. Such freedom as is permitted to men is freedom under the state, not under God.

Turning again to Gumplowicz, we find a frank statement of the fact that man, as a creature of the state, cannot be free:

> That man is a free being is pure imagination . . . The premise of "inalienable human rights" rests upon the most unreasonable self-deification of man and overestimation of the value of human life, and upon a complete misconception of the only possible basis of the existence of the state. This fancied freedom and equality is incompatible with the state and is a complete negation of it.[1]

In Biblical theology, the absolute freedom of God is a basic premise: God cannot be controlled or governed by anything outside of Himself. This is the premise of humanistic doctrines of the state: the absolute freedom of the state.

At the same time, radical and final coercive powers are claimed by the state. It can be noted indeed that there are limits, in the United States and

other countries, to these coercive powers, but these are self-limitations. Acts of Congress or of Parliament can at any time alter or remove those limits. Without the limitation of faith in and a covenant with and under God, the state is the absolute determiner of its own powers. With each passing year, we have seen an extension of those powers. In the United States, whatever the platform of moderation, reform, or the limitations of powers whereby presidents and members of Congress have been elected, there has been a steady increase of coercion and a decrease in freedom.

In Mexico, there has been a clearer development of the theology of the state, because Mexican intellectuals have been more successful in implementing their philosophies. The Mexican economy has been more backward by far than anything else in North America, but its politics has been more dominated by intellectuals and theoreticians and hence in advance of the United States and Canada in developing the implications of humanism.

No less than do Christians believe in a final order, the full and perfect community created by God, do humanists also believe in their own final order, the "Great Community" of man. Thus, in Mexico, leading thinkers have been ready to allow a semblance of religious liberty provided that the churches do nothing to influence or alter the social order. Thus, for Gabino Barreda,

> An individual should think and believe as he pleases, provided that his thoughts and beliefs do not alter the social order. The mission of public education was not merely to teach; it was to make public order possible.[2]

Less honestly stated, this is the position of many state and federal agencies in the United States during the 1970s and 1980s in particular. Religious freedom was tenable only when and where Christianity was having no influence on the social order. When the Christian school movement began to move the faith from irrelevance to relevance, persecution began. It became obvious that the much vaunted religious liberty meant for many officers of state the freedom to practice religion only between the limits of a man's two ears.

The Marxists have seen liberty as a concept used by a social class to their advantage. The Mexican positivists hold that a thing is free when it follows its natural course and encounters no obstacles. It then follows the law of its

being. A stream coming down a mountainside is in terms of this definition free. However, where applied to man, this doctrine has some interesting consequences, because freedom is then clearly related to the doctrine of man. If man is God's creature, then freedom is only under God. If, however, man is an evolving animal whose being is determined by naturalistic drives and forces, then religion is a dramatic restraint on his freedom.

Thus, for Gabino Barreda, the individual was not free to do as he wished. Rather, "Freedom ought to be subordinate to the interests of society, namely, to the interests of the Mexican nation." A laissez-faire freedom is to be seen instead as disorder, not liberty. "The freedom of the individual must subordinate itself to the social order." Freedom is not under God, but under the state. "Thus, the state should intervene, as an instrument of society, in the moral education of Mexicans. It must prepare Mexicans to be good civil servants by stimulating their altruistic sentiments."[3] For this reason, Barreda could say, "the rights of society are more important than the rights of man."[4] It followed also that Barreda could propose a civil dictatorship to promote freedom.[5]

The equation of reason and morality with the state is commonplace to humanistic thought. (A variation is its equation with autonomous man.) Such a view is productive of a new pharisaism. In this self-righteous faith, the state as the great good passes judgment on all other segments of society. It holds that the state and its sovereignty constitute the necessary order for life, indeed, the saving order. Dissent from the state then becomes true evil. Not crime but nonconformity is then seen as the great problem.

As a consequence in the Soviet Union, criminals are not seen as the great offenders. Rather, it is the dissenter of any kind, especially the Christian or the libertarian dissenter. The uniform testimony of former slave labor camp prisoners is that criminals have a privileged status and are commonly used to terrorize political prisoners. The only offense of these political prisoners, when there is any offense, is their real or fancied dissent. Vicious hoodlums do not threaten the political philosophy of the state, but dissenters do, and they are accordingly treated more severely.

We see steps in the same direction in the United States. As the state's ability to cope with crime, and its concern to do so, diminishes, its zeal to penalize dissent increases. The persecutions of churches and of independent Christian schools points clearly to this zeal to limit liberty. Thus, many people find a dual limitation on their freedom. In major cities, freedom of movement, especially after dark, is limited because of the freedom of the

criminal element. At the same time, their personal and religious liberties are increasingly restricted by statist claims and the growth of statist power.

Bussell pointed out how, in medieval Europe, the empire revived Roman law (in the twelfth century) to destroy the freedom of the church. Roman law "could not conceive of a genuine *dyarchy* in which both parties respect the limits of the sacred and profane departments."[6] By 1453, Bussell held, the ideals of the medieval world were dead, and statism in the saddle.[7] The savagery of the modern age was under way, and the Renaissance of paganism was also the renewal of tyranny and barbarism.

Despite the rise of the national states, the Holy Roman Empire and its dream persisted. Maximilian I (1459–1519), called "the foremost knight of the age," is, like Sigismund, well regarded by many historians. However, as we know from a letter to his daughter Margaret, Maximilian hoped to gain the papal throne on the death of the pope, and at times thought of deposing Pope Julius II. Moreover, Maximilian dreamed of the "good" he could accomplish by using the church's wealth for the empire.[8]

There were and are no restraints on the dream of the modern state. What Maximilian dreamed about, Henry VIII in effect did, and also Louis XIV and other monarchs with their state churches. With the French and Russian Revolutions, the state made itself man's church and savior. As man's true savior and church, the modern state began an open or a covert war against the church, and also against man's freedom. The only freedom desired by the modern state is its own.

As we have noted, man's freedom was separated from God and creation in His image and made a natural fact, freedom to follow our natural course. One religious consequence of this has been the sexual revolution. Another, and an earlier one, is aptly summarized by Hallowell: "Communion with nature replaces communion with God as the source of inspiration and true enlightenment."[9] An early example of this was William Wordsworth. The environmental movement has deep religious roots.

This "natural freedom," however, does not make possible any freedom for man other than an esthetic and sexual venting of his impulses. To "do your own thing" is a logical consequence of Wordsworth's religion. It means submission to, not resistance against, the forces of history, and it is the death of freedom, which is an antinaturalistic motive. Because the Biblical doctrine of freedom is antinaturalistic and supernatural, only Christ can make us free (John 8:36). We are made free by the supernatural act of regeneration. Since our natural course is a fallen one, natural freedom is

to sin and die. The history of true freedom cannot be known or written apart from Jesus Christ. Inevitably, the modern humanistic state is anti-Christian and anti-freedom.

32

INTERCESSION

A MUCH MISUNDERSTOOD TEXT OF SCRIPTURE IS I TIMOTHY 2:1–2:

> I exhort therefore, that, first of all, supplications, prayers, intercessions, and giving of thanks, be made for all men; For kings, and for all that are in authority; that we may lead a quiet and peaceable life in all godliness and honesty.

This is a text much used by those who advocate unconditional submission to civil authorities. It is well to remember, that this text represents a point of offense to Rome, and conflict with the magistrates. Perowne, in analyzing the points of conflict between Rome and the church, cites this as one of them. Of "the attitude of Christians to the state," Perowne says, "This was, in brief, that while they were ready and anxious to pray *for* Caesar, and, as their Master had taught them, to render unto him the things which were his, they refused to pray *to* him. This attitude simply confirmed the belief that they were a seditious and subversive organization."[1]

With this in mind, the text takes on a new meaning. One is reminded of *Fiddler on the Roof*, in which the rabbi is asked how best to pray for the tsar. The rabbi answered, "God bless the Tsar, . . . and keep him far from us!" Paul's words, however, are very positive. We are to pray for rulers in order that we may lead a quiet and peaceable life in all godliness and honesty; civil order and peace are dependent upon his just exercise of authority. We

are to give thanks for all good government the civil ruler provides. However, our prayers for the civil authorities involve also *intercessions* for them. The Greek word is *enteuxis*, a technical term for approaching a king. Here, however, the king is treated as a needy soul, and the praying Christian as a higher power who intercedes with the Great King for him! The Christian has continual access to the great intercessor at the right hand of God, Jesus Christ, who "is able also to save them to the uttermost that come unto God by him, seeing he ever liveth to make intercession for them" (Heb. 7:25). To pray *for* Caesar, in brief, was an affront to Caesar and a serious derogation of his authority.

Turning to the present, a related incident can be cited. The Reverend Robert McCurdy, a Baptist pastor in East Point, Georgia (a part of larger Atlanta), had a notice in the church's paper calling for prayers for the abolition of the federal Internal Revenue Service. The IRS sees itself as the entity which alone can validate a church's claim to be a church. It gives taxpayers who owe money a given number of "days of grace" to pay up. The IRS reaction to Pastor McCurdy's request for prayers against the IRS was a stiff note of protest!

Again citing the present, Segundo, a liberation theologian, defined socialism thus:

> We give the name of socialism to a political regime in which the ownership of the means of production is removed from individuals and handed over to higher institutions whose concern is the common good.[2]

The "higher institutions" are agencies of the state. The state is seen as an agency which transcends the greed and limitations of "private" individuals and has as it "concern . . . the common good." The state replaces God as the transcendent power who is above and beyond the petty concerns of men. The state becomes a god on earth.

The state's "concern" is by nature good, because, since Plato, a vast stream of philosophy has identified politics and ethics. As Willoughby pointed out many years ago:

> In such a political philosophy as this the idea that the state existed solely, or even chiefly, for the protection of the private rights of its citizens of course found no place. Rather it was held

> that without the state the individual would have no rights at all — not even natural or moral rights, for without the education and order which the state affords he would have neither the disposition nor the opportunity to lead a moral, rational life.
>
> A further consequence which followed from this extended idea as to the scope of the state, was to make of politics and ethics practically one science. As we shall later see, in the writings of Plato the two were completely identified. Aristotle distinguished between them, but in conformity with the principles which we have been stating, made politics the master science, with ethics one of its subdivisions. Thus he explicitly declares his *Nicomachean Ethics* to be a political treatise, and to be but the introduction to his treatise on politics proper.[3]

Neither Plato nor Aristotle were breaking new ground with their ideas. They were formulating Greek practice in terms of their own specific objectives. Willoughby cited Felix Dahn in confirmation of this:

> It was not so much that the State interfered in almost everything, but rather that everything was absorbed in the State. Religion was the State's religion, and any one who announced new gods, had to drain the fatal cup. The family was only a means to the end of the State. The State might prevent trade and traffic with foreign countries, and fetter the full activity of the economy of individuals; it acknowledged no society but itself. That State was only the logical consequence of the same political idea which prescribed to music its melodies, to instruments their tunes, and even ventured to forbid the Hellenes to read Homer.[4]

The point is well taken: "everything was absorbed in the State." This same absorption is again taking place, or has, as in the Marxist states. Its presupposition is the infallibility of the state, and the virtual imbecility of all who dissent, as Mill pointed out more than a century ago.

In the Western world, many liberal and Jacobin thinkers have an alternate theory which does give us finally a similar conclusion. In this theory, an entity exists which epitomizes virtue and is yet at the same time the oppressed element. This entity is "the people." The Marxists use the

same concept but identify "the people" with a particular social class. "The people" represent the oppressed and the good; they seek to achieve their perfect realization in the state. If the state frustrates that realization, it is evil, fascistic, reactionary, or some like monstrous entity. However, in priority and in the beginning is "the people," and "the people," the true logos of history, seek to incarnate themselves in the state. Instead of God, "the people" are the basis and the source of power. Anything which is not of, by, and for the people is evil. As Halle noted,

> Today, when the Premier of the Soviet Union addresses a communication to the President of the United States he undertakes to express the view of "the Soviet people" on the matter in question. When the President of the United States replies he gives the answer of "the American people" to the contents of the Premier's note. At San Francisco in 1945 sixty individual persons, vested with the authority of as many sovereign states, some of them what we call dictatorships and a few that we call liberal democracies, drew up and agreed upon a document that begins: "We the people of the United Nations . . ."[5]

The Preamble to the Constitution of the United States invokes the same evil myth of, "We, the people." "The people" are not a corporate entity with a corporate will, but this is the myth of modern politics. "The people" as a corporate entity with a common will, is an *idea*, not a fact of life, not an entity. To base our political life on a myth is to invite every kind of evil in the name of the myth. As Halle pointed out, "Both the liberal and Jacobin procedures are based on the premise that, among the forms of being in the existential world, there is a personal entity called 'the people.'"

Given the identification of "the people" as an entity, every political charlatan, knave, pharisee, quack, and hypocrite can then denounce all opponents as "against the people." We can, in fact, identify the political Judas as a man who "speaks for the people." Robespierre loved to proclaim in the French Assembly, "the People are the law,"[6] but if any persons among "the people" disagreed with Robespierre, they were beheaded. Two Jacobins, d'Herbois and Fouche, issued an edict which began, "All is permitted those who act in the Revolutionary direction."[7] Nothing was permitted to those who by definition were not "the People" and hence not part of the Revolution.

In the 1960s, the youth movement embraced lawlessness and violence in the name of "the people." The nuclear freeze movement, environmentalism, zero economic growth, zero population growth, abortion, homosexuality, and more have all been championed in the name of "the people." In the name of "the people," yes, anything goes. This is the great name of power in the modern world.

The Christians offended Rome by invoking, not Caesar, but praying to God. Now, humanism invokes the name of "the people" and is offended when Christians refuse to submit to the will of "the people" as expressed in the state. Christian churches, their schools, pastors, and parents are taken to court because they dissent for religious reasons from submission to the new god. (I have heard judges rebuke Christians for citing Scripture, because they recognize no authority from God.) How men stand in this warfare depends to a large degree on their doctrine of intercession. If the power whose law-word is to be obeyed, and to whom intercession is made, is the state or "the people," then resisting Christians are clearly in the wrong. But if God is alone Lord, and Christians have an intercessor at the throne, then the state and the champions of "the people" are wrong, and they shall be judged.

PROCESSION

AN ESSENTIAL DOCTRINE DOES NOT DISAPPEAR WHEN MEN NEGLECT it; there is simply another and illegitimate manifestation of it in another sphere. This is true of the doctrine of procession, now rarely discussed or remembered. Its meaning on the level of the Trinity appears most clearly in John 15:26, "But when the Comforter is come, whom I will send unto you from the Father, even the Spirit of truth, which *proceedeth* from the Father, he shall testify of me." The procession of the Holy Ghost speaks of the *work* of the Spirit. As the Spirit of truth and of power, He proceeds from the Father and the Son *to the believer* to communicate truth and power to him. Knowledge is also given (1 Cor. 2:12–16). The essence of procession thus is *the manifestation and communication* of gifts by the supreme power to those whom He favors. It can, however, manifest those gifts negatively, i.e., as judgment. Processions from antiquity have been very much a part of political as well as religious life. Rome, for example, had triumphal entries for victorious conquerors; arches were erected to commemorate the event, and divine honors conferred on the conqueror. Palm Sunday commemorates a great procession, the triumphal entry of Christ into Jerusalem. The procession of Christ to the cross was an example of a Roman processional of judgment, again a communication of power in a negative, judgmental sense. For centuries, in much of the world, executions were preceded by processions to the gallows or the block. In a procession, the supreme power could either honor or degrade a person, or else set forth its victory and authority

in a public display. The carrying of the ark of God in the Old Testament was a processional. In pagan cultures, processionals often required the carrying of farm produce to manifest the fertility with which the god blessed men, and some processions may have been means of celebrating the movements of heavenly bodies. The origin of both drama and the dance are in pagan processionals. One form of purificatory processional which still attracts interest is walking through fire; the ruling powers give public witness to the devotee by taking him safely through the fire. Processionals had their origin both in the Old Testament and in pagan antiquity; they were a part of every culture.

Processions thus became a part of the life of the church. Three kinds of processions have been common. *First*, some processions are of persons or dignitaries and their staffs, and none other. *Second*, other processions have been of images and icons borne by processionists. *Third*, still other processions have been of the host or communion wafer. A *fourth* kind of procession is the extraordinary one, for special purposes, as in time of famine, plague, war, disaster, thanksgiving, and, sometimes, to carry relics. Such a procession sought favor from God by honoring Him, or thanked God for grace manifested.

At the same time, statist processions, now called parades, continued. In the Christian era, these took on by the medieval era a semblance of Biblical form. The king or emperor entered a city as a Christ-bearer, with the crowds hailing him, "Blessed is he that cometh in the name of the Lord" (Matt. 21:9).[1] Much later, James Nayler, the Quaker leader, not only imitated Christ in his appearance but also entered Bristol in a simulation of the Triumphal Entry of Christ.[2]

The procession thus is the expression of a people whereby their belief in the supreme power is made visible. It is normally a joyful occasion, because it is the visible expression of their favor under and covenant with the supreme power. During much of history, the state has claimed to be the manifestation of that power, and hence all other processions were forbidden. There could be only one *public* power. In the family and before the family shrine, the father was that *private* power, but there could be only one public procession.

In the medieval era, there were two kinds of processionals at first, the royal, civil processional, and then the ecclesiastical processional. Later, a third form also developed, the *academic processional.* The university began to see itself as the voice of God and reason speaking to church and state

alike, and the robed processional came into being, and also the doctrine of academic freedom. This doctrine asserts the independence of the academic community from any responsibility to church, state, or community. It sees ultimate authority resting in the intellectual elite of the university, and, in both its processionals and in its doctrine of immunity from consequences from God and man, sets forth the implicit thesis of the processional: it is the focal point of power and authority, or should be.

The public response to processionals is indicative of the public faith. In the modern era, ecclesiastical processions are less and less relevant in most areas, and really a matter of curiosity in some cases. The locale of power is seen as elsewhere. However, the modern age has seen pomp and circumstance attached to royal processions, military reviews, and political parades because humanism has seen the state as the source of power. The modern parade has replaced the church's processions. Now, of course, the old excitement over parades is waning, because the state, while more powerful than ever, is increasingly a false god.

We have, thus far, dealt with the formal procession. It should be remembered that the procession is not limited to a formal march or parade. The athletes of ancient Greece wore a laurel crown to indicate that power had proceeded to them. He was a hero, a manifestation of power. The modern athlete has a like role. The farmer and the businessman may be resented if they make too much money, but very rarely the successful athlete or actor.

Charismatic political and social leaders are better examples in our time. Such people bring into focus the visible manifestation of the favor and power worshipped by millions of people.

At this point, it is necessary to discuss the direction of the procession. In the Bible, the procession is from God to man. The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son to the earth, to man. The procession is entirely by God's grace, and it is separated from the will of man. We are told of the redeemed who are made the sons of God in power, that they "were born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God" (John 1:13). Before God, the nations are as nothing (Isa. 40:15–17); He sets up one and abases another at His will. The Biblical doctrine of procession is from God to man.

All other doctrines of procession see either in some degree or in totality the direction as from man to God, or at least from man upward. The Tower of Babel was a doctrine of procession embodied in stone, a stepladder building exalting man into divinity. The entelechy of being is seen

as manifesting itself in a leap of being, an upward surge, which brings into focus the latent powers of man.

The procession is related to sacraments, in that the procession is a visible sign of a fact of being. If that view of being is humanistic, the procession will manifest man's strength and power. If God alone is the Lord, the procession will celebrate His being, grace, and justice.

The Christian procession has receded in our time. No emphasis on ritual parades can alter that fact. Above all else, procession is *personal*: the Holy Ghost is sent by the Father and the Son to the faithful covenant people. To restore the Christian procession means, *first*, that God the Lord is again gracious and merciful to His erring people, and forgives their sins. *Second*, covenant man in faithfulness obeys the mandate of the procession. The procession does not convey an empty experience. It gives marching orders for the conquest of all things in the name and power of Christ. Our Lord commanded the church to move only in terms of the power of the procession: "But ye shall receive power, after that the Holy Ghost is come upon you: and ye shall be witnesses unto me both in Jerusalem, and in all Judaea, and in Samaria, and unto the uttermost part of the earth" (Acts 1:8).

In our time, the state's procession is very much at the center of all things, but it is an increasingly bankrupt manifestation. The state now lacks the power of moral authority and has substituted brute force in its place. It is this brute force which is used to attempt to control Christian churches and schools. However, even as the coercion increases, the public appeal of the state's parade diminishes. A morally bankrupt power has very little to parade, except its guns.

The philosophies of the modern faith are very much in evidence: process theology, evolution, the great chain of being, and more. All are equally bankrupt.

34

THE "ATHEISM" OF THE EARLY CHURCH

BECAUSE WE TEND TO PROJECT THE PRESENT ONTO THE PAST, WE too often view the conflict of Rome with Christianity as a persecution of religion. As we have seen, Rome's concern was that all religions should be licit or licensed and controlled. As long as the religion was not subversive of Caesar's authority and power, Rome was only incidentally concerned with the content of the new religion.

Christianity was charged with being an atheistic cult, and Rome hated atheism as a subversive force. The readiness of Rome to believe that Christians were guilty of incest and cannibalism was due to its conviction that atheists are capable of anything. Eusebius, in his *Church History* (bk. 5), gives an account of the persecution of Christians in Lyons. Earlier, the Jews had been accused of atheism. Now the Christians were the main targets. Justin Martyr said that Christians were called atheists because they arrayed themselves in opposition to the demonic forces of their day and against its moral corruption. The Christians held the gods of the pagans to be "wicked and impious demons." Justin added, "And we confess that we are atheists, so far as gods of this sort are concerned, but not with respect to the most true God, the Father of righteousness and temperance and the other virtues, who is free from all impurity."[1] Justin spoke out sharply against the Cynic, Crescens, who had accused the Christians of atheism:

> I, too, therefore, expect to be plotted against and fixed to the stake, by some of those I have named, or perhaps by Crescens, that lover of bravado and boasting; for the man is not worthy of the name of philosopher who publicly bears witness against us in matters which he does not understand, saying that the Christians are atheists and impious, and doing so to win favour with the deluded mob, and to please them. For if he assails us without having read the teachings of Christ, he is thoroughly depraved, and far worse than the illiterate, who often refrain from discussing or bearing false witness about matters they do not understand. Or, if he has read them and does not understand the majesty that is in them, or understanding it, acts thus that he may not be suspected of being such (a Christian), he is far more base and thoroughly depraved, being conquered by illiberal and unreasonable opinion and fear.[2]

We have here too important a point to pass over quickly. A Cynic philosopher is the last one most people today would expect to accuse Christians of *impiety* and *atheism.* What did these terms mean to Crescens and to men of his day? Piety meant above all else a respectable submission to statist authority; a pious Roman was a man devoted to and obedient always to the Roman state. Christians felt that theirs was a truer and higher piety, but, to Romans, they were indeed impious, and to the Greeks as well.

Clement of Alexandria sought to show that the only real Gnostic is the Christian, who "alone is truly pious."[3] Of the charge of atheism, he declared:

> He, then, who is persuaded that God is omnipotent, and has learned the divine mysteries from His only-begotten Son, how can he be an atheist (*atheos*)? For he is an atheist who thinks that God does not exist. And he is superstitious who dreads the demons; who deifies all things, both wood and stone; and reduces to bondage spirit, and man who possesses the life of reason.[4]

Clement redefines atheism to give it a Christian content which it did not previously have. What, then, was atheism to the Greeks and Romans?

We find the key to this in Eusebius, as he gives us the record of an interrogation by Aemilianus, the deputy prefect, of a group of Christians. One of the Christians, Dionysius, reported the matter in a letter to Hermammon:

> Dionysius, Faustus, Maximus, Marcellus, and Chaeremon being arraigned Aemilianus the prefect said: "I have reasoned verbally with you concerning the clemency which our rulers have shown to you; for they have given you the opportunity to save yourselves, if you will turn to that which is according to nature, and worship the gods that preserve their empire, and forget those that are contrary to nature. What then do you say to this? For I do not think that you will be ungrateful for their kindness, since they would turn you to a better course." Dionysius replied: "Not all people worship all gods; but each one those whom he approves. We therefore reverence and worship the one God, the Maker of all; who hath given the empire to the divinely favored and august Valerian and Gallienus; and we pray to him continually for their empire, that it may remain unshaken." Aemilianus, the prefect, said to them, "But who forbids you to worship him, if he is a god, together with those who are gods by nature. For ye have been commanded to reverence the gods, and the gods whom all know." Dionysius answered: "We worship no other." Aemilianus, the prefect, said to them: "I see that you are at once ungrateful, and insensible to the kindness of our sovereigns. Wherefore, ye shall not remain in this city. But ye shall be sent to a place called Cephro. For I have chosen this place at the command of our sovereigns, and it shall by no means be permitted you or any others, either to hold assemblies, or to enter into the so-called cemeteries. But if anyone shall be seen without the place which I have commanded, or be found in any assembly, he will bring peril on himself. For suitable punishment shall not fail. Go, therefore where ye have been ordered."[5]

We see here clearly the totalitarian mentality. Aemilianus feels that he is being gracious in allowing the Christians to submit to his demands, and he calls them "ungrateful" for persisting in their faith.

More important, Aemilianus tells us what atheism meant to Rome: it was the refusal to worship the gods of nature, i.e., natural forces. The Christian idea of God was "contrary to nature." We come now to the focal point. For paganism, divinity was a power inherent in nature which manifested itself in great men, in heroes, but supremely in the state. In the

state, men and the gods realized themselves. A stateless man was no man at all, and a stateless god was a contradiction in terms. Power came to focus in the state, and the idea of a god divorced from and transcendental to the human order was anathema. All the pagan cults which infiltrated Rome, such as Mithraism, were cults in search of a state. Christianity, by declaring the triune God to be totally separate from the state and totally over it in authority, was atheistic; it was denying the state and its gods. Christianity made the triune God the source of all power, authority, and legitimacy, whereas Rome maintained that it alone made the gods legitimate, because power and authority belonged to Rome.

Rome thus recognized the supernatural God of Christianity as the enemy of its foundations and its power.

We have today a like conflict. The modern humanistic state, while not using the same term, regards Christians as in effect atheists because they believe in a supernatural God whom "scientists" regard as nonexistent and a superstition. John Dewey in *A Common Faith* echoed Aemilianus's hostility to Christianity as an enemy of a true naturalistic social order.

The authority of the state as the ultimate natural order is undermined by the Christian faith. Crescens and others in the Roman Empire were not ignorant of the contents of the Bible. For them, the only moral force tenable for man was the fear of the state. If man were placed instead under the rule of a remote and unseen God, what would then restrain man from incest and cannibalism? So reasoned the Romans and Greeks. For them, thus, the church was the enemy of man, of social order, of the state, of morality, and of the gods. They called it *atheism.*

35

STATISM AS A RELIGIOUS FACT, PART 1

FOX, IN A STUDY OF PRE-INDUSTRIAL INDIA, NOTED THAT THE KIND of civil government existing then could not be described in terms of the contemporary concept of the state:

> R. E. Frykenberg has noted that the Western concept of the state is not readily applicable to governmental forms in traditional India. The state in Western political theory enjoys a monopoly of coercive force in the society, and is the center of administrative decisions and judicial review. Frykenberg suggests that traditional politics in South Asia never controlled such centralized powers. Rather, administration, police, and civil activities often were dispersed, sometimes resting with the virtually autonomous or independent local overlords, and at other times with kin groups or civil servants.[1]

The same, however, can be said of Europe prior to the French Revolution. In theory, the rulers claimed "divine right" and absolute power. In practice, their powers were limited, and local units had a variety of independent powers. Although often their taxes did not reach the proportions exacted by the modern state, it can be said of the prerevolutionary leaders

that, on the whole, they taxed more than they ruled. In France, the many religious houses, i.e., monasteries, with their extensive welfare and educational programs, were suppressed. All sources of charity were seized by the state between 1789 and 1793.[2]

Much earlier, the Germanic kingdom not only was not a state, but, according to Strayer, "was in some ways the complete antithesis of a modern state." It was based, not on the state as an entity, but "on loyalties to persons, not to abstract concepts or impersonal institutions." In short, "Security came from family, and neighborhood, and lord, not from the king."[3]

Even after the origin and development of the state, it was some time, largely since the French Revolution, that drafted and standing armies existed. Taxation was not organized with even the remote thoroughness of the twentieth century. The state was essentially the personal court of a king and his associates.

The development of the modern state is a religious and anti-Christian fact. Strayer's comment is especially important: "A state exists chiefly in the hearts and minds of its people; if they do not believe it is there, no logical exercise will bring it to life."[4]

It is important to understand this shift from the more basic governments of family, community, and church to the state. The shift was a religious one. Ralph summarized it clearly as it came into intellectual focus in the Renaissance: "Together with other thinkers of the age, Erasmus, More, and Machiavelli shared a conviction that, without any change in human nature or any drastic altering of institutions, the political order could be made to serve desirable human ends."[5] As Hellenic thought was revived, the pagan doctrine of the state was reintroduced into European thought. The Reformation and Counter-Reformation set back this paganism for a time, but, after 1660, it was again increasingly dominant. With the Enlightenment, it was in obvious power. Mirgeler said, of Western Christianity,

> After it had struggled — *also*, but still very thoroughly — at enormous moral, social and political expense, to make man and his world endurable, the Enlightenment suddenly and with great pathos presented it with the claim that the natural man (Rousseau), and even the Jew (Lessing) and the savage (Seume), were better men: in other words, that the thousand-year-old exertions of Western Christianity had brought about a merely negative result.[6]

In brief, Christianity was increasingly held to be the hindrance to the good life, not the means to it, and the state sought to place a distance between itself and Christianity.

Previously, in medieval Europe and the Reformation, Christian man was seen as the necessary unit for a good society; now he was the impediment. It is ironic that this idea of the secular state is so popular in many evangelical circles, because it denies that conversion is necessary before a man and his society can become morally sound.

The modern state popularized slogans which had as their purpose the erosion of nonstatist government and the enhancement of state power. Max Beloff called attention to this with respect to Austria at the time of the French Revolution:

> Both liberty and equality were devices by which the State could be strengthened. If Jews and Protestants were to be freed from persecution, and encouraged to come into Austria, it might be possible to rival the economic success which toleration was believed to have brought to Prussia. If the serf could be freed and allowed to choose his occupation, industry would acquire new sources of labour. Equality meant the breaking down of the groupings and orders into which the social and legal order was divided, so that all citizens should be equally subordinate to a strengthened bureaucracy, and equally tributary to the royal treasury.[7]

Thus, the modern state worked first to free men from church, family, and local rulers and customs in order to strengthen itself at their expense, and then, having accomplished this, it began to strengthen itself against individuals, who were now without their traditional coverings and institutions. How radical this destruction of the ancient Christian governments was is apparent when we look at what happened to Benedictine monasteries. Long a source of welfare and more, of almost 1,500 in 1789, only about thirty remained in 1814, and these had fewer men and were despoiled of their assets.[8]

The French Revolution had in 1789 proclaimed a Declaration of Rights, but it then proceeded to trample all rights underfoot as no previous regime had ever done. Equality, fraternity, the rights of the people, liberty, land to the people, bread, and more have been revolutionary slogans which have

led to the denial of precisely their affirmations. In the 1790s, "the two great weapons of the modern State," conscription (born in France), and the income tax (made in Britain), were created.[9]

In the Ancien Régime, the state's claims to total power were still in embryonic form and in trifling ways of etiquette. Thus, when Louis XIV's meals passed by in the hall of Versailles, it was customary to raise one's hat in salute and sweep the ground with its feathers.[10] After the French Revolution, the totalitarianism was more substantial. The state began to make itself coterminous with society, which meant controlling or suppressing all other powers and governments in society.

The roots of this went back to the thirteenth century, when final decisions concerning social objectives began to be made by civil governments. The church was held to be increasingly "merely a private society with no public powers or duties." Leadership had passed from the church to the state.[11]

The goal of the state is the old pagan and Platonic dream of a *monopoly of power.* By its claim to sovereignty and to universal jurisdiction over everything within its domain, the modern state seeks indeed to be a god walking on earth. The Biblical faith in a multiplicity of governments under God is denied. The self-government of the individual and the governments of the family, church, school, vocation, and society are all subverted in favor of the unitary power of the state.

Let us consider again Strayer's comment, "A state exists chiefly in the hearts and minds of its people; if they do not believe it is there, no logical exercise will bring it to life."[12] The modern state is faltering badly. In the United States, it is said that the percentage of eligible voters who vote has been dropping in presidential elections since Woodrow Wilson's day. The modern state is "a god that failed." When Christians again see the total crown rights of Christ the King, the threat of the state will collapse.

STATISM AS A RELIGIOUS FACT, PART 2

AS WE HAVE SEEN, THE STATE IS A RELIGIOUS ENTITY. JOSEPH R. Strayer stated that, "A state exists *chiefly* in the hearts and minds of its people; if they do not believe it is there, no logical exercise will bring it to life."[1] Why should a given state have given boundaries? Is it "race" which describes the state? The United States is certainly not of a given race, if we can use that word. France includes a variety of peoples, and Britain is made up of Gaels and English, in a not too harmonious union. Is it language? In the United States, besides Indian tongues, we have Spanish as an official language of New Mexico, and a variety of Europeans and Asiatics clinging to their mother tongues. In France, the Bretons prefer their language to French, and Great Britain has its Gaelic-speaking minorities. Why, if language and race are important, should not Germany include East and West Germany, Austria, and other territories, or the United States include Canada, and France much of Switzerland, and so on? National boundaries are artificial lines, not God-given realities which have a natural inevitability about them.

Moreover, the state cannot be identified with government. It is one form of government among many, the main forms being the self-government of the individual man, the family, the church, the school, vocations, society, and then civil government. Within each of these spheres, there are many

varieties of governments. Thus, within the world of commerce, there is the government of the stock and commodity markets. Here, oral contracts made and made without witnesses are regularly kept, although five minutes after a telephone call, a change in the price of a commodity can cost a man large sums of money; still the contract is kept. Customary law has long ruled in many societies. In some parts of the United States, as in the Ozarks, some religious groups restricted marriage and divorce to the church and refused to recognize any valid role for the state; this was still true as late as the 1950s.

This does *not* mean that these varying forms of government necessarily gave good government. To say so would be to fall into the same fallacy as statism, namely, the belief that some institution can give good government to bad men. Each at least in its own sphere gave some checks and balances against the others. The U.S. Constitution includes a checks-and-balances element in its three branches, executive, legislative, and judicial. These, however, functioned only when the federal government was small, and one variety of government among many. Now, all three branches are in essential union against all rival forms of government: the individual, the family, church, school, vocation, and society. The state now claims to be *the government*, a radically false claim.

This is not all. The state is no longer content to be that form of government which is a ministry of justice under God. It claims to be the overlord or god of society. It seeks to subordinate all other jurisdictions under its own, as though the state represents disinterested benevolence and is hence the proper judge over all. Where many governments exist, the corruption of one is not necessarily the corruption of all. Where statism triumphs, the small corruptions are replaced by the massive corruption of the state, an evil which permeates all of society.

The issue with regard to the state is thus a religious one. Evil is a problem for all of society. The corruption of sin affects the person and all his institutions. The family is God-ordained, but sin can turn the family into hell. Recently, a boy murdered his father. The father had forced the mother into prostitution, repeatedly raped his daughters, and assaulted his son. He had forced drugs and pornography on all his children.[2] The family in the hands of such a man is clearly an evil place. So, too, are church, state, and school in the hands of reprobates. The idea that the state can be the overlord and moral arbiter between men, other governments, and institutions is one of history's most evil illusions. It is a religious illusion which seeks

to circumvent the need for God. Its ancient classic is Plato's *Republic*; its current expression is the modern state.

At issue is whether or not the key governing unit on earth is the redeemed man in Christ, or the state as a god walking on earth. Behind this is the basic issue: Does sin have its only true cure in Christ or in the state? How is the good life possible for men? Can the state provide justice without Christ and His law-word, or is the logical end of the state, like unregenerate men, to be a hell on earth?

We must affirm that the individual, the church, the state, and all other forms of government can only manifest original sin, the will to be their own god (Gen. 3:5), apart from Jesus Christ. There can be, and needs to be, a disestablishment of the church, but there cannot be a separation of religion and the state. It is only a question of which religion shall prevail.

The modern state is anti-Christian in origin, conception, and administration. Earlier, we saw the implications of Marsilius of Padua's thought. Walter Ullmann, in *The Individual and Society in the Middle Ages*, called attention to the humanistic foundations of the state in Marsilius and others, and as developed by the state. Laws were held to be valid laws by *consent*; by means of this doctrine, the law of God was not proper law, because its subjects gave no consent. Sovereignty was transferred from God to the people when lawmaking was given to man. Instead of power and sovereignty coming from God above, it was now held to come from man below. Whatever the natural inequality of men, within the sphere of civil government all men were held by Marsilius to be without distinction. Marsilius also placed control of the church in the hands of men, as E. A. Goerner, in *Peter and Caesar*, pointed out. Church and state were thus both under man, not Christ. Even more, control of the clergy was given to the state so that the natural order might predominate over the supernatural. The church, in fact, was viewed as a human institution. Marsilius's position was a political Averroism; Aristotle's humanistic state had been revived, and Marsilius was a professed Aristotelian. He was a man whose thinking made Christianity at least irrelevant, if not a nuisance. We cannot, however, see Marsilius as the inspiration to Machiavelli, Erasmus, More, Hobbes, and others. All together were part of a shift from Christianity to humanism, from God to man, and from redeemed man to natural man.[3] The thinking Marsilius represented was current in his age.

The revival of Hellenic thought meant that priority was given to the natural order. In time, the supernatural receded to a minor role, and then

it was denied. George Grote (1794–1871), the English historian, educator, and politician, wrote his many-volume *History of Greece*, a work which gave devout attention to all the details of Greek culture and history. Turner described Grote's attitude as a "vendetta against modes of human association other than the ties of citizenship." His view of society was of essentially atomistic individuals under the state. He saw family relationships as pernicious to the body politic, and he looked for "a new genesis of the man and the citizen" under democracy, which for him was "a vehicle for moral transformation."[4] The Victorians believed that the ancient Greeks had a natural virtue which provided for a good society. Matthew Arnold and others saw Greek humanism as man's hope.[5] English education for its elite students was mainly in Greek and Latin and studiously irrelevant to the modern world in order to be relevant to its humanistic faith.

The state was seen as man's hope and salvation. The variety of secret societies in Britain and America were dedicated to this faith: man by his own efforts through the state can remake man and society. The consequences have been the wars and politics of the twentieth century, man's darkest age.

STATISM AS A RELIGIOUS FACT, PART 3

THE MODERN STATE IS IN CONTINUITY WITH PLATO'S *Republic* AND Aristotle's *Politics.* In Plato's *Republic*, there are no laws, only philosopher-kings whose sovereign planning constitutes the source of all law. It is necessary, in the perspective of Hellenic thought, for elite men to rule, because "chance and accidents . . . legislate everything for us," and it is necessary to assert the reign of reason. In Plato's perspective, "god" is on the level of chance and accidents as the blind unreason of being.[1] "Guardians" are needed to control men and society.[2] Justice does not come from God but from reason; God does not reveal a law.[3] Virtue itself is rational order.[4]

It is this perspective which subverted the medieval era and the modern world. Since law does not come from God, neither does sovereignty and government. Given the growing medieval respect for Greek thought, *the natural order was seen as the determinative order*, and the great natural order is the state. The government and predestination of man was transferred from God to man.

In England, King Henry II, in the Constitutions of Clarendon, asserted his "rights" over the church. The Constitutions (1164) extended the already existing civil power over the church even further. Against this Thomas Becket asserted the freedom of the church. For him, the basic issues were, *first*, the inviolability of church property; *second*, canonical elections to

high offices in the church, i.e., with minimal royal interference; *third*, freedom for churchmen to leave the country at will, to obey a summons from the pope, to consult the pope, or carry appeals to him; *fourth*, freedom to fill vacant sees promptly; *fifth*, control of church property and church jurisdiction by the bishops; *sixth*, free entry of papal legates into the country; *seventh*, recognition by the king of papal authority over the whole church in England; and, *eighth*, freedom from interference and control by the barons.[5] Two years later, in 1166, Henry II issued the Assize of Clarendon, which contained the first civil legislation on heresy since Rome's era. It was the state which demanded uniformity and subservience, both of the church and all individuals. Winston noted, "The very language of the Assize testified to the general state of lawlessness, and to a tendency to institute tyrannical rule."[6] The state, then as now, is more interested in power and control than in peace and freedom.

The state, however, had in its favor the growing humanism of society which the revival of Greek and Roman thought greatly furthered. The Renaissance was the culmination of the decline of late medieval thought and life. Petrarch summed up the new outlook with a motto he adopted from Terence: "I am a man, and nothing human do I consider alien to myself." Humane letters now replaced theology as the true basis of knowledge, and history, classical history, was "put forward as an instrument for the renovation or salvation of society."[7] It was the revival of Classicism which led Erasmus in February 1517 to write about his expectation soon of a golden age.[8]

Ever since, the dream of a golden age by human planning has become more and more prominent in Western thought. State projects are seen as major steps towards a humanistic utopia. Slum clearance in recent years has been seen as salvation. In terms of this faith, Robert Weaver, former administrator of the U.S. Housing and Home Finance Agency, once said that, with slum clearance and the work of social agencies, "miracles can be accomplished" in the lives of families.[9] Peter Marris, an English "social scientist," observed: "In Robert Weaver's words, what is to be accomplished is not the recreation of a way of life, without rats, dirt and overcrowding, but a miracle — a shock of enlightenment which, like a religious conversion, transforms a person overnight."[10]

Change is to occur by "revolution," state conducted or otherwise, according to humanism. Franz Fanon appealed to violence as society's hope; he saw violence as "an assertion of meaning, rather than an act of

destruction."[11] What Fanon said plainly, legislators hold to implicitly, and social legislation in the modern era is increasingly designed to do violence to society. Lawmaking by the humanistic state is a form of warfare against man and society.

As Owen Chadwick pointed out, "Society is impossible without law."[12] When lawmaking passed into the hands of the state, secularization began. "The Reformation made all secular life into a vocation of God. It was like a baptism of the secular world."[13] However, because lawmaking became all the more a state function, the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation were undermined. In the Enlightenment, the humanistic philosophies triumphed, and humanistic secularization proceeded. While the Enlightenment affected the leaders of society, the humanistic secularization affected the many.[14] This secularism meant a radically this-worldly approach; determination is by man within history, not by God. On November 16, 1878, the conservative deputy, Comte de Mun, speaking to the Paris Chamber of Deputies, said: "The Revolution . . . puts the human reason as Sovereign, in place of the law of God. From this flows all the rest — especially the pride and rebellion which is the source of the modern state. The State has taken over everything, the State has become your God."[15] Such a state cannot tolerate anything with a will or a government of its own. This was stated plainly by a republican anticlerical in France in the 1880s: "Anything with a strong moral life has a will of its own. Anything with a will of its own embarrasses government."[16] From the days of Tertullian to the present, the strong moral life of faithful Christians and churches has been no commendation of them to earnest statists. A strong moral unit of men creates a strong center of strength and government apart from the state. There is thus a hostility to the moral element, and an indulgence of the immoral. For Hegel, for the kings of yesterday, and for the bureaucracies of today, "the state's highest duty is 'to perpetuate itself.'"

Because the state sees itself as the overlord for all within the territory of the state, it grows increasingly intolerant of any divergent element, especially one which insists on a transcendental order. The true Christian must insist on the crown rights of Christ the King; he believes in God's law; he recognizes the necessity of obeying and pleasing God, not man, and he moves in terms of his calling from God. He has what the modern state detests, a dual citizenship in the local state and in the Kingdom of God; in that dual citizenship, God's Kingdom has priority and must govern over the local realm.

There is thus a state of war between modern civil orders and Christ's Kingdom. Those who refuse to recognize that war will become the first victims of it.

38

THE VATICAN AND THE CONFLICT

A KEY FACT TO AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE CHURCH AND STATE problem is to face up to the fact that the state not only fought the church but worked to subvert it. We have seen that Marsilius or Marsiglio of Padua wrote against the church and was a promoter of statism. He and John of Jandun were under the protection of the emperor, Louis IV, the Bavarian, in his battle against the church. The influence of Marsilius may have decided Louis IV in favor of marching on Rome. The Franciscan, Peter of Corbara, was set up as an antipope under the title of Nicholas V, and Marsilius was named papal vicar of Rome and archbishop of Milan. The man Louis (or Ludwig) made pope, Nicholas V (1447–1455), did little to reform the church. Rather, he began what the Renaissance popes continued, i.e., to make the church an art center. He imported artists and scholars to make Rome a cultural center. It had been previously surpassed and disdained by the cathedral cities of France, England, and Italy. It was now to chart a course very different from that of popes who fought for the freedom of the church. "Culture" and statism began to replace Christianity as the faith creating and governing society. We have seen how the Council of Constance was concerned more with controlling the papacy and the church than with reforming it. In time, prelates and priests became actors more than men of God, and the church service became high pageantry rather

than pure worship. In the process, the College of Cardinals had also become the tool of monarchs rather than the voice of the church.

As a result, after the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, the church became progressively weaker, and the state stronger. Both Catholics and Protestants retreated into pietism and into ecclesiastical, institutional, and pietistic concerns. Pope Benedict XIV, 1740–1758, a more vigorous pope than others of his era, in his long encyclical, *A Quo Primum*,[1] took time, among other things, to attack the Church of Armenia for adhering to the Mosaic law, and, in particular, the dietary laws.

In the nineteenth century, the popes began again to deal with the church and state issue. Pope Gregory XVI, 1831–1846, issued an encyclical on the issue on May 17, 1835, *Commissum Divinitus.* This was in answer to the assembly at Baden which sought to give power to the "civil authority either to approve or to oppose the celebration of the diocesan synods, and to inspect the synods, to oversee seminaries and to confirm the system of their internal governance established by bishops, to remove clerics from ecclesiastical duties, to govern the religious and moral instruction of the people, and finally to regulate everything which, they claim, pertains to the external discipline of the Church, although these things may be of a spiritual nature or character and may concern the worship of God and the salvation of souls."[2]

Pius IX (1846–1878) was vigorously on the offensive against the enemies of the church and opponents of papal supremacy. His encyclical, *Incredibili*, September 17, 1863, opposed the attempt of the Republic of New Granada to control the church. *Maximae Quidem* (August 14, 1864) was directed against a like effort in Bavaria. The problem, as *Quanta Cura* (December 8, 1864) made clear, was that the state held it had "a right of property in those goods which are possessed by the Church, by the Religious Orders, and by other pious establishments."[3] This was increasingly the problem everywhere in Europe. In Poland and in Russia, the clergy were actually imprisoned and robbed.[4] *Etsi Multa*, November 21, 1873, dealt with the problem facing the church in Italy, Germany, and Switzerland.[5] In *Vix Dum A Nobis*, March 7, 1874, the attempt of Austria to control the church was dealt with,[6] and in *Quod Nunquam*, February 5, 1875, the offender was Prussia.

In the *Syllabus of Errors*, 1864, Pius IX catalogued the humanistic heresies of the day and condemned them. He saw clearly that the age sought to deprive the church of its prerogatives and freedom. On the other hand, he sought to reiterate every claim of the church against civil governments

and other branches of the church, and, in Vatican Council I, 1870, had the doctrine of papal infallibility proclaimed. The Ultramontanes pushed papal claims to the limit: the pope, Pius IX in particular, was called "King of kings"; hymns the Roman breviary addressed to God were addressed to Pius IX; "the semi-official Vatican Journal *La Civiltà Cattolica* took the liberty of writing, 'When the pope meditates, it is God who thinks in him.' Bishop Berteaud of Tulle described the pope as 'the word (of God) made flesh, living on in our midst.'" The bishop of Geneva spoke of a triple incarnation of God the Son, in Jesus, in the Eucharist, and in the pope. Pius IX was called "redeemer" and "God on earth." St. John Bosco said, "Jesus has put the pope on the same level as God." Miraculous powers were ascribed to Pius IX. In 1866, Pius IX applied to himself Christ's words, "I am the way, the truth, and the life."[7] By this means, Pius IX made the position of the church ridiculous; in the eyes of all too many, the center of attention shifted from the freedom of the church to the extravagant claims of the papacy. It was made easier for the humanistic state to pose as the arm of liberating reason against a reactionary and oppressive old order. As a Catholic scholar has noted, the ideal for the church was now made into a trust in a superpope, and a devotion to the pope. "The life of the Catholic Church ever since has been deeply disturbed by it."[8] Vatican II was in part a reaction to this. Without touching Vatican I, it stressed, in Tillard's words, "that the Church of God, seen in its universality, is the *communion* of local or particular churches."[9] Without any surrender of earlier statements, this marks an emphasis long familiar to those of Congregational and Baptist persuasions.

Pope Leo XIII, 1878–1903, faced the Kulturkampf of Bismarck in Germany, its influence in Switzerland, and a dedicated statism in virtually every country. In *Inscrutabili Dei Consilio*, April 21, 1878, he spoke against the laws "that shake the structure of the Catholic Church . . . and the confiscation of property that was once the support of the Church's ministers and of the poor," as well as the removal of charitable institutions from the control of the church. He reminded civil authorities "that the teaching of Christ is, as Augustine used to say, 'a great blessing to the State, if obeyed.'" The peace and safety of the state is bound up with the peace and safety of the church.[10] The Christian constitution of states was the subject of *Immortale Dei*, November 1, 1885. He condemned the humanistic concepts of state authority. True authority is inseparable from the public profession of Christianity. All men must face God's judgment, and therefore every area of man's life must be governed by God. This means that true religion is

necessary, and this, Leo said, Christ "committed to His Church to protect and to propagate." God has established two powers, the ecclesiastical and the civil. Each must have a regard for the nature and power of the other. Religion is a public concern and cannot be left to private judgment any more than civil government can. The attempt of the state to reduce the church to the status of ordinary private association is an act of arrogance. "To wish the Church to be subject to the civil power in the exercise of her duty is a great folly and a sheer injustice." The people are not the source of authority; "the origin of public power is to be sought for in God Himself, and not in the multitude."[11] It is to be sought from God through the Catholic Church, Leo said in *Officio Sanctissimo*, December 22, 1887: "To Her has He given in charge all He has revealed to men and established as sole interpreter, judge, and mistress, most wise and infallible, of the truth, whose precepts states as well as individuals must hear and accept."[12] Religious toleration was thus condemned, and Leo declared in *Libertas*, June 20, 1888, that it was an excuse by liberals for refusing to allow the Catholic Church to be free.[13] Morality, said Leo in *Au Milieu Des Sollicitudes*, February 16, 1892, enters into every human act, and morality signifies an order of dependence upon truth. Since truth is derived from God, a secular state forsakes truth in forsaking God. Hostility to Christianity by the state is thus a most dangerous course.[14] On November 1, 1900, Leo, in *Tametsi Futura Prospicientibus*, attacked the faith which rejects Christ's kingship and "places man at the summit of all things and declares that human nature must rule supreme." The supremacy of man is founded entirely on selfishness, not upon the love of God as manifested in Christ.

> Man may indeed be king, through Jesus Christ: but only on condition that he first of all obey God, and diligently seek his rule of life in God's law. By the law of Christ we mean not only the natural precepts of morality and the Ancient Law, all of which Jesus Christ has perfected and crowned by His declaration, explanation and sanction; but also the rest of His doctrine and His own peculiar institutions. Of these the chief is His Church. Indeed whatsoever things Christ has instituted are most fully contained in His Church.[15]

Religion and politics cannot be separated, Leo held in *Cum Multa*, December 8, 1882, and those who would do so separate the political sphere

from its health and prosperity. A sound relationship between the two powers, civil and ecclesiastical, is as much in the interest of the state as of the church (*Nobilissima Gallorum Gens*, February 8, 1884).[16] Since the authority to rule comes from God, "whosoever rules, he is the minister of God," and must acknowledge the source of his authority (*Humanum genus*, April 20, 1884).[17] The source of all human power is in God.

> But in order that justice may be retained in government it is of the highest importance that those who rule States should understand that political power was not created for the advantage of any private individual; and that the administration of the State must be carried on to the profit of those who have been committed to their care, not to the profit of those to whom it has been committed. (*Diuturnum,* June 29, 1881)[18]

In Leo XIII, the Catholic Church had a scholar-pope who, after centuries of extensive retreat, advanced very clearly and firmly the claims of the church against statism. Without the rancor or self-promotion of Pius IX, Leo developed a substantial foundation for resistance to the currents of humanistic statism. Resistance, however, requires more than leadership. The infiltration of the currents of liberalism into all churches would in time undermine the best forces of resistance.

Certainly Pius X, 1903–1914, in calling for the restoration of all things in Christ, in *E Supremi*, October 4, 1903, struck the right note. His pontificate was marked, however, by a return to the intransigence of Pius IX. He saw the commission of Jeremiah 1:10 as also his own: "Lo, I have set thee this day over the nations and over kingdoms, to root up, and to pull down, and to waste, and to destroy, and to build, and to plant." He declared that "the way to reach Christ is not hard to find: it is the Church."[19] In *Vehementer Nos*, February 11, 1906, Pius X attacked two current assumptions, among other things: *first*, that the state must be separated from the church, and, *second*, that the State must not recognize any particular faith or church.[20] The separation of church and state was the subject on January 6, 1907, of *Une Fois Encore.*[21] In *Pascendi Dominici Gregis*, September 8, 1907, Pius dealt with modernistic doctrines, among them "the principle that in temporal matters the State possesses absolute mastery." From this it followed "that when the believer, not fully satisfied with his merely internal acts of religion, proceeds to external acts, such for instance as the administration

or reception of the sacraments, these will fall under the control of the State. What will then become of ecclesiastical authority, which can only be exercised by external acts? Obviously it will be completely under the dominion of the State."[22] Unlike past challenges to the freedom of the church, the modern tyranny denied the Christian doctrines of truth and justice and so constituted a greater menace, according to *Editae Saepe*, May 26, 1910.[23]

At this point, Pius X came to the heart of the matter. Liberals, Protestant and Catholic, were blind to the fact that the basic faith of society had shifted to a non-Christian premise; the virtues they prized, with their Christian upbringing, had no roots in the new culture. All things now had new and alien meanings, so that truth and justice as men had known them in Christendom were being set aside.

Pope Benedict XV, 1914–1922, in his appeal for peace, *Ad Beatissimi Apostolorum*, November 1, 1914, declared the heart of the current evil to be in the heart of human society, in the abandonment of the precepts of Christianity.[24] Paganism had revived, he declared in *Humani Generis Redemptionem*, on June 15, 1917, and he blamed the failure of preaching for the revival of paganism:

> The causes of these evils are varied and manifold: no one, however, will gainsay the deplorable fact that the ministers of the Word do not apply thereto an adequate remedy. Has the Word of God then ceased to be what it was described by the Apostle, living and effectual and more piercing than any two-edged sword? If that weapon does not everywhere produce its effect, the blame certainly must be laid on those ministers of the Gospel who do not handle it as they should. For no one can maintain that the Apostles were living in better times than ours, that they found minds more readily disposed toward the Gospel or that they met with less opposition to the law of God.[25]

It should be noted that Benedict XV applied the faith practically in a number of ways; during World War I, he established an international missing persons bureau in the Vatican; he was actively concerned with the relief of poor children in Central Europe. He manifested a love of the Bible, and he was strong in advocating Biblical preaching.

Pius XI, 1922–1939, in *Iniquis Afflictisque*, November 18, 1926, spoke out against the persecution of the Catholic Church in Mexico; the church was

disestablished and separated from the state, and both priests and religious men were forbidden to open or conduct elementary schools. Foreign priests and religious men were expelled from Mexico. On December 31, 1929, Pius XI, in *Rappresentanti in Terra*, spoke on Christian education as a prior right of the church and family and not an area of state control. (He also opposed education of the sexes together.) The education of youth belongs to both church and state, he held, which meant church-controlled state-supported schools. It is not enough for the school to give some religious instruction: "it is necessary that all the teaching and the whole organization of the school, and its teachers, syllabus and textbooks in every branch, be regulated by the Christian spirit, under the direction and maternal supervision of the Church."[26] It was at this point that the weakness of the Vatican's approach became obvious. The modern state was increasingly a humanistic and anti-Christian power whose politics embodied a radically alien doctrine of salvation. The Vatican spoke and negotiated as though these were traditional constituent states within Christendom who were temporarily erring. The result was a policy of negotiation which only masked a steady retreat. At the same time, papal encyclicals gave much attention to ecclesiastical and pietistic concerns rather than the theology of humanistic statism and the Christian position. The desire to establish concordats with these powers meant a process of accommodation very much like the American policy of detente with the Soviet Union. Detente did not eliminate the conflict: it merely masked it, and so, too, did the Vatican's desire for concordats during the years up to 1939. Pius XI was keenly aware of the church's sufferings in various countries, but he relied on diplomacy rather than confrontation. The statist powers kept the church in their realm bound to their concordat without feeling bound themselves.

In *Mit Brennender Sorge* (March 14, 1937), Pius XI showed his awareness of what German National Socialism meant. He declared, "The believer has an absolute right to profess his Faith and live according to its dictates. Laws which impede this profession and practice of Faith are against natural law."[27] Benedict XV had placed the blame for the weakness of the church on non-Biblical preaching; other popes were able analysts of the opposition but failed to see as Benedict did the sources of the church's power. Pius XI in *Divini Redemptoris* (March 19, 1937) set forth the evil of atheistic communism. The Vatican had assumed the position of negation which also marked the conservative politics of the Western democracies: able and telling critiques of the opposition, but little of the dynamics of a

positive and active faith. Pius XI's last encyclical, *Ingravescentibus Malis*, September 29, 1937, was on the rosary. Like others, he put great trust in pietistic hopes, declaring,

> 22. The Holy Rosary, besides, not only serves admirably to overcome the enemies of God and Religion, but is also a stimulus and spur to the practise of evangelic virtues which it injects and cultivates in our souls. Above all, it nourishes the Catholic Faith, which flourishes again by due meditation on the sacred mysteries, and raises minds to the truth revealed to us by God.[28]

As the world moved into World War II, Catholics were offered the rosary, and Protestants were looking for the rapture and deeply committed to the efficacy of pious gush.

It must be added that Pius XI, in *Quas Primas*, December 11, 1925, spoke on the kingship of Christ, and very plainly, declaring:

> 13. The foundation of this power and dignity of our Lord is rightly indicated by Cyril of Alexandria. "Christ," he says, "has dominion over all creatures, a dominion not seized by violence nor usurped, but His by essence and by nature." His kingdom is founded upon the ineffable hypostatic union. From this it follows not only that Christ is to be adored by angels and by men, but that to him as man angels and men are subject, and must recognize his empire; by reason of the hypostatic union Christ has power over all creatures. But a thought that must give us even greater joy and consolation is this that Christ is our King by acquired, as well as by natural right, for he is our Redeemer. Would that they who forget what they have cost their Saviour might recall the words: "You were not redeemed with corruptible things, but with the precious blood of Christ, as of a lamb unspotted and undefiled." We are no longer our own property, for Christ has purchased us "with a great price"; our very bodies are the "members of Christ."[29]

In *Quadragesimo Anno*, May 15, 1931, Pius XI spoke on the reconstruction of the social order. This important encyclical manifested clearly a problem of considerable dimensions. The rise of capitalism had introduced a

new factor into the Western world; this rise had coincided with the rise of liberalism; it had some roots in liberalism and many more in Medieval and Reformation culture. The Vatican viewed the rise of the free market with elements of distrust as well as a grudging tribute. There was a lack of appreciation for the role of society in a culture; the traditional pattern of church, state, and workers' associations seemed safer. Thus, while struggling against the corporate state, the papacy was unable to set forth the free market as a tenable alternative to state regulation. As a result, in facing the economic crisis of the depression, Pius XI, in *Nova Impendet*, October 2, 1931, had no real answer, only a summons to a "Crusade of piety and of love." Charitable institutions did become active, but neither Catholic nor Protestant thinkers analyzed at all well the statist interventionism into the economy and its monetary systems which had led to the Great Depression.[30]

The stress of Pius XII was on the internal reform of the Catholic Church and on the development of Catholic piety. His pontificate, from 1939 to 1958, covered some of the most eventful years in the world's history. While diplomatically active with respect to National Socialism and Communism, his intellectual and dogmatic contributions to the church and state issue were limited. After Pius XII, the papacy entered a new phase, with bishops exerting more freedom.

It would be very wrong to infer that Pius XII was not aware of the theological issues between church and state. His forte had been diplomacy, and it was through diplomacy that he sought to solve the problems of the day. His successors, while not undiplomatic by any means, have explored other channels.

How keenly aware Pius XII was of the basic issue, as well as of the importance of freedom, was made clear on October 20, 1939, in his first encyclical, *Summi Pontificatus*, on the unity of human society:

> 60. To consider the State as something ultimate to which everything else should be subordinated and directed, cannot fail to harm the true and lasting prosperity of nations. This can happen either when unrestricted dominion comes to be conferred on the State as having a mandate from the nation, people, or even a social order, or when the State arrogates such dominion to itself as absolute master, despotically, without any mandate whatsoever. If, in fact, the State lays claim to and directs private

> enterprises, these, ruled as they are by delicate and complicated internal principles which guarantee and assure the realization of their special aims, may be damaged to the detriment of the public good, by being wrenched from their natural surroundings, that is, from responsible private action.[31]

Pius XII was more aware of the basic issues than most of his contemporaries.

In dealing with the oppression of the church by Chinese communism, Pius XII, in his last encyclical, *Ad Apostolorum Principis*, June 29, 1958, said that "Christianity never opposes or obstructs what is truly useful or advantageous to a country." It renders to Caesar what belongs to Caesar, but not what belongs to God:

> 23. However, if Christians are bound in conscience to render to Caesar (that is, to human authority) what belongs to Caesar, then Caesar likewise, or those who control the state, cannot exact obedience when they would be usurping God's rights or forcing Christians either to act at variance with their religious duties or to sever themselves from the unity of the Church and its lawful hierarchy.[32]

Pius XII's pontificate was marked by the strongly personal rule of a seasoned diplomat. He was an unceasing foe of atheism and socialism in all its forms, but he fought as a diplomat.

Given the heightened world crisis since 1958, one would expect an even greater confrontation and challenge by the popes to the atheistic and anti-Christian statism of the nations. The encyclicals of John XXIII (1958–1963), of Paul VI (1963–1978), and of John Paul II since 1978 (none were issued by John Paul I) are surprisingly weak in this regard. The issue of church and state is bypassed, as is Communism (except for Paul VI, in *Ecclesiam Suam*, August 6, 1964, sections 101–3). Paul VI, in the same encyclical, spoke of atheism (sec. 104), and in *Populorum Progressio*, March 26, 1967 (sec. 39), he spoke briefly of atheism. Little else has been said since 1958.

In *Ecclesiam Suam*, Paul VI raised the question, "how is the Church to adapt its mission to the particular age, environment, educational and social conditions of men's lives?"[33] This was the key: adaptation. It ran from strategic considerations to liberation theology, a form of theological Marxism.

The supposedly revolutionary changes in the church often resembled surrender and retreat more than change. John Paul II, in *Redemptor Hominis* (March 4, 1979), showed evidences of his earlier existentialism in declaring that, for the church, all ways lead to man. The church, he said, must endeavor "to make human life more human," a statement which is a far cry from the older standard that human life must be made *godly.* Man's life and soul, said John Paul II, are his own, again a departure from the doctrine that man is God's creation and property. John Paul II introduced into the dogmatic life of the church radically existentialist premises, declaring, in the same encyclical:

> Man in the full truth of his existence, of his personal being — in the sphere of his own family, in the sphere of society and very diverse contexts, in the sphere of his own nation or people (perhaps still only that of his clan or tribe), and in the sphere of the whole of mankind — this man is the primary route that the Church must travel in fulfilling her mission: *he is the primary and fundamental way for the Church*, the way traced out by Christ himself, the way that leads invariably through the mystery of the Incarnation and the Redemption.[34]

He said further, "because man — every man without any exception whatever — has been redeemed by Christ, and because with man — with each man without any exception whatever — Christ is in a way united, even when man is unaware of it," it follows that "this man is the way for the Church," and is "the basis of all the other ways that the Church must walk."[35] Man had replaced Christ as the way, and Christ was now the existential principle, not the Lord of old.

These three popes also showed confusion in their grasp of economic matters. John Paul II, in *Laborem Exercens*, September 14, 1981, held that there could be no "legitimate title" to property unless it served labor.[36] Earlier, in *Pacem in Terris*, April 11, 1963, John XXIII called for a world community *without Christian faith as its premise. Pacem in Terris* stressed the rights of man, and it saw more hope apparently in a world community than in Jesus Christ. The Catholic Church was shifting its foundations, a recipe for disaster.

Earlier (chap. 35) we saw that, in the thirteenth century, according to Strayer, men's loyalty and trust shifted from family, community, and

church to the state. In France, this was clear in the late thirteenth century in the reign of Philip the Fair, "the high priest of the religion of monarchy." Philip saw himself as a good Catholic, but he saw the state as central, the king as the vicar of God whom to oppose was sacrilege. He believed that, as such, he had healing power.[37] In his conflict with the papacy, he had a great advantage. Many bishops, as well as commoners, agreed with him. The king, moreover, could reward a man better and more quickly than the pope, and also hurt him more quickly. Philip claimed the right to control everything within his realm, including the church. Philip was able to replace the intransigent Pope Boniface VIII with the radically subservient Clement V. Boniface VIII is remembered for the claims set forth in the bull *Unam Sanctam* (November 18, 1302), with its high claims for the papacy.[38] Humanistic as well as Protestant historians do not seem to be aware that popes like Boniface VIII often made up for their impotence or weakness with extravagant claims. Boniface, no model pope, was condemned by a council called by Philip, seized by a military force, the papal palace sacked, and left a broken man who died a month after his return to Rome.

Benedict XI, his successor, lived only eleven months, with rumors that he was poisoned circulating. After a year's battle, the cardinals gave in to Philip's choice, Clement V, who later settled at Avignon, beginning the long "Babylonian Captivity" of the popes. Actually, whether in Avignon or Rome, they were controlled whenever possible, sometimes brutally. The puppet popes like Clement V promoted themselves, became patrons of the arts, and were commonly subservient to some monarch.

Man's new religion was statism, and it controlled the church whenever possible. For centuries, the monarchs and princes were favorable to Christianity, but as the servant of the state. After the French Revolution, Christianity was steadily separated from the state and persecuted.

The result has been conflict. The tragedy is when churchmen adopt the faith of the enemy and call it liberation.

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TOWARDS THE REBIRTH OF GOVERNMENT

IN THE MODERN WORLD, THE STATE HAS MADE ITSELF MAN'S PROvider; its goal is to provide cradle-to-grave security, as well as "social justice." We need to remember that other agencies have at times assumed this role. In old China, the effective government was not the emperor but the family system. It provided the basic religion, ancestor worship; the family courts administered what was religiously believed to be justice, and the family also provided social security. All this was accompanied by religious ideas and practices alien to Biblical faith, but old China was ruled by the family system more effectively than by civil authorities. More often than not, the civil rulers impeded rather than furthered effective government.

The medieval monastery was commonly a better functioning "state" than was the regional king. Decarreaux noted of the monastery that "the ecclesiastical property had already acquired the general outlines of a little sovereign State."[1] The monastery, usually begun on donated land, was a landed estate. The lands were often marginal and undeveloped; through good administration, they became richer than surrounding properties. The monastery would commonly have one or two hundred monks. It also acquired serfs, who "were part of the monastic 'family' and often better off there than in lay service."[2] Independent small landowners would frequently seek monastic protection and oversight, as would villages. The monastery

lent money to these peoples at a lesser rate of interest than professional moneylenders. Surplus production was sold by the monastery at lower prices than those charged by others. All charity was in the hands of the church, and the monasteries took over a large part of it. Travellers and pilgrims were housed; infirmaries cared for the sick, and learning in varying degrees was preserved and fostered. At the same time, the monastery faced confiscation by kings, or abbots imposed upon it by a lord or king.

It should not surprise us that William Cobbett, writing on Henry VIII's seizure of the monasteries, should view this as a great disaster for the common people of England. So savage was the destruction that Henry's wreckers did not spare Hyde Abbey, founded by King Alfred. Not even Alfred's tomb there was spared.[3] The state was determined to be man's essential government.

The conflict between church and state has been a continuing one since the days of Rome. The battle has seen various rises and falls of Christian freedom, but, with it all, an advance in the awareness of the implications of the struggle.

On the institutional side, there have been losses. Both within the church and the state, there has been a steady growth in the power of bureaucracies. When the Avignon "captivity" of the papacy took place, the popes were less vocal in vetoing the policies of kings. They turned inward to control the clergy, develop a bureaucracy, and centralize power in the papacy. There was much good in this, in that universities and learning were promoted, some orders reformed, uniform practices furthered, and canon law strengthened.[4] However, how deeply the bureaucratic mentality took hold appeared when the papacy returned to Rome. The irresponsible Urban VI was so deadly for the church, and his election so questionable, that some cardinals met to plan some kind of restraint on the pope. They were concerned with a legitimacy of argument, and they wrote down their scholarly opinions and findings and thereby ensured their arrest, torture, and murder.[5]

It is worthy of note that a very great improvement of the church's administration and bureaucracy also occurred under the Borgia pope, Alexander VI, in the latter half of the fifteenth century. Moral reform was lacking under Alexander, but there was a major advance in administrative controls.[6]

By the time of the Reformation, the church was very much on the retreat in the struggles with the states. Government was shifting from the

family and the church to the state. The Protestant princes often rebelled against Rome in part to have the freedom which the major Catholic states, as against the lesser ones, had gained.

Ozment has said, of the Middle Ages, that they were not an era of church domination. The church was on the defensive; it was an embattled institution which "won battles, but lost wars."[7] The Reformation represented a theological advance, even as the Counter-Reformation meant the revivification of a faltering and failing church. The Reformation era did give, even in the midst of increasing statism, some great opportunities for action against the previously growing departure from old Christian norms. Both "tithes and alms have fallen away," Luther wrote Elector John Frederick on October 31, 1525.[8] The clergy in both Protestant and Catholic circles became in many cases very poor. For some time, the Calvinists were almost alone in a sustained challenge to the state.

In England, the Puritans revived the older position of confrontation. The Puritans represented, not an order sponsored by a prince, but one created in terms of the daring faith of many. They also stressed and produced moral reform. Richard Baxter wrote that, during his fifty-six years of close contact with nonconforming congregations, he knew of only one instance of fornication. The offender had been disciplined, and, when Baxter wrote some years later, had not been restored to fellowship.[9]

In America, Puritanism lacked a like moral clarity. The reason for this was that the colonies essentially followed the English pattern of mandatory church attendance plus the equation of citizenship and church membership. To be an Englishman meant being a subject of the Crown and a member of the Church of England by birth, not by profession. This meant that many immigrants who had come for wealth or as a prison sentence were in the church, while not truly of it. The control of their behavior, and their conversion, was a continuing church problem.

With the U.S. Constitution and the First Amendment, there was an edge of freedom which stimulated evangelism as well as congregational financial responsibility. Behind the settlement involved in the First Amendment, the Bill of Rights, and the Constitution were certain presuppositions. The state, the church, and the individual conscience had each in its place a measure of authority. All had, however, a common superior, the triune God. These human authorities, whatever their claims, had no right to set the limits to their power, because this is God's prerogative.[10]

Since the writing of the First Amendment, the state, the church, and

the individual have in varying degrees denied their common superior, the triune God. The results have been a greatly weakened church, a state playing god, and individuals whose actions neither recognize nor tolerate any superior power, let alone God. If the church does not see its authority as a transcendental one, from God and not from man, and in a manner set forth in Jesus Christ, then the church is readily absorbed into the state's power. It then falls into the humanistic ecumenicism displayed by Sergio Méndez Arceo, bishop of Cuernavaca, Mexico, at the Vatican II Council. The church should be, he held, an open community inclusive of Jews and Freemasons.[11] Since then, Bishop Arceo has become more inclusive!

Amid all this decay, certain countertrends are increasingly in evidence. Only a few will be cited here. *First*, there is the rise of fundamentalism with an increasingly faithful and clear-cut dedication to the faith. Christian schools, missions to the needy, to delinquent children, to criminals, and to a variety of other causes signify a return to an ancient Christian catholicity of faith and life. Arbitration courts and like developments make it clear that fundamentalism is a governing force.

Second, the intellectual foundations for the return of Christianity to government are being laid down. In this area, Chalcedon Foundation has pioneered, rebuilding on ancient foundations.

Third, the modern state exercises more and more power and less and less true government. As the state's power grows, the people's liberties and the securities of their life and property diminish. The modern state is increasingly a taxing rather than a governing power. The decay of messianic politics is steadily in evidence. In May 1984, a Democrat in Pennsylvania, asked about the presidential primary, expressed some dismay over the available candidates. As against Mondale, he said, "I did end up voting for Hart in the primary, just to throw a wrench into the system to see if maybe the convention would become somewhat of a stalemate and they could come up with a 'savior.' Unfortunately, I think I am looking for the ideal person, and I'm sure he doesn't exist."[12] In 1932, Americans elected Franklin Delano Roosevelt as president in a campaign in which Roosevelt and the Democrats ran with a plainspoken slogan: "Throw the spenders out."[13] They then instituted the most massive spending career in American history to that date. Subsequent administrations have been as faithful to their promises, usually.

The state is sick and dying. Government needs to be reborn. This can only happen as men govern themselves and their spheres under God, as,

step by step, they take government back from the state and restore to man his responsibility and freedom to be, in every sphere of life, a participating and governing power. Earlier, we pointed out that in most countries today the problem is no longer one of church and state in the classical sense, i.e., a single church versus a single state. There are now a multiplicity of churches, and the result has been good for Christianity. It must be added that the need is now for the development (and, in some areas, redevelopment) of a multiplicity of governmental agencies and institutions. Nothing is more dangerous or more deadly to government than to restrict it to the state.

The state taxes to govern, and taxation becomes its major instrument of power and control. After a certain point, sound government decreases as taxes increase, because the state's central and unspoken goal becomes the growth of its controls, regulations, jurisdiction, and power. The average man today pays taxes on a scale unknown in the medieval era, and prior to this century, except, as Knowles noted, by those in the medieval era who were in the hands of usurers.[14] The victims of the usurer had their debts to blame for their predicament, not the state.

The state has used its powers over the centuries to compel many things outside the legitimate province of civil government. Our concern is the compulsion to be a part or member of a particular church. The same power has often been used against Christianity or the church, and sometimes against both. Thus, in England, under King William Rufus, converts were forced back into Judaism. This was done at the instigation and the pay of influential Jews, and William Rufus himself threatened to become a Jew.[15] Such a use of the state was commonplace over the centuries. Thus, as Burckhardt noted, in Persia under Shapur II (A.D. 309–379), the Jews, who were very influential in Persia, took part in a great persecution and killing of Christians. Both Christians and Jews used the state in different eras to gain their ungodly ends, and rulers exploited their animosities. This kind of situation, together with the often enforced very close financial ties of Jews to the monarchs, led later to massacres of the Jews. As Ames noted,

> A prudent king would cheerfully watch the Jewish usurers grow rich and then levy a tax on them. Under Henry II, for example, the richest man in the kingdom was a Jew, Aaron of Lincoln, and he kept Henry almost solvent. In 1187, the Jews were reckoned to have one-fourth of the moveable wealth of the kingdom, and theirs were the only stone houses, besides the

> king's, in the realm. Inevitably, Christian debtors considered the wealth of the creditors to be built on their misery. And however a riot started, it ended in the robbing of the houses of the moneylenders — and the burning of the records of indebtedness.[16]

The same kind of privilege led later to a like unreasoning and destructive hostility against the church. Neither Jews nor the church had freedom most of the time. The monarchs regarded every concession as a privilege to be exploited, and the results were disastrous for both Jews and the Christian church.

As Burckhardt observed, some years ago, "First and foremost . . . what the nation desires, implicitly or explicitly, is power."[17] The medieval monarchs did not bequeath national debts to their posterity in any appreciable degree. This was the work of "the modern centralized State, dominating and determining culture, worshipped as a god and ruling like a sultan."[18] In recent years, not only the Marxists but other humanists have seen the state as the new source and center of religion. The English idealist philosophers, for example, held, in Hallowell's words, that "[t]he state is not limited by morality, it *is* morality." Bosanquet wrote, for example,

> The Nation-State as an ethical idea is, then, a faith or a purpose — we might say a mission, were not the word too narrow and too aggressive . . . The modern nation is a history and a religion rather than a clear-cut idea.[19]

Another modern scholar has said, "It is a distinguishing mark of a State that there is no authority external and superior to itself."[20]

Unless the state is under the triune God, there is no hope for freedom for either the church or men. If the state is its own god and its own source of morality, then the state can do no wrong, and no man has then the right or freedom to differ from or to challenge the state.

Again, if the state is equated with government, there is then no freedom for man, because freedom is inseparable from self-government under God.

Thus, the Christian community must assert the priority of God's law-word as binding on all of life, including church, state, and school. Christians must once again take over government in education, welfare, health, and other spheres. Basic to this takeover is tithing.[21]

At times in the past, the conflict between church and state has been an institutional conflict, sometimes for power, and often for very principled reasons of jurisdiction. It is more than a *jurisdictional* dispute now: it is *religious* conflict, and a war unto death. The modern humanistic state is history's most jealous god, and it will tolerate no rivals. Hence, its war against Christianity. In this struggle, however, the state has taken on a power far greater than itself. As the humanistic world powers take "counsel together against the LORD, and against His anointed," planning to overthrow His law and government, "He that sitteth in the heavens shall laugh: the Lord shall have them in derision" (Ps. 2:4). He shall break His enemies with a rod of iron.

> Be wise now therefore, O ye kings: be instructed, ye judges of the earth. Serve the LORD with fear, and rejoice with trembling. Kiss the Son, lest he be angry, and ye perish from the way, when his wrath is kindled but a little. Blessed are all they that put their trust in him. (Ps. 2:10–12)

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EPILOGUE

IN 1984, A RECURRING CONTROVERSY SURFACED. PRESIDENT RONALD Reagan announced that he would appoint William A. Wilson as his personal representative to the Vatican. Like steps had been previously taken by presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and James Carter. For about twenty years prior to 1867, the United States did have diplomatic relations with the Papal States. This ended with the unification of Italy and the end of papal civil power. A law of 1867 prohibited the use of federal funds to maintain an official at the Vatican. The law was repealed, prior to Reagan's appointment, when Senator Richard G. Lugar, a Republican from Indiana, introduced an amendment to the State Department appropriations bill. Many Protestants, and especially fundamentalists, protested. Dr. Cline E. Hall asked, "Why should the government give preferential treatment to any one religious group, whether it be the Roman Catholic Church, Russian Orthodox Church, Southern Baptist convention, National Council of Churches, or the temple of Hare Krishna in West Virginia?"[1]

The question is a good one. To answer it, let us consider the fact that this step was taken by Reagan in an election year. It was an obvious appeal for the Catholic vote. An ambassador at the Vatican serves no great purpose on the diplomatic scene; it serves a very real political purpose on the American scene in its intended effect on Catholic American voters. Why not an ambassador to the Baptists, as if they would want one, another

man has asked. The answer is that such a person exists. President Reagan has an unofficial cabinet of fundamentalist leaders who meet periodically at the White House, especially in an election year. These men are given a high unofficial status to enlist their support. This unofficial cabinet did not secure the release of Pastor Everett Sileven from a Nebraska jail, nor influence any administration measure. Rather, the loyalties of fundamentalist leaders to Reagan has been carefully nurtured.

In any association between two powers, the greater power normally exploits the weaker one. The United States, in establishing relationships with the Vatican and with fundamentalist leaders, is primarily seeking a political advantage. It has no desire to further Christian freedom and has done nothing towards that end. The decline of religious freedom under Reagan, from 1980–1984, has been marked. Not all the evils can be attributed to the Reagan administration, but neither can any positive and favorable steps be ascribed to it. *Humanly speaking*, the United States is a greater power than the churches, and it will concede nothing to them unless forced to do so.

The problems are not new. In the Civil War, the federal government through the courts gave title to local Presbyterian Churches to that denomination. The general assembly meanwhile had passed the infamous Gardiner Spring Resolution *requiring* an oath of allegiance to the United States of all pastors. Pastors in the Confederate States had to leave and form a new denomination. In the border states, pastors had congregations with divided loyalties and were unwilling to commit the unity of the church to a cause other than Christ. These pastors were by law set aside and many churches closed. With this step, the Roman Catholic doctrine of centralized ownership and control of all churches was used to further a political purpose. Lincoln's contempt of religious liberty was obvious. Since then, this decision has been used to deprive dissident congregations of all their assets, the sole exception, by a legal quirk for a few years, being the separation of some Presbyterian U.S.A. churches to form the Presbyterian Church of America (PCA).

During World War II, control of the churches became a standard practice in some dictatorships. Church unions were promoted in order to make greater centralized control of all churches possible.

Since then, the control of churches in some countries has increased. In the United States, the courts show a studied ignorance of the meaning of the First Amendment and an unquestioning faith in the lordship or sovereignty of the state. There is a radical lack of any principled regard

for religious freedom. Only the voting power of the church is feared or respected. The answer to Dr. Cline Hall is that the temple of Hare Krishna in West Virginia has no political power and hence little standing before the state. If, however, Baptists were to become a self-conscious and organized voting bloc and power, they would have a federal representative assigned to them — if they wanted one!

The churches represent the great area of freedom from statist controls in many countries. This is a condition which the modern state finds intolerable and is determined to alter.

The state's great ally in this struggle is all too often the church itself. The humanism of so many churchmen makes them dedicated allies of statist objectives.

Another factor is the internal corruption of the churches. Certainly, the exposure of the character of the Vatican bank has been strong evidence of this. Behind the façade of the bank was an alliance of Freemasons in high church offices, and also the Mafia, fascists, Communists, and opportunists. The attempt by Pope John Paul I to clean house in the Vatican led to his death, according to one writer. Certainly John Paul II has perpetuated the old corrupt order, and, on November 26, 1983, dropped the ruling that Freemasons are subject to automatic excommunication.[2]

There is no reason not to believe that the same evils are to be found in the major, and some minor, Protestant churches. My own experiences, travels, and conversations with churchmen points towards the same ugly associations. Certainly, Freemasonry is very powerful in most Protestant churches, and, as Knight points out, the Soviet KGB has found that Masonic lodges are easy to infiltrate and important for their members' fields of influence.[3] Then, too, homosexuals have become vocal and open in their work in many churches.

In spite of these and other problems, a major change is under way. Laymen are active in the faith; the Christian family is coming into its own; "minority" groups and various races are rapidly taking leadership within the church and extending the scope of the Kingdom. The battle is real, but the promises of victory are very great. The kingdoms of this world shall indeed become the kingdoms of our Lord, and of His Christ, for this is the victory which alone shall overcome the world, even our faith (Rev. 11:15; 1 John 5:4).

APPENDIX

THE MARXIST SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE

AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE MARXIST DOCTRINE OF THE SEPARATION of church and state is urgently necessary, because there is a growing confusion between the Marxist view and the earlier American position.

In the Marxist world, as in the Soviet Union, the separation of church and state means that the church must be totally separated from every area of life and thought. It cannot be allowed to educate or to influence education, let alone the state. Because children are seen as the property of the state, the church cannot influence or teach children. In all spheres, the church is isolated from the world and life of its times and is required to be irrelevant and impotent. In the Marxist view, the separation of church and state is a major legal handicap and penalty imposed upon the church. It is in effect a separation from relevance, the power to influence, and the freedom to function.

In the historical American view, the First Amendment places all the restrictions upon the federal government, which is barred from establishing, governing, controlling, or regulating the church. The Marxist view handcuffs the church; the American view handcuffs the state.

In recent years, the state, Congress, the courts, and the various presidents have in varying degrees manifested an adherence to the Marxist view. Even as the statist power has encroached on every other sphere of

society, so, now, it is encroaching on the church. It is assured that the state has total jurisdiction over every sphere, and the courts in recent years have ruled on such absurdities as school dress codes, and the length of a boy's hair. No concern is too trifling to be overlooked by the courts in their zeal for totalitarian jurisdiction. Without being Marxist, they share in the Marxist belief in total state jurisdiction. Predictably, they are moving in the same direction.

This should not surprise us. Given the humanistic belief in man or the state as ultimate, any freedom or power claimed by the church is seen as irrelevant or wrong. The humanist is being faithful to his faith, to his presuppositions.

The sad fact is that too many churchmen share the Marxist view. For them, the separation of church and state means that the church must never involve itself with anything which is of political concern. I am regularly told by readers of pastors and church leaders who will not permit mention of abortion, homosexuality, euthanasia, or any like subject from the pulpit or even on church premises. Such matters, they insist, are "political" and "violate" the separation of church and state. They claim the name of orthodoxy for their confusion, cowardice, and heresy.

The prophets, God's preachers of old, were commanded by the Lord to proclaim God's law-word concerning all things and to correct and rebuke kings and governors. When our Lord promises His disciples that they shall be brought before governors and kings for His sake, and "for a testimony against them" (Matt. 10:18), He did not mean they were then to forswear the faith, wink at abortion and homosexuality, and be silent about the sins of the state!

There are no limits to the area of God's government, law, and sovereign sway. There can then be no limits to the areas of the church's witness, its preaching, and its commanded concern.

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APPENDIX: THE MARXIST SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE

No notes.

GENERAL INDEX

Four indices have been provided: General, History, Scripture, and Works Cited.

In this General Index, certain subjects are so heavily covered by the author that a thorough indexing of them would be unwieldy. Therefore, the indexer has focused on a limited number of issues for subjects such as *the state* and *humanism*, and has consciously omitted a main entry for *statism*. The entries for *history* and *medieval era* are also very light as a thorough treatment of relevant subjects is given in the History Index. Some names, organizations, places, and events that are included in the History Index may have been omitted from the General Index, as the entries would be more helpful in the former.

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HISTORY INDEX

The purpose of this index is to provide a timeline of the material referenced so that the reader may see how the author traced certain themes in their historical contexts. It also provides access to names, organizations, places, and events that may have been omitted from the General Index.

This index is not arranged conventionally. When groups of general entries are not sorted alphabetically, they have been sorted in a loose chronological order. These general entries precede dated entries. Dated entries are sorted chronologically, with a few exceptions. These dates are based on the indexer's research, with deference given to the dates the author gave when provided. The dates in this index are for the reader's convenience but are not to be relied upon as an infallible record.

Italic numerals indicate quotation or extensive discussion.

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